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Deregulating Telecommunications
in Internet Time
James B. Speta*

Abstract
The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996 hasyielded more litigation and less
local competition than its supporters expected or intended. Callsfor its
reform are multiplying. In this Article, ProfessorSpeta diagnosesthe 1996
Act's failings and prescribes a framework for reform. The successful
deregulations of the transportation industries and of long-distance
telecommunications (precedents the 1996 Act sought to follow)
demonstrate that the Act should have taken additionalsteps to promote
intermodal telecommunicationscompetition. Transportationderegulation
successfully prompted competition where (as in the case of airlinesand
trucking) multiple firms could compete on an intramodalbasis or where
(as in the case of railroads) the single firm was subject to intermodal
competitionfrom firms using other technologies. The 1996 Act's reliance
on the unbundling of incumbent local telephone companies' networks
reveals that its supporters thought that portions of the local wireline
networks would remain bottlenecks. The lesson, therefore,is that the 1996
Act should have taken additional steps to create the conditions for
intermodal competition.
Based on this analysis, ProfessorSpeta outlines a new communications
law that increasesthe possibilitiesforintermodalcompetition. Indeed, the
glimmers of hopefor localcompetition-cellphone substitutionand voiceover-Internet-protocol (VoIP) telephony-are intermodal competitors.
Although the 1996 Act did move in this direction and the Federal
Communications Commission is vigorous on severalfronts, more can be
done. Spectrum reform (the most significant missed opportunity in the
1996 Act) and other steps would decrease legal and economic barriersto
intermodalcompetition. The Article also addresseslocal andstate control
* Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A., 1988, J.D., 1991,
University of Michigan. Thanks to Joseph Kearney, Thomas Merrill, and Philip Weiser for
extensive comments on earlier versions and to participants in the Georgetown Law School
Colloquium on Intellectual Property and Technology Law. Henrik Haeckel provided valuable
research assistance. Comments are welcomed to j-speta@northwestem.edu.
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of telecommunications carriers, regulatory parity, universal service
reform, and government funding of research and infrastructure,and it
offers a technology-neutralregulatory scheme for VoIP. The proposed
deregulatoryagendaseeks a law capableofaccommodatingthespeed and
diversity of technologicalchange in this "Internet time."
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I. Introduction
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was both intended and expected to
usher in a new era of competition in telephony and emerging data services.
Advertised as the "most deregulatory [law] in history,"' the Act was designed to
"fundamentally restructure[] '2 local telecommunications-replacing longmonopolized markets with vigorous competition. Unfortunately, the Act has
largely failed on its own terms. Its core provisions--opening the incumbent
monopolists' networks to lease by other providers-have yielded more legal
battles than competition. Key parts of this structure have been to the Supreme
Court twice,4 and the D.C. Circuit has just reversed the FCC's third attempt to
devise rules to implement the Act's network sharing scheme, the first two
attempts having been struck down as well.5 Indeed, in recent years, the
percentage of local markets served by new carriers purchasing pieces of the
incumbents' networks has actually fallen.
And yet, despite the poor showing of the 1996 Act's unbundling regime,
there are glimmers of hope for local telecommunications competition.
Increasing numbers of young people are "cutting the cord"-relying on their
I. H.R. REP.No. 104-204, at 48 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, II.
2. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999).
3. This proposition needs qualification, of course, which I will provide (see infra notes
129-46 and accompanying text), because there is substantial competition in some local markets,
such as the large-business market. Nevertheless, there is substantial sentiment, justified in my
view, that local competition has failed to develop in many local markets with the robustness
expected in 1996.
4. See generally Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (upholding
FCC's choice of pricing methodology for unbundling rules); AT&T, 525 U.S. 366 (upholding
FCC jurisdiction to make unbundling rules under the 1996 Act but striking down central parts
of those rules).
5. See generally United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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cell phones for all of their voice needs. And, with a giddiness not seen since
before the Internet crash, cable and Internet companies-and even regulatorsare touting voice-over-Internet-protocol (VolP) services that could provide
alternative phone service for the increasing number of broadband users.
Finally, direct broadcast satellite has begun competing well against cable
television companies.
These glimmers require a reassessment and reworking of communications
law to ensure that, now, true competition can take hold. Although sixty-two
years passed between the original 1934 Communications Act and its 1996
overhaul, and only eight since, technological developments and competitive
markets now require a regulatory structure that can accommodate the rapid and
unpredictable advances of "Internet time.",6 Indeed, the 1996 Act's focus on
fostering competition through the device of unbundling the incumbent's
network seems incomplete at best.
This Article begins a reassessment of the 1996 Act and a comprehensive
prescription for a new regulatory agenda. This reassessment necessarily begins
with the precedents upon which Congress itself relied: deregulation of the
transportation industries and of long-distance. Congress thought that the 1996
Act would prompt the same, relatively quick development of competition that
followed these earlier deregulatory efforts. It is indisputable that, shortly after
deregulation of the transportation industries, those markets began to behave
much more competitively-with the benefits and detriments that usually
accompany competitive markets. And long-distance markets became more
competitive shortly following the Bell System's demise. This paper therefore
compares these previous examples of deregulation to the 1996 Act's approach
to local markets and, by so doing, identifies the piece missing from Congress's
attempt to introduce competition into local telecommunications markets. If
deregulation could produce competition in so many other markets, the 1996
Act's failure to prompt widespread local telecommunications competition
demands some explanation.
The answer, or at least a significant part of the answer, is that the most
significant prior efforts at deregulation-the elimination of traditional
6. There is no consensus on who coined the term "Internet time," but it is generally held
that Internet time (for example, Internet technologies and business methods) moves four times
as fast as real time. See MICHAEL A.CusuMANo & DAVID B.YOFFIE, COMPETING ON INTERNET
TIME: LESSONS FROM NETSCAPE AND ITS BATTLE WITH MICROSOFT 3 (1998) (describing the
explosion in the development of the Internet in the 1990s). For an example of the difficulties
the FCC faces in responding to events in Internet time, see Chairman Michael K. Powell,
Remarks Before Cellular Telecommunications Internet Association's CTIA Wireless 2001, at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2001/spmkpl0I.html (Mar. 20, 2001) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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regulation over transportation industries-shared a common presumption that
the markets had become (or always were) structurally competitive. Once
deregulated, the markets very quickly conformed to expectations and
competition developed. In the case of trucking and airlines, the consensus and
reality was that the markets were internally competitive. The elimination of
legal entry barriers and other regulatory burdens permitted multiple trucking
firms and airlines to compete freely, with the familiar results of lower prices
and increased quantity. In the case of the railroads, a similar consensus
prompted deregulation, although it was competition from other forms of
transportation-such as trucks, air carriers, and water carriers-that rendered
the market structurally competitive. In economics short-hand, the trucking and
airline markets could support adequate intramodal competition while railroads
were subject to intermodal competition. The development of competition in
long-distance telecommunications was similar: the Justice Department
prosecuted the case against the Bell System based on the conviction that
technological change made competition in long-distance markets structurally
possible.7 Other deregulatory efforts in natural gas and electricity showed a
similar consensus, albeit limited in some regards.
What was different about the 1996 Act was Congress's conviction that
local telecommunications markets likely would not be structurally
competitive-at least not for a significant period of time. Congress assumed
that certain elements of these local networks would remain bottlenecks that new
entrants would not find economical to duplicate. The 1996 Act attempted to
deal with this by creating the network-sharing provisions of the Act, which
require the incumbent local telecommunications companies to lease portions of
their networks to new local carriers.8 This was an attempt to create some
intramodal competition at the retail level of local telecommunications, even if
the underlying infrastructure remained monopolized. To say the least, no one
has been satisfied with the implementation of these provisions, as almost no
one is satisfied with the level of competition that has developed in local
telecommunications markets.
7. Whether that competition is characterized as intermodal, because MCI used wireless
long-distance technologies and AT&T used copper wires, or intramodal, because both soon
switched to fiber optic technologies, is an interesting question, but not one relevant to this
paper's project. For a discussion of the development of microwave for long-distance and its
being the basis for the government's antitrust case, see infra notes 92-94 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the industry-wide transition to fiber optics, see generally JONATHAN M.
KRAUSHAAR, FCC, FIBER DEPLOYMENT UPDATE-END OF YEAR 1998 (1999), available at

http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/Fiber/fiber98.pdf.
8. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-56 (2000) (establishing interconnectivity requirements). See
generally AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388-90 (1999); infra note 128.
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This inquiry yields more than an interesting historical comparison; it also
demonstrates what ought to be done to promote local telecommunications
now-to maximize the possibility that local competition will. take hold and
flourish. If Congress was right that new entrants into local telecommunications
markets would not duplicate the incumbents' telephone wires, then the
development of complete alternatives to those wires-that is, the development
of true intermodal competition--ought to have been recognized as the best way
to develop competition in local markets. To be sure, Congress made provision
in the 1996 Act for the possibility of some intermodal competition, by affirming
and expanding the incumbents' duties to interconnect with (many) other
telecommunications carriers. And Congress took the important step of
eliminating legal barriers to entry into all telecommunications markets, 9 which
was necessary for any intermodal competition to develop. But Congress did
nothing further to assist the development of intermodal competition. Rather, it
continued the historic, but increasingly irrelevant, regulatory divisions between
services, based on the technologies used to deliver them.
What is needed today is a clear agenda to increase intermodal (and all
other facilities-based) competition in local telecommunications markets. The
glimmer of competition in many local markets is the prospect of intermodal
competition--competition with the traditional telephone companies from
wireless, cable, and even electric companies and competition with the
traditional cable television services from satellite, wireless, and (maybe) the
telephone companies. Already a substantial number of proposals exist that
could form the core of such an agenda, and these ought to be the highest
legislative and regulatory priorities. The FCC is working on some of these
fronts, confronting both new technology and old law with admirable results.
But much of its energy is also consumed by the failed experiment with
compulsory access to local networks and by a series of legal battles foisted
upon it by new services that do not neatly fit in old regulatory categories. More
importantly, to avoid costly litigation and uncertainty, Congress should embody
many of these proposals in new legislation. In particular, Congress ought to
quickly adopt proposals that decrease the barriers to entry faced by wireless and
cable competitors. These are the main hopes for true, effective local
telecommunications competition.
This Article seeks to make the case for such a new agenda: for such
deregulation that encourages the multiple technologies of the Internet and that
is flexible enough for "Internet time." Part II provides a brief overview of
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2000) (forbidding state and local regulation that "prohibits or
has the effect of prohibiting" any entity from providing telecommunications services).
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earlier deregulatory statutes in the transportation industries, establishing the
essentials of the model just described. Because no economic impediments
existed in the underlying industry structure, legal deregulation quickly yielded
competitions, Part III extends the analysis to telecommunications, noting first
that deregulation before the 1996 Act succeeded for the same basic reason as
transportation deregulation-all agreed that the underlying markets had
competitive shape. Second, the Part contrasts the passage of the 1996 Act with
both the experience in transportation deregulation and with early
telecommunications deregulation: despite general deregulatory rhetoric,
Congress did not emphasize true facilities-based competition, nor has such
competition substantially developed in local telephone markets. Part IV details
how the unbundling regime itself has not succeeded, legally or economically,
but how intermodal competition may be on the horizon for a variety of services.
Part V provides the outlines of a comprehensive program to substantially
increase the prospects for intermodal competition in local telecommunications
services, the true hope for introducing competition. The Part details a number
of specific proposals, such as spectrum reform, and also discusses a number of
consequences that a focus on intermodal competition will have, for example, on
universal service policy. Intermodal competition also raises the challenge of
regulatory parity-ensuring that markets and not governments determine
winning technologies and services-and this Part offers a framework for
addressing parity arguments. At bottom, these individual proposals justify a
wholesale rewriting of the Communications Act, and this Part offers a rough
framework for doing so. Part VI concludes with some additional observations
on the political possibilities of wholesale legislative reform, regulatory
resources, judicial review, and codifying this "new" reform agenda.
II. The Market Structure of Deregulated TransportationMarkets
A wide consensus exists that the legal deregulation of the transportation
industries was rapidly followed by the more or less competitive provision of
these services. This "Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law"'0
began with the substantial deregulation of railroads, trucking, and airlines in the
1970s and 1980s. "Deregulation," although it differed in these industries in
many regards, had a common core, just as the regulation that preceded it was
based upon a similar model. In particular, based upon common law notions of
common carriage and the seminal Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (ICA), the
10. Joseph D. Keamey &Thomas W. Merill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323 (1998).
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transportation industries (and related industries, including telecommunications)
had long been subject to administrative agency control over entry, exit, pricing,
and other terms of service. " In general terms, deregulatory statutes eliminated
entry controls and price regulation and permitted competitive markets to
operate. Deregulatory statutes eliminated the quality of service regulation that
attempted to specify what the consumer received while maintaining basic safety
regulation.
Deregulation was generally followed by the rapid development of
competition, as evidenced principally by lower prices and higher output. This
section briefly reviews these deregulatory successes to demonstrate that the
legal deregulation was preceded by, and in large part driven by, a consensus
that the markets were structurally competitive. Because the elimination of
regulation was premised on the view that these transportation markets were
structurally competitive (or largely so), and because this presumption turned out
to be correct (or largely so), the deregulation was quickly followed by
competitive performance. 2
It is useful to divide transportation deregulation into two different
categories, with airline and trucking deregulation in a first category and railroad
deregulation in a second. Trucking and airline markets were deregulated
because a consensus emerged that these markets were internally competitivethat a significant number of trucking or air carriers could simultaneously
operate in competition with one another, mimicking classically competitive
markets. Railroad was deregulated not because of internal competition; indeed,
deregulation led to quite substantial consolidation of railroads and the
elimination of much rail route competition. But railroads faced effective
competition from trucking in most markets, so deregulation was followed by
declining prices and other indicia of competition.

II.

See generally id. at 1327-30 (providing an overview of economic regulations);

STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM (1982) (discussing the need for regulation,
possible solutions, and reform); CHARLES F. PHILLIPs, JR., THE REGuLATION OF Puuc UTuxmEs:
THEORY AND PRACTICE

10-35 (3d ed. 1993) (examining the significance and new environment

of public utilities).
12. 1do not claim to be tilling new ground with the argument that these successfully
deregulated markets were structurally competitive; indeed, that would be inconsistent with my
claim that substantial consensus recognized this fact even prior to the legislation's being passed.
I will therefore proceed to retell the story in summary fashion, principally to establish the
contrast with the 1996 Act. For more complete retellings, see, for example, Stephen G.Breyer,
Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1005 (1987)
(summarizing the risks and policy problems existing in deregulated industries); Kearney &
Merrill, supra note 10.
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A. Airline and Trucking Deregulation: Intramodal Competition
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,' 3 called by one leading
commentator "the most significant piece of legislation in the field of transport
regulation in the [previous] forty years,"' 4 began the process of deregulating the
previously highly regulated transportation industries. Prior to its passage, air
carriers were governed by the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act' 5 and its controls on
entry, exit, and rates. 16 The statute borrowed its general agency-centered
approach and many of its specific provisions from the Interstate Commerce
Act's provisions regulating railroads.' 7 But, unlike the ICA, the principal
justification for which was controlling the monopoly power of railroads, 8 the
1938 Civil Aeronautics Act was based upon the notion that competition would
be "destructive," both in the sense of failing to provide adequate service and in
the sense of providing inadequate safety to the traveling public.' 9
The deregulatory legislation largely eliminated barriers to entry,20 phased
out barriers to exit,2' phased out price regulation,22 and, in fact, calendared the
13. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
14. Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fallofthe Civil AeronauticsBoard-Opening
Wide the Floodgatesof Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 93 (1979).
15. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (codified before
repeal at 49 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1952)). For discussions of the origins of the 1938 Act, see
generally Michael E. Levine, Revisionism Revisited? Airline Deregulationand the Public
Interest, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (1981); ROGER NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION
(1971).
16. See generally SAMUEL B. RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN AIR
TRANSPORTATION 15-20 (1961) (discussing the Act and the Board which implements the Act).
17. See infra Part I.B (examining railroad deregulation). See generally Kearney &
Merrill, supra note 10, at 1335 (comparing the 1938 Act to the Interstate Commerce Act).
18. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (describing the burdens the ICA placed
on railroads).
19. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 75-686 (1937) (examining airline competition). The Senate
stated:
The air lines.. . are engaged in intensive competition with each other and with...
other carriers. This competition is being carried to an extreme which tends to
undermine the financial stability of the carriers and jeopardize the maintenance of
transportation facilities and service appropriate to the needs of commerce and
required in the public interest and the national defense.
Id. at 2. Academic commentary of the time (that is, influenced by the Great Depression), "which
mostly supported airline regulation on grounds similar to those being advanced to support the
suppression of competition elsewhere in the economy,. . . took this view into the 1960s."
Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in DeregulatedMarkets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and
Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 398 (1987).
20. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 12, 92 Stat. at 1716-18
(1978).
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demise of the regulatory agency itself.23 The consensus of academic research
finds that the Act was quickly and wildly successful in creating a more or less
competitive market in air service: prices fell, service improved (except where a
city lost service entirely), and efficiency measures climbed. One early review
concluded that the welfare gain to travelers through lower fares and increased
service exceeded six billion dollars per year;24 more recent work has concluded
that the benefits from increased competition continue, even if certain
developments (such as decreasing fuel prices and the development of more
efficient jets) have made it more difficult to determine the magnitude of the
benefits. 25 Following deregulation, almost all served routes experienced entry
by multiple carriers, and, although entry declined in the mid-1 990s following
the ValuJet crash, entry by so-called low-cost carriers continued to increase.26
Deregulation of airlines was prompted by a broad consensus-shared first
by academics and later by leading regulators and legislators-that the market
for air carriage was structurally competitive. (By structurally competitive, I
simply mean that there are no important economic barriers to multiple entry and
competition, such as economies of scale or scope or network effects.) As one
commentator put it, "by the mid-1970's it was probably fair to say that no
impartial academic observer of any standing doubted that the airline business, if
unregulated, would reach something that more or less resembled a competitive
21. Id. § 19. As in the case of railroad deregulation, carriers' ability to exit a market was
a contentious and important issue. It was contentious because the original regulatory paradigm
maintained air service to many locations that did not generate enough traffic to justify service on
purely economic criteria. In the familiar story of promoting internal cross-subsidies, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) limited entry on profitable routes and required airlines to provide
service on unprofitable routes. See Dempsey, supra note 14, at 1 1-14 (examining CAB's entry
criteria in various markets). The legislation therefore required service for ten years following
enactment to every market receiving service on the date of its passage. Nevertheless, after the
period ended, many cities lost commercial air service, and virtually no city that was not
previously served gained service. For evidence that some optimism exists that the development
of smaller but more efficient jets could increase service to small or medium communities, see
TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN THE

U.S.

AIRLINE INDUSTRY 155-58

(1999), but no such developments have yet occurred.
22. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 31.
23. The 1978 Act required the CAB to prepare a report in 1984 describing the effects of
deregulation, 49 U.S.C. § 1551(c), (d)(Supp. 1981), but it scheduled the CAB to terminate,
with its residual functions being passed to the Department of Transportation, in 1985. Id.
§ 1551.
o
24. See STEVEN MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE
DEREGULATION 1-2 (1986) (analyzing the impact of deregulation).
25, See, e.g., TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supra note 21, at 61-63 (summarizing collected
studies).
26. See id. at 40-42 (analyzing trends in market entry activity).
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equilibrium. ''2 7 This academic consensus was able to point to several
significant pieces of evidence in the real world, most importantly the much
lower prices and more frequent service prevailing on intrastate routes in
California and Texas where state regulation permitted free entry.28
Additionally, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the air market became the
principal example used by the new economics of market "contestability" to
show that (under certain conditions argued to prevail in airline markets) even a
carrier that had a natural monopoly over a market would price its service close
to its cost. In other words, this argument suggested that even if a route was
served by only a single carrier, that carrier was likely to price at cost and not at
a monopoly level.29
27.

Levine, supra note 19, at 394.

28.

See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 14, at 116 (concluding that travelers accepted more

crowded aircraft if prices were lower); Michael E. Levine, Note, Is Regulation Necessary?
CaliforniaAir Transportationand NationalRegulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416, 1430-43

(1965) (analyzing California data). Other evidence included the success of air charter service,
which provided much lower fares and proved that the traveling public would tolerate morecrowded planes in exchange for lower fares, until the CAB killed the market. See Levine, supra
note 19, at 402 (noting CAB's elimination of the threatening non-scheduled carriers).
29. On the theory of contestable markets generally, see WILuAM J. BAUMOL ET AL.,
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); John C. Panzar &
Robert D. Willig, Free Entry and the Sustainabilityof NaturalMonopoly, 8 BELL J. ECON. I
(1977). On the application to the airline industry, see ELIZABETH E. BAILEY ET AL.,
DEREGULATING THE AIRLrNEs 153-72 (1985); Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Panzar, The
ContestabilityofAirline Markets Duringthe Transitionto Deregulation,44 LAW & CONTEMP.

125 (1981).
The essential argument is this: Where market participants can enter and exit costlessly at
efficient scale, even a natural monopolist will price at cost because any attempt to price above
cost will invite entry at an undercutting price that would take the entire niarket. Two summaries
of the theory, reasonably accessible to lawyers, are Michael Spence, ContestableMarketsand
the Theory of Industry Structure: A Review Article, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 981 (1983), and
PROBS.

Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulationand the Theoryof ContestableMarkets,
I YALE J.ON REG. I II (1984).

With respect to airline markets, the essential intuition can be seen in a grossly simplified
example. Imagine a route (say Peoria to Chicago) on which demand is such that only a single
airline will serve the route, for example because 125 people a day wish to fly from Peoria to
Chicago, and the most efficient way to serve that demand is by a single 125-seat aircraft. That
is, flying any bigger plane is more costly, as is flying multiple flights of smaller planes. This is
the definition of a natural monopoly market. See WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY. OF
NATURAL MONOPOLY 19 (1982) (determining that where market demand is most efficiently
served by a single carrier, natural monopoly obtains). If entry and exit from a market are
costless, however, the single carrier serving the market cannot price above its cost, or another
carrier will enter the market and undercut it. Entry and exit were hypothesized to be relatively
costless in airline markets because other airlines had many planes on multiple routes and could
divert a plane into a market in which the incumbent was charging above-cost fares and then
withdraw from the market and put the plane to another use. See generally Bailey & Baumol,
supra;Bailey & Panzar, supra.
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Regulators, most famously Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) Chairman
Alfred Kahn (an economist), and legislators soon adopted this academic
consensus and explicitly referred to it in the proceedings leading to the 1978
Act. The famous "Kennedy hearings" in 1975 were scripted to build to the
conclusion that air carriers should be deregulated and included testimony from
a number of academics. 30 And the committee reports as well as the floor
testimony on the 1978 Act repeatedly referred to the consensus that airline
markets were structurally competitive. 3'
The deregulation of trucking presents a case similar to that of airlines.
Indeed, although the Motor Carrier Act of 193532 adopted "utility-type
regulation," few argued even then that the industry had any characteristics of
natural monopoly. 33 Rather, industry stabilization, as well as the need to

protect railroads from emergent competition, provided the bases for expanding
the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) jurisdiction to.include motor
carriers.34 Between 1935 and the mid-1970s, the ICC followed these two
purposes and largely forbade any entry into interstate trucking. "By protecting
carriers from new competition and by keeping rates at a level where profits
30. See generally SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
(1976). For a description of the Kennedy hearings, see BREYER, supra note 11, at 321-39.
3 I. The most forceful statements in 1978 came from Senator Kennedy, even though he
was not the manager of the bill.
In my 16 years in the Senate, I have seldom come across a national economic
problem of such apparent complexity and political sensitivity that has been studied
by so many independent and diverse sources, yet prompted sets of
recommendations that are so similar. Virtually every independent study undertaken
in the last 20 years has concluded that less regulation is the appropriate policy ...
[T]he message has always been the same: namely, it is time to revitalize the airline
industry with competition.

H.R.

COMM. ON PUB. WORKS & TRANSP., 96TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978, at 971 (Comm. Print 1979); see also Air Service Improvement Act

of 1978, H.R.REP. No. 95-121 1, at 2-3 (discussing favorable experience of low-fare carriers
permitted unrestricted entry in Texas and California).
32. Act of Aug. 9, 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543. For general descriptions of the 1935 Act
and its purposes, see, for example, Warren G. Magnuson, The Motor CarrierAct of 1935: A
Legislator Looks at the Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 37 (1962); William E. Thorns, Rollin'
on... to a Free Market: Motor CarrierRegulation 1935-1980, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 43 (1983);
Note, FederalRegulation ofTrucking: The EmergingCritique,63 COLUM. L. REv. 460,461501 (1963).
33. See Thorns, supra note 32, at 47-50 (explaining the arguments for regulation).
34. See, e.g., id. at 50 (describing why the ICC's jurisdiction was expanded); Paul
Stephen Dempsey, Entry ControlUnder the InterstateCommerce Act: A ComparativeAnalysis
ofthe Statutory CriteriaGoverningEntry in Transportation, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729,
730-40 (1977).
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the ICC helped assure the emergence of a trucking
were guaranteed,
35
oligopoly.

Although the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 did not do away with the
regulator, it did eliminate entry and exit restrictions and rate regulation.36 And,
again, significant academic commentary had argued that trucking involved no
economies of scale or scope and few network effects-in other words, that
37
multiple firms could readily compete against one another to provide service.
"By 1970, many commentators had remarked upon the inappropriateness of a
utility model of regulation for a possibly competitive industry. Trucking just
did not seem to have many of the characteristics of natural monopoly. 3 8 As
was the case with airlines, the economists had several unregulated industry
segments-including contract carriage, private carriage, agricultural
commodities, and various Canadian provinces--that provided evidence that the
market could be competitive.39
Deregulation of the trucking industry quickly resulted in more competitive
service. Most commentary has concluded that the decrease in prices reflected
new competition and not merely a shift from nonprice to price competition.4 °
Indeed, a comprehensive survey of the economic literature in 1992 concluded
of service
that consumers received significantly lower prices, a wider variety
41
offerings, and a wider variety of companies engaged in trucking.
35. Thorns, supra note 32, at 58.
36. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Congressional Intent and Agency Discretion-Never the
Twain Shall Meet: The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1, 3-10 (1981)
(discussing traditional entry criteria from 1935 to 1977); Donald V. Harper, Entry Control and
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 12 TRANSP. L.X 51, 56-62 (1980) (examining entry control
restrictions on common carriers). It did not, curiously, eliminate tariff-filing.
37. See generally Dudley F. Pegrum, The Economic Basis of Public Policyfor Motor
Transport, 28 LAND ECON. 244 (1952); James Sloss, Regulation of Motor Freight
Transportation: A Quantitative Evaluation of Policy, I BELL J.ECON. & MGMT. SCl. 327
(1970); Joseph L. Steinfeld, Jr., Regulation Versus Free Competition-The Current Battle Over
Deregulation ofEntry into the Motor Carrier Industry, 45 ICC PRAC. J. 590 (1978).
38. Thorns, supra note 32, at 68; see also Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of
Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS 1, 18 (Marten Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1989) (noting academic
consensus on the benefits of deregulation).
39. See Sloss, supra note 37, at 330-35 (using Canadian provinces as an example);
Thorns, supra note 32, at 61,66-68 (discussing exemptions from Motor Carrier Act generally).
40. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose, The Incidence ofRegulatory Rents in the Motor Carrier
Industry, 16 RAND J. ECON. 299, 314 (1985) ("Share price data indicate that regulatory reforms
significantly reduced the expected future profits of firms in the motor carrier industry. The
results are consistent with the presence of monopoly profits for trucking firms in the pre-1978
regulatory environment.").
41. See JOHN RICHARD FELTON & DALE G. ANDERSON, REGULATION AND DEREGULATION OF
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Three caveats are in order here, half way through the historical review of
deregulation, lest the reader accuse me of telling an overly ambitious "Just So
Story." First, there were, of course, causes for the deregulation of airlines and
trucking other than the academic consensus that regulation was unnecessary in
these markets-including the arguments that entry barriers in trucking were
hurting minorities 42 and that decreasing transportation prices would help fight
the severe inflation of the times. 43 The political and economic history of the
deregulatory statutes is complex, and many works have examined them in
greater depth. 44 A few more ambitious works have attempted a synthesis of the
deregulatory movement of the past thirty years. 45 The discussion both here and
in the next subpart is designed only to show that, in cases where deregulation
succeeded, there was reason to think that the markets were structurally
competitive.
Second, the debate over the benefits of deregulation is not entirely onesided, with some significant minority commentary continuing to question its
benefits and to assert the need for new regulation.46 My agenda here is not to
THE MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY

155-59 (1989) (evaluating the benefits of deregulation). See

generally Office of Economics, ICC, The U.S. Motor CarrierIndustry Long After Deregulation
(1992).
•42. See Thoms, supranote 32, at 68 ("Minority truckers felt left out of a system where all of
the goodies were divided up in 1935.").
43. See, e.g., Harold T. Johnson, Introduction to LEGiSLATtvE HISTORY OF THE AIRLN
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978, supra note 3 1, at v ("This type of legislation can be a powerful
weapon in the fight against inflation."); Thorns, supra note 32, at 70 (examining inflation during
the 1970s). Thorns writes:
Beginning with the Ford administration and continuing through the Carter regime,
inflation became the principal concern ofthe American political economy. Increased
competition was considered to be a weapon to use against the inflationary forces
surrounding us. Regulated industries, because of their controlled oligopolistic
position, could pass on increased costs of equipment, fuel and labor by going to the
appropriate regulatory agency and gaining permission to increase rates.
Id.
44. See generally BREYER, supra note II; Keamey & Merrill, supra note 10; Noll, supra
note 15; infra notes 71-89. My caveat, supra note 12, also notes the scope of this project.
45. In my view, the best is Keamey & Merrill, supra note 10; others include BREYER, supra
note Hi; MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLrrTcs OF DEREGULATION (1985) (concluding
that elite opinion favoring deregulation and implementation of the ideas of competition by an
agency prior to legislation were the principal drivers of statutory change); Richard D. Cudahy,
Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRV. Am. L. 155 (2001)
(examining deregulation and the California energy crisis).
46. See generally MICHAEL H. BpzER, SWEATSHOPS ON WHEELS: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN
TRUCKING DEREGULATION (2000); Mark N. Cooper, Freeing Public Policy from the
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debate the merits and demerits of competition.47 Rather, my essential claim is
that these industries, when deregulated, began to behave as competitive
industries. Indeed, most of the criticism of the deregulatory statutes is actually
criticism of the results of competition-that safety is inadequately provided for,
that wages fall, and that service to small markets disappears.4 I acknowledge
significant economic and noneconomic reasons to regulate away from the result
that purely unfettered competition might provide, though I would prefer to
utilize direct safety regulation and explicit government subsidies to reach most
of those results. (I return to this issue in the context of universal service
policies for telecommunications later in the paper.49 )
Third, I do not wish to portray any of these markets as mirrors of the
perfectly competitive markets described in microeconomics texts.
Imperfections remain, most notably in air carriage due to the (largely
unforeseen) development of hub and spoke systems and the related scarcity of
gate and runway slots. 50 But the consensus evidence is that deregulation was
followed by significant gains to competition.
B. RailroadDeregulation: Intermodal Competition
Railroads present a different case, for deregulation occurred
simultaneously with a consolidation of the industry that left many major routes
with only one rail carrier. With railroads, the consensus was not that
railroading itself was competitive, but that competition from other forms of
transportation largely controlled any market power that the remaining railroads
could exercise. Indeed, such was the competition from other modes of
DeregulationDebate: The Airline Industry Comes ofAge (andShould Be Accountablefor Its
Anticompetitive Behavior), 13 AIR & SPACE LAW., Spring 1999, at 1; Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation& Reregulation: The Paradoxof Market Failure,24
TRANSP. L.J. 73 (1996).
47. My view, recorded elsewhere, is that this sort of extensive economic regulation is
justified only in very narrow circumstances. See generallyJames B. Speta, A Vision ofInternet
Openness by Government Fiat,96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1553 (2002) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG,
ThE FuTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001)).
48. See, e.g., BELZER, supra note 46, at 175-92 (discussing the benefits and harms of
economic competition).
49. See infra notes 397-413 and accompanying text (asserting a need for a universal
service policy).
50. See TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supra note 21, at 65-67 (explaining the spread of hub
and spoke systems); Cooper, supra note 46, at 23-25 (examining the effect of a hub and spoke
network on regulatory concerns). See generally Daniel R. Polsby, Airport PricingofAircraft
Takeoff and Landing Slots: An Economic Critique of FederalRegulatory Policy, 89 CAL. L.
REv. 779 (2001).
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transportation that two leading commentators have quipped: "The railroad
industry is perhaps the only U.S. industry that has been, or ever will be,
deregulated because of its poor financial performance under regulation."' But
it is clear that the government-financed bailout of Penn Central, together with
the prospect of further railroad bankruptcies, created the impetus for
government to2 do something to help railroads, and that "something" was
deregulation.
The Interstate Commerce Act's model of extensive economic regulation
has already been described.53 By the 1970s, the principal feature of that
regulation that hurt the railroads was the restriction on exit. Under the ICA, a
railroad could neither discontinue nor abandon service on a particular route
without ICC approval,5 4 and such approval was rarely granted. Thus, "a large
fraction of the nation's rail service was provided at an economic loss, with
returns on investment for most major railroads falling below the returns of other
U.S. nonfinancial corporations."05 To address this problem, the various statutes
deregulating rail carriers,56 and in particular the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 57

51. Curtis Grimm & Clifford Winston, Competition in the Deregulated Railroad Industry:
Sources, Effects, and Policy Issues, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDusTRIES: WHAT'S NEXT?
41,41 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000).
52. See id. at 42 (evaluating railroad deregulation); see also William E. Thoms, Clear
Track for Deregulation: American Railroads, 1970-1980, 12 TRANsp. L.J. 183, 212 (1982)
(discussing the motive behind passing the Staggers Act). Thorns states:
The main concern for Congress in passing the Staggers Act was the financial
condition of the railroads. This Congress was faced with the spectre of more
bankruptcies.... But this time Congress faced an electorate worried about
government spending. The idea of paying for another Conrail, much less buying up
independent, solvent lines was too vexing.
Id.
53. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text (describing subsequent legislation's
reliance on the ICA).
54. See Dempsey, supra note 34, at 732-34 (describing § 1(18) of the ICA).
55. Grimm& Winston, supra note 51, at 41; see also Richard C. Levin, Railroad Rates,
Profitability, and Welfare Under Deregulation, 12 BELL J. ECON. 1,3 (1981) ("attempt[ing] to
predict the impact of rate flexibility on... the rail industry"). See generally THEODORE E.
KEELER, RAILROADS, FREIGHT, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1983).
56. For a summary of the progression of these statutes, which include most significantly
the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (easing rail carrier exit from passenger carriage and
creating Amtrak), the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (the 3R Act) (creating Conrail
as the successor to the bankrupt Penn Central system and easing route exit for Conrail), the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the 4R Act) (easing rate regulation
generally), and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, see generally FRANK J. DOOLEY & WILLIAM E.
THOMS, RAILROAD LAW A DECADE AFTER DEREGULATION 1-13 (1994).
57. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
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intended to assist the financial situation of the railroads by permitting
consolidation and streamlining the railroads' exit from unprofitable routes. 58
Indeed, by contrast to airline and trucking deregulation, which were
premised on the notion that these separate markets were internally competitive,
no one expected that deregulation would lead to entry of new railroads.
Everyone--on all sides of the deregulation debate-expected that it would
cause more consolidation in rail service, with more routes being served by only
one railroad, and substantial abandonment of rail routes.5 9 These results were
consistent with a competitive market because of the intermodal pressures to
which railroads were subject. Somewhat ironically, the prior deregulation of air
and trucking had put significant pressure on railroads, for, although unit costs
for rail transportation were probably lower than those for air6 or trucking, the
deregulated carriers were able to undercut rail significantly. 0
Congress recognized these competitive pressures61 and the academic work
that had long argued that competition from other types of carriers would
constrain the railroads' ability to price above cost. 62 And, although the
examples were fewer than in air and trucking, a few earlier ICC actions that
decreased constraints on railroads nevertheless provided some evidence that
wholesale deregulation might improve performance and would not hurt
consumers. 63 The Staggers Act did not eliminate the regulator (that came in the
58. See Rodney D. Peterson, Entry and Exit: An EconomicAnalysis of StatutoryChanges
in Rail Carrier Entry and Exit, 13 TRANsP. L.J. 189, 210-20 (1984) (analyzing three major
railroad deregulation acts). The Staggers Act also assisted entry, most significantly by requiring
railroads to share trackage. Id. at 218.
59. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No.96-1035, at 44, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3989
("Restructuring would involve a consolidation and reduction of duplicate tracks and facilities,
discontinuance of uneconomic service, rationalization of routes and terminal facilities, and
improvement in operating efficiencies."); Christopher A. Vellturo et al., Deregulation, Mergers,
and Cost Savings in Class I U.S. Railroads 1974-1986, 1 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 339,
341-47 (1992) (summarizing fifteen years of railroad mergers).
60. See Peterson, supra note 58, at 217 ("Results of both statutes caused further
difficulties for railroads. Congress, by its partial deregulation ofair and motor carriers, fostered
additional entry, lower rates and fares.").
6 I. For example, the House Report repeatedly noted that the poor financial condition of
the railroads was due to competition from trucking and water carriers (barges) and noted that
"[b]oth motor carrier and water carrier competition have continued to take intercity
transportation business away from the railroads. Today, the once dominant railroad industry
accounts for but 36 percent of the inter-city ton miles of freight. In 1947 railroads had twice the
market share." H.R. REP. No. 96-1035, at 35, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3980.
62. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1035, at 35-40, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978,3980-85
(discussing the history of freight rates).
63. See, e.g., Thoms, supra note 52, at 210 ("A definite philosophy change ranged at the
ICC during the 1970s. With the Ford and Carter administrations enthusiasts for deregulation,
and with air deregulation approaching, the ICC began to change its attitude. The Commission
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1990s 64) nor did it eliminate all economic regulation. The Act retained rate
control in markets, such as coal, in which shippers were thought to be captive
to the railroads, 6 but it did increase the railroads' flexibility to raise rates.6
Even in its retention of regulation for these markets, however, the legislation
recognized intermodal competition as the appropriate measure of the railroads'
market power. 67
All in all, railroad deregulation is considered to have resulted in a more
competitive transportation market, notwithstanding the rail consolidation and
route abandonment. For some years, there was a dispute about whether the fall
in real rates was due to deregulation," but later work showed that, after 1980,
rates became more sensitive to the elasticity of demand for rail service and that
deregulation was responsible for this result.6 9
has applied in motor carrier cases a less protectionist policy, and this began to occur with
railroads as well.").
64. See generally ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
65. The House Report stated that the new statute "provides the Commission with
jurisdiction to determine rate reasonableness only when there is not effective competition."
H.R. REP. No. 96-1035, at 33, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3978.
66. See Thorns, supra note 52, at 213m-15 (analyzing decreased rate regulation).
67. See 49 U.S.C. § 10701 (2000) (conditioning rate regulation on a finding of
dominance); id. § 10707(a) (defining dominance with respect to competition from other
railroads and from other modes of transportation); see also H.R. REP. No. 96-1035, at 39,
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3984 (discussing the impact of competition). The
committee stated:
The test of a transportation alternative is a sound one. If a shipper can rely on a
transportation alternative, which could include another railroad, abarge, or a truck,
at a transportation cost which is not substantially greater than the rail transportation
cost, then competition is present. Competition will serve to hold down rates, and
the railroad would not have market power.
Id.
68. Compare Kenneth D. Boyer, The Costs ofPrice Regulation: Lessons from Railroad
Deregulation, 18 RAND J.ECON. 408, 411 (1987) (concluding that deregulation raised overall
prices), with C. Bamekov & A. N.Kleit, The Efficiency Effects ofRailroad Deregulation in the
United States, 17 INT'L J.TRANSP. ECON. 21 (1990) (concluding that deregulation caused a
relative price decline).
69. See CLIFFORD WINSTON ET AL., THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SURFACE FREIGHT
DEREGULATION

13 (1990) ("Deregulation appears to have changed both carrier and shipper

behavior as policymakers intended. Carriers have taken significant steps to improve the
efficiency of their operations and to set rates that are more responsive to competitive market
conditions."); Wesley W. Wilson, Market-Specifc Effects of Rail Deregulation, 42 J. INDUS.
ECON. 1, 20 (1994) ("[Wlhile differences exist across commodities (especially in the early
periods of deregulation), the effect of deregulation on prices has generally been to lower them.
With price decreases and cost savings from deregulation, welfare gains from deregulation are
likely positive.").
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It is ,probablygilding the lily to go on further, but the same point could be
made with respect to deregulation of natural gas pipelines, wholesale electricity
transmission', and a variety of other markets. Deregulation succeeded because
none was needed-intra- or intermodal competition became possible and lifting
regulatory barriers opened the market.70
III. TelecommunicationsDeregulation: Computer I Through the 1996 Act
By contrast to the legislative action that deregulated the transportation
industries in the 1970s and 1980s, those decades saw only limited deregulatory
steps in telecommunications. These limited steps were taken either by the
regulators or the antitrust enforcers without significant involvement of (indeed,
with some resistance from) Congress. These moves in telecommunications, of
course, were not taken in a vacuum, for the FCC and the antitrust division were
influenced by the general change in thinking that favored deregulation and
markets. Importantly, this "new" thinking affected not only these two executive
institutions, but also the courts that reviewed the FCC's decisions and that
prodded the agency toward competition on several important occasions. 7'
Given that the original Communications Act drew largely upon the Interstate
Commerce Act for its regulatory principles, 72 telecommunications law had long
looked to transportation law. Many in the communications sector were now
influenced by deregulation in transportation.7 3
70. See, e.g., TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN Er AL, A SHOCK TO THE SYsTEM: RESTRUCTuING
AMERICA'S ELECTRICrIY INDUSTRY 61-63 (1996) (discussing Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
orders opening long-distance transmission markets); PAULW. MACAvoY,THENATURALGAMARKEr
10 (2000) ("[W]ith technical limits on pipe size, at approximately thirty-six inches in diameter, and
demands growing to levels that allowed multiple companies, each with lines ofthat diameter, to serve a
metropolitan region, entry and overlap of carriers grew widespread.").
71. See, e.g., Keamey & Merrill, supranote 10, at 1370 ("Therecan benoquestion thatin some
industries the courts have pried open doors to competition that legislators or regulators preferred to

keep shut .... This has been especially true in... telecommunications."); Clifford Winston, Economic
LrrERATURE 1263, 1264-66
(1993) ("[C]ongressional action was not the sole source ofthe deregulation movement and, infact, was
Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, 31 . ECON.

often the last step in the process."); Thomas S. Ulen, Book Review, 17 INT'L REv. L. &ECoN. 293,295

(1997) ("[M]ore typically, Congress keeps its distance from the regulators and allows the cowls to hold
the agencies accountable."). See generallyGUnter Knieps & Pablo T. Spiller, Regulatingby Partial
Deregulation: The Case of Telecommunications, 35 ADMIN. L. REv. 391 (1983).
72. See generallyGlen 0. Robinson, Title I: The FederalCommunicationsAct: An Essay on
Originsand RegulatoryPurpose,in ALEGISLATwE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934,

at 3 (Max D. Paglin ed. 1989).
73.

See PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN PRICES AND POLITICS
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The FCC's deregulatory actions during this time and the antitrust
breakup of the Bell System provided examples of competition in
telecommunications markets (or in closely related markets, such as for
telecommunications equipment), and these examples were additional
precedents for the 1996 Act's focus on introducing competition for local
markets. In this Part, I first briefly review these telecommunications
precedents to show again that the successes came where there was strong
reason to believe that the markets were structurally competitive. Indeed,
the FCC's deregulation of computer and customer equipment markets, for
example, was based upon findings that the markets were internally
competitive (intramodal), while the impetus for the long-distance portion of
the government's case against AT&T was the development of a technology
that promised intermodal competition.
Cable television provides a useful contrast to administrative attempts
at deregulation in telephony, confirming the importance of intermodal
competition and of using regulation where necessary to eliminate other
barriers to entry. In 1992, Congress provided that states and municipalities
could no longer grant exclusive franchises to cable operators. But, despite
the lifting of that legal barrier, very little competition developed in cable
markets until recently. In only a few areas did new cable companies install
wires to provide intramodal competition. The more significant competition
today is intermodal-from direct broadcast satellite (DBS). Even this
intermodal competition, however, was possible only with regulation that
affirmatively enabled DBS to offer a truly competitive multi-channel video
product. Subpart B briefly reviews these episodes of cable competition.
In the final subpart of this Part, I look at the 1996 Act as a historic
matter to show that both the economists and the legislators had significant
doubt that the local telephone markets were structurally competitive.
Everyone was hopeful that new telephone companies would enter to
compete with incumbent local carriers, and some legislative leaders did
tout the possibility that wireless or satellite or cable companies would
provide this competition. But doubts about the viability of local
competition were prominent, and these doubts explain both the Act's
reliance on provisions "unbundling" elements of the incumbent carriers'
networks and the Act's more limited steps to provide a framework for
intermodal competition.

129, 344-45 (1987) (discussing the influence of deregulation on telecommunications).
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A. The Pre-1996 Act Precedents
During the 1970s, prodded by the courts, the FCC took several steps that
introduced competition to formerly monopolized telecommunications networks.
The most significant deregulation came when the FCC used its authority to
essentially define certain services out of the common carrier title of the
Communications Act and therefore out of the agency's economic regulation.
The FCC also began the process of liberalizing entry into long-distance
markets, which was completed by the AT&T Consent Decree that settled the
government's antitrust case against the Bell System.
1. Redefining the Network
In the 1970s, the FCC faced a variety of challenges brought about by the
development of the computer and the integration of computer and
telecommunications services. In response, the Commission began the famous
Computer Inquiries,which resulted in two significant decisions concerning the
scope of regulation under the Communications Act. 74 First, the agency held
that computer processing services that employed telecommunications services
would be considered "enhanced services" and not common carrier
communications services. These services would therefore be outside of the
traditional regulatory structure provided by Title II of the Communications
Act.7" Second, the Commission held that consumer premises equipment (CPE),
such as telephones, fax machines, and other devices that hooked up to the
telephone network, was also outside of the Act. 76 Each of these decisions 77 was
based upon an explicit finding that the respective markets could be
competitively supplied-that, apart from the power of the telecommunications
company to control the market by limiting its provision of communications
74. The story of the Computer Inquiries is comprehensively reviewed in Robert Cannon,
The Legacy of the FederalCommunicationsCommission'sComputerInquiries,55 FED. COMM.
L.J. 167 (2003), and in James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet
Interconnection, 54 FED. CoMM. L.J. 225 (2002).
75. See Amendment of section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Final
Decision, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, f 16-26 (1980) [hereinafter FinalDecision) (determining issues
related to data processing).
76. See id. 144 (discussing the demand for various CPE products).
77. The FCC's decision to deregulate customer premises equipment was prompted by a
series of court decisions questioning AT&T tariffs (approved by the FCC) that sought to prevent
customers from using any but the carrier's own equipment. For this history, see, for example,
Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward,7 YALE J. ON REG.
325,327 (1990).
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services, computer services and customer premises equipment could be
provided by multiple companies in competition with one another. 78, And each
of these decisions spawned serious competition-with lower prices and
increased diversity of service offerings to consumers. 79 In subsequent years,
both before and after the 1996 Act, the FCC continued to use the.device of
redefining the services subject to common carrier regulation, when it could find
that these adjunct markets were competitive.80
There can be little doubt that the FCC's definitional moves followed from
its conviction that these services could be competitively provided and therefore
should not be regulated, rather than from some pure interpretive exercise that
simply happened to provide the happy result that these competitive services
would not be subject to regulation. 8' Although many computer-based services
were "new," CPE and customer-premises wiring had long been considered
common carrier services that were subject to economic regulation.8 2 Moreover,
had it chosen to do so, the FCC had ample precedents to draw upon which
would have placed the new computer-based services inside its jurisdiction. The
ICC had long regulated terminals, docks, freight forwarders, and other
"adjuncts" to railroad shipping. 3 The FCC could have similarly held that retail
78. See Final Decision, supra note 75, 109 ("There are literally thousands of
unregulated computer service venders offering competing services connected to the interstate
telecommunications network.... [W]e have concluded that the enhanced services market is
competitive. By removing this barrier the entire market for enhanced services should be even
more competitive."). The decision stated:
The competitive potential of terminal equipment markets isreflected in the fact that
there are hundreds of manufacturers and suppliers of modems, terminals, storage
devices, front end processors, large and small central processing units,
multiplexers, concentrators, and virtually innumerable related devices. While some
segments of the CPE market may be more competitive than others, we have been
given no evidence that, given certain modifications in the markets, any segment is
inherently less competitive than another.
143.
79. See Cannon, supra note 74, at 175 (noting the FCC's concerns about the pure
communications market's potential to become a monopoly).
Id.

80. See James B. Speta, MaintainingCompetition in Information Platforms: Vertical
Restrictions in Emerging TelecommunicationsMarkets, I J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 185,

198-99 (2002) (discussing the FCC's decisions to take inside wiring and payphones out of the
Act); see also 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2000) (establishing an independent regulatory system for
commercial mobile services, based upon competition).
81. See Cannon, supra note 74, at 176-77 ("The Computer Inquiries policy had as its
explicit goal the promotion of economic growth and innovation in the computer services
market.").
82. Id. at 177.
83. See Jurgen Basedow, Common Carriers: Continuity and Disintegration in U.S.
TransportationLaw, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 1,21 (1983) ("The [1906] Hepburn Act widened the range
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computer services which depended on telecommunications services were
themselves: a new form of telecommunications service subject to regulation.
The FCC's decision to invent the new regulatory category of enhanced services
to exempt these from full economic regulation-for all of the economic benefit
and regulatory confusion that choice has caused-was a policy choice for
competition.
And, by all accounts, competition successfully followed
deregulation in customer premises equipment and enhanced computer
services.84
As the FCC was deciding that the common carrier companies (read:
the Bell System) could not control the provision of all services and
equipment related to the network, the courts were also prodding it to allow
entry into even traditional communications services. In the so-called
Execunet decisions, in particular, the courts pushed the Commission to
justify its protection of the Bell System from competitive entry.85 At issue
was MCI's attempt to provide regular long-distance services by combining
certain retail services it purchased from AT&T with its own long-distance
networks.8 6 The FCC was undoubtedly correct when it held that MCI's
operating permits had been issued solely with the idea that it would provide
private-network services to large business customers.87 And the FCC was

of regulated activities performed by these carriers by extending the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission ... to terminal facilities, freight depots, and all services connected with
receipt, delivery, transfer, or storage of goods.").
84. See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and "Telecommunications Services,"
Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam ofthe Regulatory System,
16 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 222 (1999) ("That approach was wildly successful in spurring
innovation and competition in the enhanced-services marketplace.").
85. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter
Execunet.l]; MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The story of the
Execunet decisions, including MCI's entry into regular retail long-distance service without
explicit FCC approval, the FCC's resistance thereto, and the D.C. Circuit's insistence that
MCI's authority be broadly construed (or the FCC explicitly justify AT&T's monopoly), is
retold in Glen 0. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered. AT&T and the Changing World of
Telecommunications, 5 YALE J.ON REG. 517, 523-27 (1988).
86. See Execunet 1, 561 F.2d at 367-68 (describing the cause of the Execunet litigation).
87. See id. at 368-70 (recounting the Commission's proceedings and findings). Glen
Robinson (an FCC Commissioner during some of the relevant years) denies that the FCC had
any particular intent as to the scope of MCI's services when it licensed MCI. See Robinson,
supra note 85, at 523-24 (speculating about the FCC's motives). Robinson stated:
If God knew what the FCC meant in 1971, He didn't say; neither did the FCC. It
seems that what the FCC originally had in mind was specialized services tailored to
distinctive service needs of particular customers, as opposed to the homogenized
services provided by MTS and WATS .... But this was never precisely stated in
the FCC's decision.
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also correct that its Communications Act precedents did not contemplate
competition in such services. But after MCI demonstrated that it was
technically feasible, the courts forced the agency to supply a reason-and,
importantly, a reason grounded in economics-that MCI should not then
have been permitted to provide these services. 88
This was the beginning of the end of AT&T's service monopoly.
Nothing in the 1934 Act had changed, of course, and the courts would have
been hard-pressed under traditional administrative law doctrines to reverse
an FCC that adopted a vigorous and consistent defense of market
protectionism. But the courts' prodding was enough to cause the FCC, in
partial touch with the times, to begin to change its course.8 9
2. The Bell Breakup
These precedents partially inspired Assistant Attorney General
William Baxter's prosecution of the antitrust case against the integrated
Bell System. 90 Indeed, the explicit theory presented by the government
throughout the litigation was that "new technology [had] introduced new
competitive opportunities into telecommunications markets,"9 1 particularly
the long-distance and manufacturing markets. Thus, the government
Id. On this point, compare

PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
§ 2.3.3.2 (2d ed. 1999) (disagreeing with Robinson). Huber stated:
MCI rushed to move far beyond private lines to a full-fledged, switched-access
long-distance service available to all. This was not what the FCC had in mind
when it licensed MCI in 1969 or when it issued its Specialized Common Carriers
decision in 1971, but it was what the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit desired
in 1977, as it indicated in its imaginative Execunet I ruling.

Id.

88. See Execunet 1,561 F.2d at 379-80 (questioning whether AT&T should be granted a
de jure monopoly).
89. See, e.g., Keamey & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1374 (summarizing the court's
prompting of the FCC to change course); Knieps & Spiller, supra note 71, at 399, 412
(analyzing the impact of partial deregulation).
90. Although the case was filed in 1976, before Baxter came to the antitrust division, it
did not move significantly forward until it was transferred to Judge Greene, and Baxter was then
the lead prosecutor. See Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the
Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50

HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1407-09 (1999) (discussing role ofJudge Greene inmoving case forward);
Richard A. Posner, Introduction to Baxter Symposium, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1007, 1009 (1999)
(discussing importance of Baxter in prosecution).
91. United States v. Western Elec. Co. & AT&T; Competitive Impact Statement in
Connection with Proposed Modification of Final Judgment, 47 Fed. Reg. 7170, 7172 (1982).
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alleged that these markets were structurally competitive and that only
AT&T's "actions, based on its control over the local exchange monopolies,
unreasonably imped[ed] competition that technological developments
increasingly made possible. 9 2 In long-distance, the well-known story is
that the new microwave transmission technology did not exhibit the same
severe economies of scale that traditional in-ground copper trunks
suffered. 93 The conclusion, drawn by many economists as well as MCI and
the government, was that long-distance was competitive.94 (The same
conclusion did not apply to local service, both because microwave was a
point-to-point service and because
local traffic volume was too low to
95
support multiple providers.)
The Bell breakup decree was not, of course, deregulation in the sense that
it eliminated any legal barriers to entry or changed the amount of legal
regulation to which long-distance service was subject. Long-distance carriers
were still required to receive certificates of operating authority from the FCC
and state regulators, 96 and the requirements of just, reasonable, and
92.

In its Competitive Impact Statement, filed in connection with the Consent Decree's

approval process, the Department summarized its positions:
At the time of the 1956 Judgment and thereafter, new technology was developing
that introduced new competitive opportunities into telecommunications markets. As
a result of research conducted in World War II and increased demand for
telecommunications products and services after the war, various firms began to
develop new means of providing telecommunications services and equipment. In
the A T&T Case, the United States contended that, in response to these actual and
potential new competitors in AT&T's traditional markets, AT&T took actions,
based on its control over the local exchange monopolies, unreasonably impeding
competition that technological developments increasingly made possible. These
alleged actions, detailed at length in various pleadings the United States filed in the
suit and summarized here, occurred in three relevant markets-intercity
telecommunications services, customer-provided terminal equipment, and
telecommunications equipment.
Id.; see also Kearney, supra note 90, at 1405-08 (examining the events preceding and during
the litigation).
93. See, e.g., Jim Chen, The Legal Processand Political Economy ofTelecommunications
Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 835, 843 (1997) ("Microwave transmission posed the most
immediate threat to Bell, for its modest economies of scale invited corrosive entry onto AT&T's
IX turf"); Leonard Waverman, The Regulation ofIntercity Telecommunications,in PROMOTING
COMPETITION INREGULATED MARKETS 201, 232-33 (Almarin Phillips ed., 1975) (evaluating the
probability of increased competition).
94. See, e.g., id. at 232-34 (analyzing the effect of increased competition on prices);
Robinson, supra note 85, at 530-35 (discussing changing view of economists on need for
regulation).
95. See Kearney, supra note 90, at 1409 (discussing this theory).
96. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2000) ("No carrier shall undertake the construction [or] ...
extension of any line, . . unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the
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nondiscriminatory rates, and of tariff-filing still applied. 97 Indeed, from a
purely formalistic perspective, the decree required additional regulation because
it required the FCC to regulate the local carriers' access charges and other
terms of service to long-distance carriers. 98 And it added to the agency's
regulation a layer involving the Decree court's interpretation of the Bell
Companies' permitted and forbidden activities under the Decree. 99 The Decree
did, however, decrease the economic barrier to entry into long-distance
telecommunications markets by providing the means by which a carrier could
enter that market without replicating for itself the local access networks
controlled by the Bell Companies.1°° Entry occurred, and economists
substantially agree that divestiture dramatically increased competition in longdistance markets.' 0'

Commission a certificate.").
97. See id. §§ 201-03 (requiring charges to be just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory);
see also MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218,234 (1994) ("For better or worse, the
Act establishes a rate-regulation, filed-tariff system for common-carrier communications, and
the Commission's desire 'to "increase competition" cannot provide it authority to alter the wellestablished statutory filed rate requirements.'"). The 1996 Act changed this, of course. See
infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text (illustrating the desire to provide authority to
promote competition).
98. See United States v. AT&T Corp., 552 F. Supp. 131, 232 (D.D.C. 1982) (requiring
Bell Operating Companies to provide service to other long-distance carriers that was equal to
that provided to AT&T), af'd Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also, e.g.,
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural Competition?: Applying the NewAntitrust Learning to Foster
Competition in the Local Exchange, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1479, 1483 (1999) (discussing FCC's
implementation of access regime, requiring BOCs to file access tariffs).
99. Judge Greene's supervision of the Decree and of (at least a portion of) the
telecommunications industry between 1982 and 1996 is comprehensively discussed in Keamey,
supra note 90, at 1403-20. Judge Greene's superintendence has been much criticized. See
generally PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET THE
COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 98-99, 150-57 (1997) (discussing Judge Greene's role in
implementing the Decree). Keamey largely defends Judge Greene. See Kearney, supra note 90,
at 1403-20 (recounting Judge Greene's supervision of the case).
100. See id. at 1403-05, 1409-16, 1420 (examining the theories behind the lawsuit).
101. Not all economists agree, with Paul MacAvoy notably arguing that little competition
existed for more than ten years after the Decree, because AT&T, MCI, and Sprint simply
engaged in oligopolistic pricing. See generally PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST
AND REGULATION TO ESTABLISH COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES (1996);

William E. Taylor & Lester D. Taylor, Postdivestiture Long-Distance Competition in the United
States, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 185 (1993). The weight of evidence is against them, however. See
Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 40 (2001) (discussing competition post-decree).
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B. Cable Competition Precedents
Until recently, cable television has been entirely apart from
telecommunications regulation, notwithstanding that one can find FCC
statements from the early 1970s expressing the hope that cable television
systems would begin to compete with telephone companies.'0 2 Nevertheless,
developments in cable television regulation in the 1980s and 1990s confirm
some of the general lessons from early telephone deregulation. Cable television
service, like local telephony, has long been considered a natural monopoly
service. Fixed costs are high; multiple wires to the home risks stranded
investment; economies of both scale and density apply.103 In 1984 and again in
1992, Congress responded to this by imposing traditional rate regulation on
cable television services; an FCC interpretation of the 1984 statute, however,
left its provisions largely toothless."14 Also, various other rules applicable to
cable programmers-ranging from the must-carry and other programming rules
to vertical and horizontal ownership limits (some of which have been
repealed)-have been based upon the view that cable companies exercised
significant market power in both the program-acquisition and retail video
markets. 0 5
Legal barriers to entry into cable television markets were lifted in stages in
the 1990s. Because cable companies extensively use public streets to install
their cables, the 1984 Cable Act confirmed the right of municipalities to
franchise cable operators, although it both limited local authority to deny
renewals and capped the local franchise fee at 5% of a cable system's
102. See Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel
Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, FinalReport and
Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 47 (1970) ("(Tlhere is a substantial expectation that broadband
cables, in addition to CATV services, will make economically and technically possible a wide
variety of new and different services involving the distribution of data, information storage and
retrieval, and visual, facsimile and telemetry transmission of all kinds.").
103. See STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND PoucY 378
(2001) (noting that cable has "long [been] regulated as a natural monopoly," and discussing
reasons that cable systems may be natural monopolies); see also Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v.
City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (same).
104. For a general history of these periods of rate regulation, see ROBERT W. CRANDALL&
HAROLD FURCHTGorrT-RoTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION OR COMPETITION? 24-49 (1996). The
1984 Act required rate regulation of cable television systems unless those systems were subject
to "effective competition." In implementing this statute, the FCC held that cable systems
operating in areas where there were three broadcast signals were subject to "effective
competition." "Since most cable systems operated in environments meeting that criterion, this
standard effectively abolished rate regulation for all cable systems." BENJAMIN ET AL., supra
note 103, at 413.
105. See id. at 441-74 (discussing the broadcast/cable relationship).
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revenues.0 6 Under this scheme, most municipalities granted exclusive
franchises. 0 7 In 1992, Congress addressed the franchise as a legal barrier to
entry and specifically provided that state and local governments could not grant
exclusive franchises. 08 Nevertheless, the FCC had, in 1970, forbidden
telephone companies to provide cable television service in their local
territories,'0 9 and Congress continued this ban in the 1984 Cable Act. This ban
continued until Bell Atlantic won a First Amendment challenge to this
exclusion" 0 and the 1996 Act confirmed that telephone companies may offer
video services." 1
Despite the absence of legal barriers to entry, only very few places in the
United States have more than one cable television provider. Indeed,
considering not only cable television services but any form of facilities-based
competitor, the FCC recently concluded that "competition from a wire-based
competitor [with cable companies for video programming] is limited to a very
few markets."' 1 2 In the past several years, significant competition with cable
has come from DBS (on which more in Part IV), providing an example of
intermodal competition similar to the development of microwave in longdistance." 3 But competition by DBS came only as a result of specific
106. See 47 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (2000) (granting franchising authority); id. § 542(b) (limiting
fee to 5%); id. § 546 (addressing renewal expectancy).
107. See CRANDALL & FURCHrOOTT-ROTH, supranote 104, at 7 ("[C]able... developed as
a municipally franchised service that was also subject to local government franchise fees,
municipal or state regulation of rates, and various local service requirements such as free cable
for schools and town halls.").
108. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000) ("[A] franchising authority may not grant an
exclusive franchise.").
109. See Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel
Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 746, 752 (1970) (concluding what is inthe public interest).
110. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 932 (E.D.
Va. 1993) (concluding that § 533(b) violated the right to free expression), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181
(4th Cir. 1994), vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996).
Ill. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(bX 1), 110 Stat. 56,
210 (repealing cable/telco entry ban, previously codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)); see also 47
U.S.C. § 571 (2000) (establishing open video system regulations as one option for telephone
companies offering video service); id. § 543(c)(4) (sunsetting rate regulation in 1999 for all tiers
of cable service except for the "rebroadcast services" basic service (which no one buys
anyway)).
112. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Tenth Annual Report, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, 1 78 (2004) [hereinafter Tenth
Annual MVPD Report].

113. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (reviewing the lesser economies of
scale of microwave transmission technology).
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regulatory moves that made cable programming networks and broadcast
networks available through that service. In particular, in 1992, Congress
required that cable companies make their affiliated programming channels
available to satellite providers, and this ensured that DBS would have the4
content, such as HBO and ESPN, necessary to offer a competing service."
And in 1999, following technological developments that permitted satellite
providers to beam signals to selective locales, Congress established rules by
which satellite providers could carry local broadcast channels-which was
necessary to put DBS on equal footing with cable's content." 5
C. The 1996 Act
The statements made in support of the 1996 Act very much mirrored the
deregulatory rhetoric preceding the trucking, air, and railroad statutes, and
Congress drew explicitly on these precedents and on the earlier development of
competition in long-distance. The central House Report declared that the bill
"promotes competition and reduces regulation in order to secure lower prices
and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and6
encourage the rapid development of new telecommunications technologies."' 1
Adopting the rhetoric of markets, the Report declares that "services would be
more widely available and at lower prices if telecommunications markets were
competitive rather than regulated monopolies." '" 7 And so the Report talks
generally of "open[ing] all communications services to competition" and
"lifting the shackles of monopoly regulation."'" 8 Indeed, many of the
legislation's supporters, and some of its opponents, drew an explicit
comparison to the prior deregulatory statutes. Representative Klug's statement
was typical of the supporters:
This bill ... will usher in a new era of competition where the market
instead will pick winners and losers, and ultimately the major winner in all
of this will be consumers. It is the way that consumers won when we
deregulated the airline industry in 1978, and it is the way that consumers
114. See James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension ofCable Open Access, 71 U. CoLO. L.
REV. 975, 1006-07 (2002) (comparing Microsoft's attempt to restrict Netscape's access to its
browser market with cable companies' attempts to restrict access to their wires).
115. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 107,228-29(2002) (discussing the passage of the Satellite Home
Viewer Improvement Amendments of 1999).
116. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 47 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, II.
117. Id.at 48.
118. Id.
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won when we deregulated the trucking industry back in 1980. Those
changes have resulted in savings of hundreds of billions of dollars to the
economy.I '9

The 1996 Act removed many legal barriers to entry into communications
markets. As to telecommunications, it preempted any state or local law that
would "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to
provide 'telecommunications services."" 20 The 1996 Act also gave the FCC
the rather remarkable authority to completely deregulate telecommunications,
by giving it the authority to "forbear" from any statutory provision that the
agency found was unnecessary in light of the development of competition.' 21
As noted above, earlier federal legislation had forbidden state and local
governments from restricting entry of multiple cable television companies, and
the 1996 Act both repealed restrictions on telephone company entry into cable
television service and eliminated much122of the remaining rate regulation under
which cable companies had operated.

119. 142 CONG. REc. 2208 (1996); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 202 (1996),
reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 95 ("Title 11 has its roots in the Interstate Commerce Act of
1887. Ironically, the railroad industry whose activities were governed by that century-old law
was largely deregulated in 1980 by the Staggers Rail Act."); 141 CONG. REC. 15,341 (1995)
(statement of Sen. McCain) (asserting the need for deregulation). McCain stated:
We need to have a deregulated industry. In the past, we have deregulated the
airline industry, the trucking industry, the railroad industry in America, and there is
very little doubt in my mind that world events, as well as national events, indicate
very clearly and very strongly that the free enterprise system, unfettered by
Government interference and regulation, not only prospers best but provides the
best services for the citizens of any nation, including this one.
Id. But see 141 CONG. REc. 27,962 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (saying that the "bill is
set up pretty much like it is for airlines," but arguing that this would result in too many
mergers).
120. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000). For a more extended discussion of§ 253, see James B.
Speta, Competitive Neutrality in Right of Way Regulation: A Case Study in the Consequences
of Convergence, 35 CONN. L. REV. 763, 770-72 (2003).
121. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000) ("[Tlhe Commission shall forbear from applying any
regulation ... to a telecommunications carrier or... service,... if the Commission determines
that--(l) enforcement... is not necessary."). Congress also gave the FCC a statutory push in
that direction, by requiring that it review its telecommunications regulations every two years and
"modify or repeal" any that were no longer necessary "as the result of meaningful economic
competition between providers of such service." Id. § 161. The D.C. Circuit has made clear
that it will hold the FCC's feet to the fire in these biennial review proceedings, requiring it to
justify existing regulations where evidence of competition has been presented. See Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding FCC decisions
not to eliminate rules in biennial review proceedings are subject to judicial review).
122. See supra Part III.A-B (discussing early regulations that the 1996 Act sought to
modify or repeal).
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The market as to which the 1996 Act intended the greatest change,
however, was the historically monopolized local telecommunications market.
Replacing laws under which "the majority of States restrict full and fair
competition in the local exchange, ...[the bill] reflects the Committee's belief
that more competition, rather than more regulation, will benefit all
consumers."1 23 Indeed, Congress acknowledged that competition had already
developed in many telecommunications markets-the local exchange was the
last bastion of monopoly.124 As Joseph Kearney has written, "[t]he hope
underlying much of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 [was] that sufficient
competition will develop in local telecommunications that this area of the
industry will witness a transformation similar to the one25 that occurred in the
long-distance segment over the last twenty-five years.'
Congress was not convinced, however, that the mere elimination of
regulation would spur competition in the local markets, and this was the genesis
of the Act's so-called "local competition provisions.' 26 Uncontroversially, the
Act strengthened the requirement that all carriers interconnect with one
another-a requirement necessary to permit a transition to a competitive
market, so that incumbents cannot use embedded network size as a barrier to
entry. 127 The Act also prohibited state and local laws that "prohibit or have the
123. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 50 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 14.
124. See id. at 49-51, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 12-14 (recounting the history of
local competition in the local exchange).
125. Joseph D. Keamey, Will the FCCGo the Way ofthe ICC?, 71 U. CoLO.L. REv. 1153,
1178 (2000); see also Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 101, at 91 ("The break up now is widely
acknowledged to have unleashed powerful forces of competition in long-distance telephone
markets; to have induced policy makers to recognize (in the Telecommunications Act of 1996)
that not even local telephone service is subject to natural monopoly."). See generally Alexander
C. Larson, Reforming Telecommunications Policy in Response to Entry into Local Exchange
Markets, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. I (1995).
126. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-56 (establishing the local competition provisions); Jerry A.
Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer- Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of
Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 426-34 (2000) (discussing the history of
network unbundling). See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of
1996, 29 CONN. L. REv. 123, 138-41 (1996) (summarizing these provisions).
127. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, I I F.C.C.R. 15499, 10 (1996) [hereinafter Local
Competition Provisions] ("[A]bsent interconnection between the incumbent LEC and the
entrant, the customer of the entrant would be unable to complete calls to subscribers served by
the incumbent LEC."), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.
366 (1999); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. EcoN. REv. 424, 426-27 (1985) (explaining that where the value of a
good depends upon the size of the network, new entrants face a barrier to entry); James B.
Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for
Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 81-82 (2000) (stating that the Act's
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effect of prohibiting" entry into telecommunications markets. 2 The Act,
however, went further and required that incumbents unbundle their existing
networks and lease those parts of their local networks to any requesting carrier
that the new entrants would find economically inefficient to duplicate. 129 These
requirements, which were born in part of a compromise between the BOCs and
the long-distance carriers," 3 go substantially beyond a mere interconnection
requirement. As implemented by the FCC, they require the incumbents to
"cooperate, against their interests and for little if any profit, with those very
competitors" who will seek to take away their local business."'
These unbundling requirements were introduced because of the concern
that certain parts of the local telecommunications network could never be
economically duplicated and that sharing of the incumbent's network was the
only way to create a form of competition. William Baumol, a leading
telecommunications economist, had published a book just before passage of the
1996 Act that advocated unbundling on just such a basis.132 His argument for
interconnection duties help overcome network effects).
128. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000); see Speta, supranote 120, at 776-80 (discussing state and
local prohibitions).
129. For example, if it remained uneconomic for new entrants to string their own copper
wires into individual homes to deliver the "last mile" of local phone service, then these
provisions would require the incumbents to lease the incumbents' own local lines to the new
entrants at "cost." See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4) (2000) (imposing unbundling obligations);
§ 252(d) (setting substantive standards for unbundling prices); see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387-94 (1999) (discussing the Act's requirements concerning which
elements must be leased); Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 476 (2002)
(discussing rules for pricing these elements).
130. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Explainingthe TelecommunicationsAct of 1996: Comment
on Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 CONN. L. REv. 217, 225 (1997) ("The stand-off between the
dominant vested players in the regulatory game was, naturally, resolved by compromise.").
131. Howard A. Shelanski, A Comment on Competition and Controversy in Local
Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1617, 1621 (1999). It is quite important to note here
that Shelanski's comment is made against the backdrop of the FCC's selection of a forwardlooking cost formula (TELRIC) that was designed to squeeze any monopoly profits out of the
charges that incumbents would make for network elements. See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 501-28
(describing the standard). A different pricing standard, such as some implementation of the
Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), could try to include in the charges sufficient
monopoly profits that the incumbent would be indifferent between acting as a retailer or as a
wholesaler. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic
and ConstitutionalConnections, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 885, 900-07 (2003) (advocating a fullrecovery price for access). On the other hand, such higher access prices are likely to result in
only "soft competition," if any, because the incumbent does become indifferent to losing
customers, and the new entrant is squeezed by high wholesale prices. See JEAN-JACQUES
LArrowr & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETmON INTELECOMMUNICATIONS 207-09 (2000) (discussing

"unbundling-based entry").
132.

See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOwARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL
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unbundling rules was based explicitly on the presumption "that the basic
network functions [such as loops, switches, and signaling] rather than the LEC
services constitute remaining bottlenecks."' 3 Other commentators made
similar arguments about the need for unbundling. 34 And both the FCC and
numerous commentators have explained that the unbundling rules are designed
to force incumbents to share economies of scale, scope, and density. 35 But if
the local market is characterized by such economies, then these are the
conditions of natural monopoly. 36 In other words, the unbundling provisions
were included to allow retail competition to develop, notwithstanding that the
122 (1994) ("[T]he LEC networks should comprehensively unbundle the [basic
network functions], each of which should be offered separately for sale at prices based on
costs."). Baumol had consulted with AT&T and other telecommunications carriers on the 1996
Act. See William J.Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the
Regulatory Contract,and the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996,72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1037, 1037
n. ** (1997) (stating that Baumol was a consultant for AT&T).
TELEPHONY

133.

BAUMOL&SIDAK,

supra note 132, at 122.

134. See, e.g., Craig D. Dingwall, The Last Mile: A Racefor Local Telecommunications
Competition Policy, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 105, 120-21 (1995) (reviewing nascent unbundling
policies); Krattenmaker, supra note 126, at 158-59 (explaining that unbundling requirements
were included in the law because "[i]t is most likely that running a telecommunications wire to
the home is a natural monopoly and so one ought to concentrate on regulating that monopoly or
mitigating its ill effects"). Schwartz and Hoagg state:
Taken together, competition (with and without interconnection) and unbundling
mean that the best customers are no longer captive, and that the BOCs must
compete for them on the basis of product and services. While the erosion of
telephone company revenues caused by competition and network unbundling has
been small (probably less than two percent on average), this erosion will increase in
places where it has begun, and spread to places where it has not yet begun.
Gail Garfield Schwartz & Jeffrey H. Hoagg, Virtual Divestiture: StructuralReform ofan RHC,
44 FED. COMM. L.J. 285, 293 (1992).
135. See Local Competition Provisions, supra note 127, M315-16 (setting forth what
incumbent LECs must provide new carriers), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
136. That is, if local markets truly are characterized by economies of scale, scope, and
density that are so severe that it is inefficient to duplicate infrastructure, then this is the natural
monopoly condition that market demand is most efficiently met by a single supplier. See
generally SHARKEY, supra note 29, at 24-30 (defining natural monopoly); W. KIP Viscusi ET
AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 337-44 (3d ed. 2000) (same). Some have
made the argument that the unbundling rules are merely transitional rules that enable a
competitor to enter an economic or advertising market while gradually building facilities, and
this argument regards unbundling as largely a means for dissipating the incumbent's advantage
of incumbency. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman & Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local
Telecommunications: Iowa Utilities& Verizon, 2002 Sup. CT. REv. 41,51-52 (examining three
different formulations of the baseline for unbundling rules). But the more often heard rationale
about dissipating economies of scale, scope, and density refers not to the incumbency advantage
but to the economics of supply in the market.
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incumbents might be wholesaling all or some of the facilities necessary for
other competitors to provide service.
Needless to say, the unbundling provisions have been extraordinarily
controversial and time-consuming to implement. Some of the processes'
protraction is inherent in Congress's design, which required new entrants
and incumbents to individually negotiate interconnection agreements,
subject to arbitration in front of state public utility commissions if the
parties could not reach agreement. 137 The idea was that voluntary, quasi
market-based negotiations would provide a better starting point than an
agency-centered administrative process. 38 But much of the delay has been
regulatory: each of the FCC's rulemakings has been challenged, with
central aspects of the FCC's rules twice going to the Supreme Court,' 39 and
almost every carrier request for unbundling has resulted in a contested
proceeding first
before a state commission and then on appeal to a federal
40
district court.

Indeed, even today, more than eight years after the Act, the FCC's
implementing rules are still substantially unsettled. The basic questions of
how much of the incumbents' networks they must share with competitors
and at what price have not yet come to rest. The Supreme Court has
resolved that the FCC has authority to set the rules as to both matters,' 4' but
137. See 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2000) (establishing "[p]rocedures for negotiation, arbitration,
and approval of agreements").
138. See generally Verizon Communications, Inc. v.FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 479, 488, 492
(2002) (noting how negotiation processes used in earlier deregulatory efforts were carried in to
the 1996 Act).
139. See generallyid. (challenging FCC's interconnection and unbundling pricing rules);
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (challenging FCC's first local competition
order on FCC jurisdiction to prescribe rules and on the scope of its unbundling rules); United
States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacating FCC's local competition
order on remand from AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.).
140. For a discussion of the somewhat odd system ("decidedly novel" in Justice Scalia's
view, AT&T, 525 U.S. at 385 n. 10 (1999)) under which (a) the FCC has rulemaking power, but
(b) the state PUCs are charged with adjudicating the controversies under this federal statute, and
(c) the state agency decisions are appealed to a federal district court, see Philip J. Weiser,
FederalCommon Law, CooperativeFederalism,and the Enforcement ofthe Telecom Act, 76
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1692, 1757-60 (2001). For representative court of appeals decisions addressing
interconnection and unbundling proceedings, see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. U.S. W.
Communications, 204 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing arbitrated agreement, which
included topics such as unbundling, co-location of remote switching units, and cost
arrangements); AT&T Communications Sys. v. Pac. Bell, 203 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2000)
(reviewing arbitrated agreement under which competitor sought entry into ILEC market).
141. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 378 (concluding that the FCC's authority encompasses §§ 251
and 252 of the Act).
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the FCC's rules defining the elements to be unbundled have yet to survive
judicial review. The agency's first rules required incumbents to provide
any element that a new entrant requests; the Supreme Court held that this
misinterpreted the statute, 142 notwithstanding that the Court itself derided
the statute as, "in many important respects[,] a model of ambiguity or
indeed even self-contradiction."0 43 When the FCC then promulgated a
limited list of elements to be unbundled,144 the D.C. Circuit struck down
the rules because they applied nationwide-that is, without taking account
of potentially different competitive conditions in different locales. 145 And
when the FCC attempted to respond to the D.C. Circuit's criticism of
nationwide rules by delegating to the state utility commissions, which
under the Act resolve disputes in interconnection and unbundling
negotiations, the authority to also determine which elements would be
unbundled, the46 court said, "Again, regrettably, much of the resulting work
is unlawful."'1
IV. The UncertainState of Telecommunications Competition
Having just limped through the three years of wreckage wrought by
the Internet meltdown, making firm predictions about the future of
telecommunications technology, markets, and competition would seem a
fool's errand. In fact, a communications revolution-in which broadband
142. See id. at 394-96. Gary Lawson has called the Supreme Court's decision in this
regard remarkable as its first invalidation of agency rules under the very deferential second
prong of Chevron review, in which an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute must be
accepted by the courts if the interpretation is reasonable. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 643 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that this case was "the first step two loss that
an agency ever suffered in the Supreme Court"); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (creating Chevron two-step analysis).
143. A T&T, 525 U.S. at 397 (recognizing the statute's ambiguity). The Court stated:
It would be gross understatement to say that the 1996 Act is not a model of clarity.
It is in many important respects a model of ambiguity or indeed even selfcontradiction. That is most unfortunate for a piece of legislation that profoundly
affects a crucial segment of the economy worth tens of billions of dollars.
Id.
144. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Third Report and Orderand Fourth FurtherNotice ofProposed Rulemaking, 15
F.C.C.R. 3696, " 162-64 (1999) (listing the network elements to be unbundled).
145. See United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 422-24 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(finding problems with a national mandate).
146. United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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will be ubiquitous, competition abundant, and services cheap-has been
predicted in some quarters for more than twenty years.147 Nevertheless, an
accurate summary of central characteristics can be briefly stated. On the
whole, substantial frustration continues with the state of local competition,
with editorial pages and prospective competitors alleging that the local
telephone companies still "enjoy near-monopolies in their service
territories."' 48 The recent release of a General Accounting Office (GAO)
survey of cable rates unleashed a similar wave of sentiment that, in the
words of Senator John McCain, due to the lack of competition,
"consumers . . continue to be fleeced by their cable operators.' 49
To justify this Article's call for fundamental change in the regulatory
landscape, this Part surveys the current state of local competition. First, except in
relatively dense business markets, little intramodal competition has developed to
incumbent telephone companies in their traditional markets. Despite its
prominence in the legislation and subsequent implementation, the 1996 Act's
experiment with unbundled network elements has been something of a failure,
with relatively few markets showing effective competition. Cable overbuilding is
also virtually nonexistent. On the other hand, in high-speed Internet access,
where incumbent telephone companies and cable companies both offer service,
these two companies are increasingly competing with one another. Second, some
solid prospects for intermodal competition are on the horizon. In fact, DBS
already provides some real competition to cable. In telephony, competition is
nascent, but wireless and Internet telephony look increasingly like promising
substitutes. Indeed, it is hard not to get caught up in the excitement over VolP
telephony. Wireless and Volt are the "glimmers of hope" that justify another
reworking of communications policy. Third, despite these "glimmers," some
scenarios exist in which nascent competition might be cut off--either because of
147. It should be no slight to Ithiel de Sola Pool's far-seeing work that his predictions of
"digital and broadband ....
pluralistic and competitive communications systems" that expand
human culture have not yet been fully realized. [THIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF
FREEDOM 226, 229 (1983).

148. Call Baby Bells to Account, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at B 16; see also, e.g., Reza
Dibadj, Competitive Debacle in Local Telephony: Is the 1996 Telecommunications Act to

Blame?, 81 WASH. U. L.Q., 1, 12 (2003) (comparing the role of competition in long-distance
and local telephony); Sanford Nowlin, Battlingthe Bells; Telecom Champion;Phone Company
CEO FightsforAccess to SBC's Networks, SAN ANTONIO-EXPRE SS NEWS, May 22,2003, at ID
(discussing competitors' battles with SBC).
149. Leon Lazaroff, Cable Rates Still Sore Subject; ReportSays Competition Benefits Few,
Cm. TRiB., Oct. 25, 2003, at Cl. See generally U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES
RELATED TO COMPETITION AND SUBSCRIBER RATES IN THE CABLE TELEVISION INDUSTRY, GAO04-8 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/

d048.pdf.
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technological and market developments or by the strategic action of companies, or
both.
A. Limited Wireline (Intramodal)Competition
The objective data reveal that some substantial telephone competition has
developed in big business and dense urban markets;5 0 notably, however, that
competition was developing even before the 1996 Act.'5 ' Overall, competitors
are providing about 15% of switched local access lines. 5 2 In residential
markets, and especially in suburban and rural markets, the percentages are
lower. I' More significantly, most of this service-approximately 8 0 %/--is
provided by competitors leasing the incumbents' local loops. 54 As a result, the
long-term viability of the service is entirely contingent on the availability and
pricing of these incumbents' elements.15 5 Reflecting this, most analysts
agree that competitive local exchange carriers face an uncertain business
future. 116
150.

See INDUS. ANALYSIS &TECH. Div., FCC, LOCALTLEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS

31, 2002, at 1-2 (2003) (summarizing recent changes), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLinklIAD/lcomO6O3.pdf; see
also Nicholas Economides, US Telecommunications Today, in IS MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 19
(Carol V. Brown & Heikki Topi eds., 2003) ("[O]ver six years after the signing of the Act by
President Clinton, entry in the local exchange has been small.").
151. See Dingwall, supra note 134, at 108-12 (comparing long-distance and local
competition).
152. See INDUS. ANALYSIS &TECH. Div.,FCC, LOCALTELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS
OF JUNE 30, 2003, at 1-2 (2003) (summarizing changes in competition), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/lcoml 203.pdf.
153. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., supra note 150, at 2-3 (summarizing recent data).
154. See id. at tbl. 3 (reporting number of end-user lines acquired from other carriers).
OF DECEMBER

155. See, e.g., CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., COMPETITION AT THE CROSSROADS: CAN PUBLIC
UTILITY COMMISSION SAVE LOCAL PHONE COMPETITION 7-9 (2003) (looking at the major states

where "the stakes for competition and consumers are huge"), available at http://www.
consumerfed.org/unep_20031 0.pdf. As Laffont and Tirole explain, the price at which the
element is made available to the entrant entirely determines the shape of the competition
between the entrant and the incumbent. See LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 131, at 129-35
(examining various aspects of access pricing).
156. See Donny Jackson, Reports: FCC Votesfor Interim UNE Rules, TELEPHONY ONLINE,
at http://www.telephonyonline.com/-ncrosites/newsarticle.asp?mode=print&newsarticleid=272
7632&releaseid=&srid= 1357&magazineid=7&siteid=3 (July 23, 2004) (considering the
prospects for competitive local exchange carriers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Jackson states:
Some sources indicated the rates for existing CLEC customers would increase
automatically by 15% under that scenario, while others believe special-access rates
will apply. Either option would have a 'drastic' negative impact on CLECs,
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In cable markets, the FCC has stopped tracking so-called cable
overbuilders as a separate category, reflecting that they are present in only
a very few locales.'
The few local telephone companies that entered the
video service market have largely exited.1 58 Nationwide, fewer than 2% of
all customers of multi-channel video service purchase from a wireline
carrier other than the incumbent cable operator. 5 9 The largest cable
overbuilder,60 RCN, recently announced that it is seeking bankruptcy
protection.
The story is somewhat better (and worse) in the local high-speed
Internet access markets. Unlike in telephone, these markets now largely
have two competitors-the cable companies providing cable modem service
and the incumbents providing DSL service.161 Nonincumbent provision of
DSL, which largely depended on leasing loops in any event, has been
falling in share of the market, and third-provider entry has been falling and
is, as noted above, threatened by uncertainty. 162 The cable companies and
the incumbent DSL providers seem to be competing, at least for the initial

according to a letter sent yesterday to Powell by five equity firms with investments
in competitive carriers.
Id. See generally Edie Herman et al., White House Won't Seek an Appeal ofthe UNE Decision,
COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, June 10, 2004, 2004 WL 60706285 (summarizing analyst reports
suggesting that CLEC prices would significantly rise).
157. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, 1 78 ("Competition from a wirebased competitor such as a BSP is limited to a very few markets.").
158. See id. 1112-15 (evaluating LEC experience over the past decade).
159. See id. 9 11- 13 (examining competition's effects on cable television).
160. See Bankruptcy Filing in the Cards for RCN, CHI.TRIB., Feb. 18, 2004, at 47
(announcing RCN's plan to file bankruptcy).
161. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET
ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31,

2002, at 3 (2003) (finding that incumbent share of DSL

service increased to 95% of market), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/ConmonCamer/
Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/hspd06O3.pdf.
162. Id. The only exception to a duopoly market is the few areas in which a second cable
company has built its own network, but this accounts for only several percent of the market. See
id. at 4-5 (indicating where high-speed providers are located). Some other possibilities started
but then faded. In the late 1990s, Sprint introduced in some areas a wireless high-speed Internet
access service, and there was much discussion about the possibility of using various wireless
services for such high-speed services. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in
the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Ninth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 26,901,
9 13-14 (2002) [hereinafter Ninth Annual MVPD Report] (evaluating particular distribution
technologies in the video program delivery market); Speta, supra note 127, at 58-60 (examining
multichannnel and local multipoint distribution systems). Sprint discontinued its service and no
significant others have been deployed.
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acquisition of customers, by offering initial discounts on installation and
service. 163
Alternatives to cable and DSL are limited. Due to their longer delays
and more limited capacity, satellite-based services, which are provided by
the DBS companies, are considered viable only in rural areas where DSL
and cable do not reach. 164 Several companies, in particular Sprint,
deployed fixed wireless platforms for Internet access in 2000 and early
2001, but those services have largely folded. 65 There are suggestions at
the FCC and in the markets of a reinvigoration of fixed wireless, but these
offerings are only just emerging again.' 66 In other words, in the vast
majority of markets, the incumbent telephone company and the incumbent
cable company are the only providers of high-speed Internet access.
B. Intermodal Competition in Video Markets
Although incumbent cable operators still have an overwhelming 75%
share of the market, 6 7 competition from direct broadcast satellite has been
increasing in recent years, and the double-digit growth rates for DBS far
surpass cable's single-digit rates. 68 Moreover, in areas where the satellite
providers offer local broadcast channels, competition between cable and DBS
is more vigorous.1 69 The FCC reports a DirecTV claim that "approximately
70%" of their new customers were former cable customers, which suggests

163. See Jim Hu, SBC Sees Surge in DSL Subscribers, CNET NEWS.COM,
http://news.com.com/2100-1034-5094331 .html (Oct. 21, 2003) (discussing SBC's increase in
broadband customers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
164. See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 1 78 (2002) (examining projections for subscribers to highspeed satellite systems).
165. See supra note 162 (describing Sprint's experience in the late 1990s).
166. See Paul Davidson, Inventive Wireless Providers Go Rural, USA TODAY, July 14,
2004, (explaining how new wireless technology is using fixed wireless technology to provide
Internet access in remote areas), availableat http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-07-14wireless_x.htm; Nick Wingfield, Technology (A Special Report)-Tomorrow's Wi-Fi." It's
Called WiMax-and Its Promoters Say BroadbandWill Never Be the Same, WALL ST. J., May
24, 2004, at R8 (discussing the technology and potential impact of WiMax).
167. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, 6 (finding a decline in purchasing
cable from a franchise operator).
168. See id. M 45-50 (examining the demand for video-on-demand and HDTV services).
169. Id.
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head-to-head competition. 70 In 2002, the Consumer Federation of America
(CFA) declared that DBS had "failed" to provide "intermodal competition" to
cable,17 1 and this analysis provided the basis for Professor Reza Dibadj's
proposal that cable be subject to unbundling and resale obligations similar to
those the 1996 Act applied to incumbent telephone companies.,72 But the
data relied upon in the CFA study largely predates the availability of local
broadcast channels on satellite, and the GAO has more recently concluded
that cable companies act to improve service, increase channel packages, and
173
generally respond to DBS's offerings where local channels are available.
This is competition on the service dimension instead of the price dimension,
but the GAO has also found that incumbent cable companies' prices are
74
between 15% and 41% lower in cities in which an overbuilder operates.
With the FCC poised to issue 7licenses for additional DBS providers,
competition may expand further. 1
On the other hand, the DBS providers assert that they are constrained by
their available bandwidth as to the number of markets in which they can offer
local broadcast channels. 76 Perhaps most telling, cable rates continue to rise
far faster than the general rate of consumer inflation. 177

170.

See id. 65 (reporting on the subscribership of DBS services).

171.

See generally MARK COOPER,

CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., THE FAILURE OF INTERMODAL

(asserting the shortcomings of intermodal
competition), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/intercomp.20020423.pdf.
172. See Reza Dibadj, Toward Meaningful Cable Competition: Getting Beyond the
Monopoly Morass, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &PUB. POL'y 245,267-71 (2003) (surveying the national
cable market and consumer satisfaction).
173. See GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 3-4 ("Competition from wire-based and DBS
operators leads to lower cable rates and improved quality and service among cable operators.");
Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, 111 (exploring competition's effect on prices).
174. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WIRE-BASED COMPETITION BENEFITED
CONSUMERS IN SELECTED MARKETS, GAO-04-241, at 4 (Feb. 2004) (summarizing results of
study), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04241.pdf. The GAO study employed a
case-study methodology, selecting six cities in which overbuilders operated, and does not
purport to be generalizable to other areas. Id. at 2. Yet it is strong evidence that competition
will occur on the price dimension as well.
175. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112,
62-64 (detailing current and
prospective license holders).
176. See id. 12 (explaining developing technology's impact on cable offerings).
177. See GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 20 (providing a variety of factors that
contributed to cable rate increases); Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, 4
(summarizing the telecommunication events of the 1993-2003 decade).
COMPETITION IN CABLE MARKETS (2002)
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C. Coming (?) Intermodal Competition in Telephony
Competition may be increasing for voice telephone services, coming from
two directions-cell phone companies and Internet telephony. Cell phone
competition is a story of relatively gradual change, while VolP could create a
rapid break in the competitive landscape. These are the types of intermodal
competition that changes in regulation should seek to exploit. In fact, both the
history of telecommunications competition and current marketplace
developments suggest that one looking to find significant competitors for
traditional wireline services should look to intermodal services. As noted
above, it was a wireless service (microwave) that provided the first viable
competition to AT&T's Long Lines and that led the United States to seek and
achieve the breakup of the integrated Bell System. 178 That episode is
concluded, as all long-distance has moved to fiber optics, 179 but DBS provides a
current example.' 80 And, although currently limited to only 2-3% of all
consumers, the number of people who will completely give up their wireline
voice service in favor of a wireless phone is expected to rise as telephone
number portability rules take effect.' 8'
Moreover, short of complete substitution, in some limited parts of the
telephone market "[t]here is much evidence.., that consumers are substituting
wireless service for traditional wireline communications."' 82 For example, due
to the ubiquity of wireless telephones, the payphone market is declining rapidly,
the demand for second telephone lines is significantly depressed, and up to
20% of all long-distance access has migrated to wireless because of the ability
to "bucket-price" instead of charge by the minute. 3 Overall, the FCC
concludes that "this is due to the declining cost and widespread use of wireless
service. In fact, a number of analysts argue that wireless service is cheaper than
178.
179.

See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text (discussing the Bell breakup).
See LINDA BLAKE & JIM LANDEY, FCC, TRENDS IN THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY, tbls. 3-5 (2001) (showing that satellite use is largely
restricted to a limited amount of international service and some services that are not sensitive to
the greater delays in satellite transmissions), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/Intl/itltrd97.pdf.
180. See supranotes 113-15 and accompanying text (describing DBS's competition with
cable).
181. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Eighth Report, 18 F.C.C.R. 14,783,
101-06 (2003)
[hereinafter Eighth Report].
182. Id. 102.
183. See id.
103-04 (discussing the trend towards wireless phones); see also Speta,
supra note 120, at 794 (analyzing data from 2000 and 2001).
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wireline."' 84 Indeed, it has been true for some time that the deployment of
wireless telephone systems, measured on a per-line basis, has been cheaper than
the creation of new wireline systems, as demonstrated by the worldwide
deployment of those systems in less developed countries.' 8 5 In the Internet
access markets, a variety of wireless solutions have become available, including
Wi-Fi hotspots, higher-speed access through cell phone companies, and DBSbased satellite services. 8 6 It is not clear, however, that any of these are (yet)
87
substitutes for the high-speed services sold by the cable and DSL providers.
Perhaps because the news has been so bad for so long in the
telecommunications industry, a significant buzz has recently developed over the
prospects for competition presented by VoIP, with the Financial Times dubbing
it "America's chance for a free market in telephony."' 88 FCC Chairman
Michael Powell has described VoIP as potentially bringing a "degree of choice
for consumers never before seen in the residential voice market."' 9 Although
cable companies have provided limited telephone service for several years (with
approximately three million subscribers as of June 30, 2003),190 VoIP promises
to make that service much less costly to provide. As a result, every significant
cable company has announced a roll-out of VoP to come within the next
year. ' 9' But it is not only the cable companies that are offering the technology;
184.
185.

Eighth Report, supra note 181,1 104.
See, e.g., Peter Haynes, The End of the Line: A Survey of Telecommunications,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1993, at 1, 7 (examining the possibilities for expansion in places like
China, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union).
186. See Eighth Report, supra note 181, 9 124-84 (evaluating mobile service data).
187. Indeed, it is unlikely that they are because the technical characteristics are not
comparable. Wi-Fi hotspots are currently quite localized, and even the fastest cell phone data
services are a small fraction of the speed of cable and DSL broadband. See, e.g., id. 9 180-84
(explaining Wi-Fi technology). These services are focused on the mobile markets and not on
the fixed residential or business markets. Satellite services are not as fast and experience delays.
See Speta, supra note 127, at 60 (discussing satellite technology's competition with cable
television video service).
188. America's Chancefor a Free Market in Telephony, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at 19.
189. Michael K. Powell, Written Statement on Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) Before
the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. 6 (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://hraun
foss. fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-24423 IAI .pdf.
190. See INDus. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., supra note 152, at 2 tbl. 5 (reporting number of
end-user switched access lines).
191. See, e.g., Peter Grant& Shawn Young, Time Warner CableExpands Net-PhonePlan,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2003, at A19 (discussing Time Warner's plans to use the Internet to
provide telephone service); Matt Richtel, Time Warner Deal Raises Ante in Cable's Bid for
Phone Market, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at AI ("In addition to Time Warner Cable, the cable
giants Comcast, Cox Communications and Cablevision have started deployment of Internet
phone services, with plans to expand those services in 2004.").
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AT&T, SBC, and Qwest are all announcing new residential or business VolP
offerings.192 In fact, the established telephone companies are playing catch-up
to a certain degree, as Internet-based telephony has long been available to those
willing to initiate their calls from their computers 193 and as new starts-ups such
connections and allow a
as Vonage deploy new boxes that attach to broadband
194
consumer to have a traditional telephone handset.
The development means that "[t]he issue is now front and center-after a
decade of fits and starts-because Internet telephony finally appears ready to go
mainstream."'9 5 If VoIP is successful, it would certainly increase the
competitive pressure facing local telephone companies in voice markets. To a
certain extent, the level of competition will be constrained by the level of
competition in broadband Internet services. Because VolP must be provided
over broadband, the price of that service includes the price of the broadband96
line. But, even if competition among Internet access networks is imperfect,
the availability of Internet telephony increases the level of competition with
traditional voice telephone companies.
D. Or (Maybe) Less Competition
The optimistic view of coming competition in the local
telecommunications market may, however, tell only half of the story. The
optimistic view is that technological developments and the passage of time will
inevitably increase competition among communications platforms.
192.

See, e.g.,
AT&Tto Expand VoIP Service, WASH. PosT, Dec. 12,2003, at E02 ("AT&T

said it plans to sell Internet-based phone service to residential customers in the first quarter of
next year to keep pace with competitors that are rolling out the service. A similar offering of
voice-over-Internet protocol service for businesses, available since 1997, will be expanded.");
Technology Briefing: Telecommunications: SBC to Sell Internet CallingService to Businesses,

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003, at C2 (publicizing SBC's efforts to sell Internet calling and data
services); Shawn Young, 'Naked DSL:' Qwest to Offer Web Service Separatefrom Phone,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2004, at DI (reviewing Qwest's plans to offer DSL to its customers).
193. See Jonathan Moules, Online Upstarts Targetthe Titans, FIN.TIMES, Nov. 20,2003,

at 9 ("Internet protocol (IP) telephony, or the transmission of voice, fax and instant messaging
over networks that use the internet's 'packet-switching' technology, is not new. However, for
home users, it has been largely a hobbyist's pursuit for those with the time and patience to
connect calls over personal computers.").
194.

See Glenn Fleishman, An Internet Extension to Your Telephone Twin, N.Y. TIMES,

Aug. 28, 2003, at G3 (explaining how the SIP phone works).
195. Yuki Noguchi, Identity Crisis; Internet Services Challenge Definition of "Phone
Company", WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2003, at E01.
196. See supra notes 148-67 and accompanying text (evaluating competition in Internet
access markets).
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Competitive telecommunications markets do not, however, always stay that
way, and technological advance might result in lower levels of effective
competition as well as greater. As a historical matter, in the early days of
telephone service, competing local companies existed in many cities, until
AT&T invented the "killer application" of long-distance (which was protected
by patents) and refused to share it with its rivals. 197 Similarly, broadcast
television was an (imperfectly) competitive market, with three networks and
sometimes independent stations competing in most local markets.' 9" The
advent of cable, however, with vastly superior distribution technology because
of the number of channels it supplied, introduced a monopoly element into
video markets. 199
Relevant to the emerging digital broadband world, some commentators
and the FCC have expressed concern that the development of more
sophisticated interactive television services could diminish whatever ability
digital broadcast and satellite have to compete with cable television systems.
Interactive television (ITV) requires sufficient downstream capacity to provide
a high-quality video stream and an efficient upstream channel to return the
user's selections. 2°° Only cable systems have both of these characteristics, and,
indeed, the cable companies themselves seem to see interactive services as the
logical next step in trying to win the market back from the satellite
companies. 20 ' If this scenario occurs, even the current level of competition in
video and Internet may take a step backwards. As the FCC put it in a 2001
notice of inquiry into interactive television services (which is, of course, still
pending): "If it turns out that only one delivery platform in each geographic
area has the capability to provide the most attractive ITV services package, and
if the platform provider is vertically integrated with an ITV service provider,
then there would be the potential for anticompetitive behavior." 20 2 These
197.

Robinson, supra note 72, at 7-8.

198.

BENJAMIN ET AL.,

supra note 103, at 441-43.

199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive Television Services over
Cable, Notice of Inquiry, 16 F.C.C.R. 1321, 6 (2001) (characterizing ITV service).
201. See Dustin Goot, Video May Kill the Satellite s Star, WIRED NEws,
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,141 2,56729,00.html (Dec. 6,2002) ("Broadband Plus,
formerly the Western Cable Show, opened this week with a call to arms from the chairman of
the California Cable and Telecommunications Association: Cable companies must 'stop the
bleeding that's going to DBS (satellite)."') (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
202. Notice of Inquiry,supra note 200, 1; see also Hernan Galperin & Francois Bar, The
Regulation of Interactive Television in the United States and the European Union, 55 FED.
COMM. L.J. 61, 74 (2002) ("The lack of a credible competitor to discipline cable operators opens
several avenues for discriminatory behavior in favor of affiliated programmers and ITV service
producers.").
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concerns may or may not materialize. It is relatively easy to envision the
alternatives to the cable companies cornering the market on interactive
television, and the telephone companies are beginning to work closely with
satellite providers to market bundles of voice, video, and high-speed Internet
services to compete with cable companies .203 Broadband terrestrial wireless
platforms could also provide interactive packet video. The installation of
substantially more fiber optics in local telecommunications networks would
permit VDSL services that too would provide interactive video.2 4 Also, a new
set-top box could combine DSL service with satellite video to provide ITV
equivalency. But, again, many of these alternatives are not in the offing.
Wireless services is another area in which technological and market
developments could roll back the current level of competition. 2 05 Wireless
telephony to date has been one of the truly competitive telecommunications
markets.2° Some consolidation has begun, and with AT&T Wireless merging
with Cingular, more is coming. 20 7 But multi-media services and interactive
services are coming to wireless telephones as well, and the experience in Japan
with NTT DoCoMo's i-Mode service shows that a company that first brings a
new service to market may be able to build an internal network effect that locks
20 8
customers into the service, decreasing competition among the platforms.
Neither of these scenarios is certain of course, and traditional regulatory
tools may suffice to handle them if they develop (though of course competition
would be a superior result to new regulation). Moreover, it is important to
evaluate carefully the types of anticompetitive behavior that arise in any
monopolistic market. In monopoly, prices are higher and output is constrained,
which certainly harms consumers as a theoretical matter. But a static monopoly
may only reflect sequential competition for the market, rather than a durable
203. See, e.g., SBC To Sell TV Packages, Ci. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2004, at C2 (discussing
SBC's bundling plans).
204. See Speta, supranote 127, at 54 (noting that fiber optics would allow DSL services).
205. The new technology actually creates a new market, one in which there are fewer
companies providing service. This new market may or may not eliminate the old market, but if
the new technology encompasses or supplants the old, it may.
206. See supra notes 178-96 and accompanying text (describing competition in wireless
telephony).
207. See Dan Thanh Dang, Wireless Customers Could Dial up Better Service if Companies
Merge but Loss of Competition Might Bring Higher Costs, BALT. SUN, Jan. 22, 2004, at IA
(analyzing possible mergers in the wireless industry). This consolidation has as much to do
with the nearly-complete transition from a local to national wireless telephone market. And
antitrust seems likely enough to ensure that consolidation does not threaten competition
(though, as is discussed later, spectrum reform would do even more).
208. See Speta, supra note 80, at 208-10 (describing a first-mover's ability to limit later
competition).
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monopoly harming consumers.20 9 Moreover, only in certain types of markets
will the monopolist have an incentive to leverage or to otherwise discriminate
against producers in related markets. It is these scenarios that present greater
threats to innovation and to free communications values and therefore warrant
special attention.
V. Learning the Lesson: Setting a New Agenda for Local Competition
If Congress had considered the precedents of airline, trucking, and railroad
deregulation from the perspective of what market characteristics had preceded
deregulation, the 1996 Act might have pursued a different course for
introducing competition into local telecommunications markets. Given that
Congress apparently did not believe that competitors would duplicate the
essential elements of the incumbents' networks, this line of reasoning should
have led to the conclusion that complete intramodal competition (the airline and
trucking model) would not in fact develop, or at least would not develop soon.
The unbundling provisions take as their premise that, unlike independent
trucking companies and airlines that provide their own end-to-end networks,
new entrants into telecommunications markets will rely upon elements owned
by the incumbent who maintains a monopoly over a part of the network. In
short, the 1996 Act reveals a concern that true intramodal competition could
not develop. This conclusion, combined with the lesson learned from
transportation deregulation, means Congress should have done more to promote
the development of intermodal competition-competition to the incumbent
telephone companies (and the incumbent cable companies) from providers who
would use fundamentally different network technologies.
Lest I be thought too harsh on Congress, let me be clear that there is much
that is good in the 1996 Act, and indeed, some features of the Act do advance
intermodal competition.
The lifting of legal barriers to entry into
telecommunications markets and the explicit provisions requiring
interconnection were undoubtedly necessary to help competition and, in these
210
regards, were similar to all of the earlier, successful deregulatory efforts.
Many members of Congress expressed hope that wireless and cable companies
would compete with wireline telephone companies. 2" I am not even
209. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 101, at 10-15 (discussing competition for the
market).
210. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (explaining how the Act drew on
prior deregulatory statutes).
211. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (quoting Senators McCain and Dorgan).
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particularly critical of the unbundling requirements, for they are an at least
somewhat effective way to introduce a limited form of competition into local
markets and, as implemented by the FCC, a very effective way to limit the
incumbents' ability to monopoly-price in important markets.21 2 In this regard,
too, 1 think that the federalization of much of local telecommunications
regulation is a good result of the 1996 Act. 1 3
Rather, I think that the 1996 Act could have done much more to increase
the possibility of true facilities-based competition (especially intermodal), and I
think that Congress should now consider making these additions to the
Communications Act. Indeed, the current developments described in Part IV
suggest that serious intermodal competition may be in the offing. Reform of
wireless policy is the largest missed opportunity for developing intermodal
competition, and a number of proposals, ranging from the uncontroversial to
the radical, are gaining currency. The FCC is acting where it can to advance
spectrum reform, but legislative direction and confirmation of FCC plans
would, as in the case of transportation deregulation, accelerate the process and
ensure that reforms are safe from judicial challenge. This Part, therefore,
reviews a number of telecommunications reform proposals that are being
discussed and some that are not (but should be) and places them within the
general agenda of promoting facilities-based and intermodal competition2,4
Indeed, my principal aim is to attempt a new, comprehensive agenda for
telecommunications policy based on the promotion of true facilities-based
competition and, in particular, intermodal competition. As should become
increasingly clear, however, I regard the important development for
telecommunications competition to be facilities-based competition among
carriers-whether that competition is intra- or intermodal. Only true facilitiesbased competition will eliminate the nearly intractable problems of
212. Indeed, this may be their most important characteristic, and the effective price controls
over DSL service may be the principal limit on the pricing by the cable and incumbent
telephone companies for high-speed Internet access service.
213. This result may not have been Congress's intent, see Weiser, supra note 140, at 172023 (discussing the prospects of agency lawmaking), but the Supreme Court has held that the
inclusion of the local competition provisions in Title ri of the Act essentially gave the FCC
regulatory control over many of the most significant aspects of local markets, such as
interconnection and element pricing. See AT&T Corp. v.Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366,37786 (1999) (discussing the extent ofthe FCC's authority). Of course, the FCC still does not have
control over local retail rates for basic telephone services. I return to the topic of increasing
federal control over certain aspects of telecommunications regulation infra notes 313-15 and
accompanying text.
214. For examples of proposals addressing the reform of the unbundling regime, see
Hausman & Sidak, supra note 126; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 131. 1set these to the side until
the end of this Part.
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interconnection pricing and of bottleneck infrastructure providers attempting to
leverage their carrier services into other markets. The imperative of intermodal
or facilities-based competition is already recognized in some circles. 215 This
Part extends the general imperative to an agenda and to specific policy
proposals.
These proposals can be grouped into helpful categories. First,
communications regulation should focus on eliminating legal and economic
barriers to entry where it can. Regulation completely prohibiting entry for
economic reasons has largely passed from the scene, and as noted in telephone
and cable markets, federal law already forbids legal exclusions. But, in
wireless, aspects of the current regime actually do create legal barriers to entry.
Moreover, legal choices can also change the economics of a particular industry
by making services more or less expensive to bring to market. Thus, a second
priority for a new communications agenda is to seriously consider ways in
which legal reform could decrease the costs of bringing services to market. In a
variety of areas, including wireless policy, right of way management, and local
franchising, legal reform could have this effect. Third, the communications law
itself should be reformed to take account of the accelerating pace and diversity
of service deployment. VolP, for all its prospects, has already endured
significant regulatory uncertainty, and significant FCC proceedings are just
commencing. The statute should be changed to ensure that the regulatory
response to new services is dictated by their economic character and not by
their resemblance to more familiar services. The FCC is already trying to do
this, but it operates within the confines of the current statute.
These changes-some radical and some less so-will have consequences,
of course, and will require a rethinking of other aspects of telecommunications
law. As an initial matter, a more competitive telecommunications marketplace
justifies increased government investment in basic telecommunications
research. Some have called for the government itself to build the broadband
networks of the future; I think that private enterprise, funded by universal
service subsidies where necessary, has proved itself more reliable and presents
fewer potentially anticompetitive problems. Second, universal service will
require a new approach. One of the main concerns with leaving VolP
unregulated is the potential damage to the revenues raised (today, only from
telephone companies) for universal service. If universal service funds must be
raised through an industry-specific tax, instead of being provided from the

215. See Jim Chen, Subsidized Rural Telephony and the PublicInterest: A Case Study in
Cooperative Federalism and Its Pitfalls, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 307, 343 (2003)
(discussing wireless as providing particularly effective competition in rural areas).
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general federal revenue, then taxing customer access to networks is the only
competitively neutral manner in which to raise funds. This does mean taxing
Internet access, but it hardly seems necessary to continue to subsidize the
Internet by treating it special, as compared to telecommunications. Finally, this
new regulatory approach raises the question of what to do about the unbundling
rules. If they are not working and if intermodal competition is likely to take off,
then it might seem obvious that they should be repealed. Although I am
generally optimistic about the chances of increased competition in local
markets, I am not yet convinced. Mandatory unbundling should itself continue,
but the pricing rules should be changed to reflect the increased risks of a
developing competitive environment.
A. Wireless Policy
A fairly widespread consensus already exists, at least in academic and
regulatory circles, that significant spectrum reform is necessary, although there
is significantly less consensus about what shape the reform should take.
Commentators have noted spectrum reform as a significant missed opportunity
in the 1996 Act,2 16 but most of this commentary focuses on the need to
reallocate spectrum from low-value to higher value uses, such as the need for
additional cell phone service, or on the manner in which administrative
spectrum allocation has protected incumbents against new entry into wireless
services. 1 7 In other words, this commentary focuses on matters internal to
spectrum policy without integrating it into the larger telecommunications
competition picture. Perhaps tellingly, the FCC's reorganization after the 1996
Act to emphasize market competition left it with two different
telecommunications bureaus-the Wireline Competition Bureau and the
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau-a regulatory separation that continues
today.2 8 The agenda I suggest views wireline and wireless competition not as
216. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First
Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. Rav. 905,905-06 (1997) ("Despite ambitious rhetoric regarding the
scope of liberalization in telecommunications markets, the omnibus 1996 Telecommunications
Act did shockingly little to disturb age-old regulatory arrangements in radio and television
broadcasting."); Krattenmaker, supra note 126, at 157 ("The new Act does very little to reform
broadcasting law and policy in helpful ways. Censorship is not repealed, but rather is extended.
The horrors of spectrum allocation for television are not ameliorated, but compounded.").
217. E.g., Hazlett, supra note 216, at 907-08 (focusing on new entry into broadcast-type
services); Krattenmaker, supra note 126, at 157-58 (exploring how consumers might protect
themselves from a cable monopoly).
218. See FCC, ABOUT THE FCC, at http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Sept. 13,
2004) (listing bureaus) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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separate matters, but as overlapping parts of a larger telecommunications
market. The important, developing possibility for wireless services is the
manner in which they can provide competition for existing wireline services,
such as telephone, Internet, and cable television service.2 19
,
The FCC has taken some important steps to increase available spectrum,
by relocating a limited number of services to higher spectrum bands, by
authorizing so-called flexible use spectrum bands, and by increasing the
amount of spectrum in which low-power devices may operate without
licenses. 220 The FCC has also begun to authorize more exotic solutions, such as
limited ultra-wideband devices, which can (sometimes) operate on alreadyallocated frequencies without additional interference. 22' The FCC also
commissioned a task force to review spectrum policy; its report called for a
radical overhaul of the regulatory regime.222
Nevertheless, the FCC likely cannot, on its own, make any significant
amount of additional spectrum available. The largest single user of spectrum is
the federal government itself, principally controlled by the Departments of
Commerce and Defense.223 Attempts at interagency consultation have not
resulted in significant spectrum transfers from any part of the federal
22 4
government to the FCC so that the FCC could make it available to the public.
219. Of course, wireless permits mobile communications, and the markets therefore cannot
completely overlap. See Speta, supra note 120, at 797 n.244 (examining wireline and wireless
technology competition).
220. See FCC, Spectrum Policy Task Force, Report, ET Docket No. 02-135, at 7-12
(2002) [hereinafter Task Force Report] (summarizing these developments), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A1.pdf; see also Ellen P.
Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DEIGo L. REv. 269, 287-88
(2004) (discussing the FCC's creation of a common pool of unlicensed frequencies). Goodman
stated:
Consistent with the intangible, unpropertied qualities of spectrum, the FCC has set
aside some frequencies as a common pool resource in the form of unlicensed
spectrum. Rather than granting exclusive or even group rights to such frequencies,
the FCC has opened the bands for low-power transmissions by operators or
members of the public without mandating licensing or coordination.
Id.
221. See Revision of the Commission's Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission
Systems, Memorandum Opinion and Orderand FurtherNotice ofProposedRule Making, 18
F.C.C.R. 3857,
7-152 (2003) (considering petitions regarding ultra-wideband systems).
222. See generally Task Force Report, supra note 220.
223. See JANICE OBUCHOWsKI, NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT POLICY: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 23 (1991) (addressing concerns about

access to federal spectrum).
224. See Task Force Report,supra note 220, at 9-11 (evaluating spectrum use and reform
considerations).
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Moreover, any global change in the method of spectrum allocation, so that
spectrum could be made available for uses that are in greater demand, would
require trenching on some powerful incumbents. As Thomas Hazlett and
others have extensively noted, those incumbent
interests have, to date,
225
prevented any real change in spectrum policy.
Reform of spectrum policy, in my view, has several important
components. First, at a minimum, spectrum policy ought to be reformed to
reduce the manner in which current policy continues to act as a legal barrier to
entry-by requiring companies proposing innovative services to receive explicit
government approval to offer them. Second, spectrum policy should focus on
making significant amounts of new spectrum available. Third, the most
substantial amount of this new spectrum should be made available by
auctioning genuine property rights in the spectrum, while maintaining and
increasing the number of unlicensed bands.
1. EliminatingLegal Barriersto Entry into Spectrum Markets
Most of the currently useable spectrum continues to be restricted to use by
particular kinds of services. This, of course, is the historic command and control
method of spectrum allocation adopted by the Radio Act of 1927 and continued into
the Communications Act of 1934, where licenses were granted to specific
companies (who could not transfer the licenses without regulatory approval), to
offer specific services, on specific frequencies, at specific powers, and in specific
locations.2 26 Today, some spectrum licenses permit so-called "flexible uses,"
whereby the licensee is authorized to provide a wide range of services. 227 And the
FCC has made available increasing amounts of spectrum for "unlicensed" use that
228
permits anyone operating within broad parameters to provide new services.

225.

See Hazlett, supra note 216, at 907-12 (discussing how incumbent broadcasters

stymied proposed reform in the 1996 Act); Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic ofScarcity: Idle
Spectrum as a FirstAmendment Violation, 52 DuKE L.J. 1, 11-20(2002) (discussing lobbying
and legislation overturning FCC's attempts to authorize low power FM stations).
226. For an overview of this regulatory structure, see BENJAMIN ET AL., supranote 103, at
9-34.
227. See, e.g., Service Rules for the 746-764 and 776-794 MHz Bands and Revisions to
Part 27 of the Commission's Rules, First Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 8634, 4 (2000)
[hereinafter Service Rules] ("Because the record indicates a wide range of possible technical
approaches to serving the expanding demand for wireless services, we have sought to establish
an open regulatory framework with the potential to accommodate both existing and future
technologies."); Task ForceReport, supra note 220, at 10-12 (summarizing other proceedings).
228. See id.
at 54 (encouraging the additional designation of spectrum for unlicensed use).
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Nevertheless, truly new services that do not fit comfortably within the
unlicensed bands 229 or the few flexible use bands still need to petition the FCC to
create new license categories or to amend old ones. It is simply not possible for a
new entrant to buy a cell phone or radio station license and convert its use to a new
technology-and over 90% of commercially viable spectrum is still tied up in
limited use licenses. 21 Subject to the debate over whether broadcast television
serves an important universal service function (on which more discussed below)
spectrum licenses should be granted without restriction as to the service that the
licensee will provide. In the past, restricting services to particular bands may have
served the important function of coordinating equipment companies with service
companies-for example, by ensuring that radio manufacturers would know which
channels their equipment must be prepared to receive. With radios becoming more
flexible and with intemal processors becoming cheaper, such a coordination
function may be less important. New devices may be able to pick up services on
any frequency, using a wide variety of protocols.231
2. Making More Spectrum Available
The consensus in favor of spectrum reform is driven in large part by
agreement that significant demand exists for additional spectrum. The FCC's
report declares: "Increasing demand for spectrum-based services and devices
are straining longstanding, and outmoded, spectrum policies. 2 32 For example,
analysts suggest that one major reason behind the Cingular takeover of AT&T
Wireless was that neither company had sufficient spectrum, standing alone, to
provide adequate service quality to increasing numbers of customers.2 33 A
variety of new services, ranging from increasing WiFi (or WiFi-like hotspots)

229. The unlicensed bands are either very high frequency or require very low power
transmission, which limits the types of applications that can be accommodated. See, e.g., id. at
55 (discussing difficulty of wireless ISPs meeting power limits in unlicensed spectra).
230. See EvAN KWEREL &JOHN WILLIAMS, FCC, A PROPOSAL FOR A RAPID TRANSITION TO
MARKET ALLOCATION OF SPECTRUM: OPP WORKING PAPER No. 38, at 1,
http://www.fcc.gov/
osp/workingp/htn (Nov. 2002) ("Currently, only about seven percent of the most valuable
spectrum (in 300 MHz-3000 MHz range) is available for market allocation, i.e., is flexibly
allocated and exclusively and exhaustively licensed.") (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
231. See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 25, 75 (2002) (comparing the security features of open and closed networks).
232. Task Force Report, supra note 220, at 1I.
233. See Dang, supra note 207 (reporting on AT&T Wireless's attempts to find a buyer).
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to fixed wireless
high-speed Internet could come to market with additional
23 4
spectrum.
The current prospects for additional spectrum to be made available for
flexible, market-driven uses are uncertain at best. In 2000 and 2002, the FCC
reallocated certain of the largely unused UHF television channels (52-69) to
new, flexible use licenses. 235 But, 60% of the remaining, most viable spectrum
is currently allocated to other government uses and, therefore, is not within the
FCC's jurisdiction to retask.2 36 Some of that spectrum is allocated to defense,
public safety, and other public necessities and could not be reallocated in all
events, but much of the government spectrum is only lightly used. 237 Of
course, some commentators argue that the spectrum currently used by the
government should be privatized as well, such that the government would have
to purchase, or acquire by eminent domain, any spectrum that it needs for
public uses-just as it must acquire land and buildings. 238 They generally
recognize that this solution will be difficult to adopt politically, unless
governments as a whole gain revenues by granting them the ability to sell the
spectrum they currently use. 239 Apart from political impediments, this proposal
is undoubtedly the most efficient, for it replaces the current regime, in which
governments do not have significant incentives to economize on the use of their
spectrum, with one in which governments at least implicitly feel the
opportunity costs of those uses. 240 The Congress should act to retask spectrum
from government to private uses and to permit the FCC to make the spectrum
available for any use.
234. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, 1102 (noting that "MSOs are
currently undertaking significant cable system upgrades, including digital build-outs").
235. See Service Rules, supra note 227, 4 (reallocating channels). See generally
Reallocation and Service Rules for the 698-746 MHz Spectrum Band (Television Channels 5259), Report and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 1022 (2002).
236. KWEREL & WILLIAMS, supra note 230, at 28 ("Restructuring spectrum not under
exclusive FCC jurisdiction will be particularly difficult, requiring concurrence by the NTIA and
potentially other government agencies now operating in those bands.... Deleting government
and shared bands reduces the spectrum total by approximately 60%.").
237. See Task ForceReport, supranote 220, at I I (reiterating the need to consider national
security and public safety when making spectrum use proposals).
238. E.g., KWEREL &WILLIAMS, supranote 230, at 29 ("[W]e think that government users
should acquire spectrum at market prices the same way they acquire other inputs such as oil, real
estate and computer equipment.").
239. See id. ("[In the transition to a market system, government spectrum users are likely
to be net sellers of spectrum, creating an initial cash surplus above the cost of replacing their
current wireless communications services."). Kwerel and Williams do not offer any statistical or
economic analysis to support their intuition, and given the current difficulties in state and
federal budgets, it seems unlikely that government will be willing to risk it.
240. Id.
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Broadcast television is a particularly ripe area for spectrum reform, to
increase its availability for other uses. Today, the need to make available
additional spectrum is one of the principal motivators behind the FCC's desire
to accelerate the transition to digital television.4 When television stations
have converted to digital transmission and 85% of consumers have adopted
digital receivers, then the television stations must surrender their former analog
licenses, which occupy some of the most technically desirable spectrum. The
original 1995 legislation that confirmed the mandatory transition from analog to
digital television initially required that the analog licenses be surrendered in
2006, but a 1997 amendment added the specific adoption thresholds.2 42
Currently, 75% of television stations are broadcasting at least one digital
signal, 4 3 but no one believes that sufficient numbers of consumers will have
purchased digital receivers such that the licenses will be surrendered in 2006.244
At a minimum, Congress should legislate a firm deadline for the DTV
transition. Ken Ferree, the chief of the FCC's media bureau, recently advanced
a proposal that would essentially force television companies to surrender their
analog licenses in 2009. The broadcasters did not respond favorably, to say the
least.2 4 5 Congressional action would circumvent a long regulatory and court
battle and move this spectrum into better uses.
Notwithstanding the broadcast industry's efforts to deploy digital TV and
the FCC's efforts to encourage the transition, the need for additional spectrum
raises the question of why over-the-air television transmission remains sensible
at all. Today, nearly 90% of all television households receive video service
from cable or DBS providers,246 and the transition to digital is unlikely to make
241. See FCC, DIGITAL TELEVISION FACT SHEET, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts
digitaltv.html (last modified July 15, 2003) ("Converting to DTV will also free up parts of the
scarce and valuable broadcast airwaves, allowing those portions of the airwaves to be used for
other important services, such as advanced wireless and public safety services.") (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
242. See 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(I 4)(B) (2000) (extending the date beyond 2006 if necessary).
243. See DTV Build-Out: Requests for Extension of the Digital Television Construction
Deadline; Commercial Television Stations Comply with May 1, 2002 Deadline, Order, 18
F.C.C.R. 22,705, 3-6 (2003) (examining the current DTV licenses).
244. See Edmund Sanders, Trinity Broadcasting Seeks FCC's Forgiveness on Digital
Deadlineby ThreateningSanctionsAgainst DelinquentStations, the Agency is Tryingto Speed
up the Slow Rollout to DTV, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at C I ("Congress has set a target date of
2006 to complete the switch to digital television, though few expect that schedule will be met.").
245. See Ted Heam, FerreePlan No Picnicfor Cable, Either; MSOs May Have as Many
Problemswith DTV Plan as Broadcasters,MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Apr. 26,2004, at 79, LEXIS,
Multichannel News File ("The Ferree plan [for a firm give-back of analog licenses in 2009] has
been controversial from the start, especially with broadcasters.").
246. See supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text (discussing competition in video
markets).
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broadcast TV a significantly more effective competitor. Even if all of the
spectrumcurrently allocated to these licenses were used for television service,
broadcast would still provide only about one-quarter as many channels as cable
or DBS., More importantly, the FCC, with Congress's approval, has decided
that digital; television license holders need only provide a single television
channel;on-each license, instead of the four or five channels each license could
accommodate.24 7 Under this rule, the licensees may use the balance of their
spectrum allocation for nonbroadcast services.248 This freedom for broadcasters
could be reversed, which might increase the number of broadcast channels, but
the FCC's decision was based precisely on the market demand for such data
services,249 and the vigor with which the broadcasters have sought must-carry
rights for digital television suggests (at least weakly) their continued concern
that the broadcast medium, standing alone, will not be competitive.2 50
Admittedly, DTV will provide better quality reception than analog
broadcasting, and this increase in quality will make broadcasting more
competitive with cable and satellite, but most analysts believe that few
customers will move back to receiving over-the-air broadcasts exclusively.2"'
Thinking about broadcasting from the perspective of total communications
competition suggests that television broadcast should be eliminated entirely (or
more accurately in my view, that the market ought to be permitted to eliminate
it entirely). Economist Thomas Hazlett, long a critic of spectrum allocation
policy, has made this argument, and the efficiency of other platforms to provide
video cannot reasonably be doubted.2 52 Subject to a universal service policy,
such a result seems tolerable. s3
247. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Television
Broadcast Service, Fifth Report andOrder, 12 F.C.C.R. 12809, 28 (1997) (holding that each
television broadcaster need only provide one channel of digital television service); id. 32
(expecting that television stations will provide nonbroadcast services over the remainder of the
spectrum).
248. Id. " 4-7 (asserting the benefits of spectrum recovery).
249. Id. 29 ("[W]e recognize the benefit of permitting broadcasters the opportunity to
develop additional revenue streams from innovative digital services.").
250. See Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals, First Report and Order and
FurtherNotice ofProposedRulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, 1 (2001) (concluding tentatively
against, but calling for additional comment on, must-carry for digital television signals).
Broadcasters would seek must-carry rights even if broadcast is competitive because such rights
would maximize their competitive position, especially in the program supply market.
251. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, 103 (relating, but not endorsing,
these views).
252. See Hazlett, supra note 216, at 935-40 (expressing criticisms of the current system).
253. See infra notes 398-414 and accompanying text (asserting the need for a universal
service policy).
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3. Propertizingthe Spectrum

Assuming that incumbent interests could be overcome and Congress
authorized the FCC to make significant changes in spectrum policy, there
remains the question of direction of the spectrum reform. Many commentators,
building on the seminal work of Ronald Coase, 25 4 suggest complete
propertization of the spectrum-allowing private ownership and free trading, as
well as private definition of the types of service that will be offered on each
slice.255 Others advocate a "commons" approach, whereby any device meeting
certain technical characteristics is allowed to operate. In a commons model, the
spectrum is not owned, and interference is prevented ex ante through the
specification of appropriate hardware and operating protocols, instead of
through ownership of noninterference rights.25 6 These approaches share a
common goal of permitting the introduction of new uses and services without
administrative approval, but they differ radically in the implementation. The
two approaches can be combined to a limited degree by, for example,
propertizing some spectrum bands and opening others to commons use 257 or
creating property rights to spectrum that are always subject to use by any other
device that does not interfere with the incumbent. 2 8 But their essential outlines
are fundamentally opposed.

254. R. H. Coase, The FederalCommunications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. I (1959).
255. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth
Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "BigJoke": An
Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001); Pablo T. Spiller &
Carlo Cardilli, Towards a PropertyRights Approach to CommunicationsSpectrum, 16 YALE J.
ON REG. 53 (1999); Lawrence J. White, "Propertyzing"the ElectromagneticSpectrum: Whylt's
Important and How to Begin, 9 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 19 (2000).
256. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 241 (2001) (encouraging regulation that will maintain the "commons"
nature of spectrum); Benkler, supra note 231, at 75 (advocating the creation of "a commons of
sufficient magnitude and stability to allow a credible investment effort... in building the tools
that can take advantage of an ownerless wireless infrastructure"). For a good summary of the
debate, see generally Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between
Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2007 (2003).
257. Both Benkler and Lessig make this proposal in their most recent works. See Benkler,
supra note 231, at 83 ("What we need is a relatively large-scale experiment in both markets.");
LESSIG, supra note 256, at 242 ("We should be setting aside broad swaths of spectrum as a
commons, intermixed with spectrum as property.").
258. See generally Gerald R. Faulhaber & David J. Farber, Spectrum Management:
Property Rights, Markets, and the Commons, in RETHINKING RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS:
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO NEW COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 193 (Lorrie Faith Cranor &

Steven S. Wildman eds., 2003) (asserting that a property rights market-based regime can
increase efficiency and decrease costs).
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The need for the development of intermodal competition to the traditional
wireline services provides some guidance in selecting among the various
spectrum reform proposals. On the one hand, a propertized spectrum makes it
easier for a service provider to provide a new service. A provider that owns
spectrum rights can more easily internalize all of the coordination problems that
a new service may entail, such as equipment standards, operating protocols, and
interconnection with other networks. Even more importantly, a spectrum
owner captures all of the returns from monitoring spectrum use. Both owned
and unowned spectrum have the problem of unauthorized users. The commons
model critically depends upon all devices using the commons conforming to
certain technical characteristics that limit their interference with one another.259
While equipment certification processes can ensure compliance by most users,
other users will have the incentive to cheat on the implementation of these
protocols or to modify the commercially available equipment to increase its power
or effectiveness.2 60 The analogy to Internet hackers and spammers is obvious. In
a commons, however, no party can internalize returns from policing the users of
the commons to limit cheating; it is a classic free-rider problem. Government
enforcement can deter cheating, but private spectrum owners will efficiently
police their own spectrum, for they bear all of the costs from unauthorized uses
and garner all of the benefits from eliminating those uses.
On the other hand, spectrum commons eliminates one barrier to entry into a
market entirely-the need to acquire spectrum rights on which to operate a
service.
Commons might permit equipment companies to introduce
communications services without themselves becoming or partnering with more
traditional communications companies-a further introduction of supplier
diversity into communications markets. And open spectrum commons might
further diversify the types of infrastructure deployed in at least some
communications markets. Commons advocates focus on technological solutions
that tend to be quite different from those employed by current spectrum ownersthat is, the use of low-powered, high-processing power devices that are
programmed, essentially, not to interfere with one another or with other uses. 26 '
259.
260.

Benkler, supra note 231, at 79-80.
See generally Durga P. Satapathy & Jon M. Peha, Spectrum Sharing Without

Licenses: Opportunitiesand Dangers, in INTERCONNECTION AND THE INTERNET: SELECTED

PAPERS FROM THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 49 (Gregory L.
Rosston & David Waterman eds., 1997) (discussing possibility of equipment cheating on usage
rules in unlicensed bands).
261. This description is only half accurate, for one of the important features of these
devices is that their high processing power permits them to better filter among multiple received
signals. In other words, while they do interfere less by virtue of their low power and use of
specific protocols, they also do not experience interference at the same level of sensitivity as

1120

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063 (2004)

On balance, I think that the imperative to introduce intermodal competition
to wireline services suggests the propertization of significant sections of the
existing spectrum. Property rights simply provide more efficient coordination and
policing incentives. And as to voice and other delay-sensitive services, the lowpower distributed services envisioned by commons advocates are not likely to
provide the quality of service that makes them reasonable competitors to wireline
services. The currently preferred architecture for these services relies too heavily
on multiple hops between devices and an Intemet-like routing structure that has
proved inadequate in the context of the wireline Internet for these types of
262 Although some of these
services. 26
issues are the subject of continuing
innovation, the expectation is that they are fairly far down the road.263 Moreover,
I am not convinced that propertizing the spectrum would eliminate, or even
significantly decrease, the deployment of such new devices and services, although
I do think that Congress and the FCC should significantly expand the spectrum
available for unlicensed uses.264 Even if spectrum were propertized, equipment
manufacturers, or coalitions of manufacturers formed through the standardssetting process, could purchase spectrum and act as, or hire, band managers. 265 If
more typical wireless devices.
262.

See Benkler, supra note 231, at 38-47 (describing network and technical

characteristics of open wireless networks); see also Marjory S.Blumenthal & David D.Clark,
Rethinking the Design of the Internet: The End-to-End Arguments vs. The Brave New World,

(Benjamin M.
Compaine & Shane Greenstein eds., 2001) (describing how the Intemet's first intime routing
structure is not optimal for delay-sensitive services); Speta, supra note 47, at 1561 (reviewing
in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE INTERNET AND BEYOND 91,94

THE FUTURE OF IDEAS' analysis of network architecture).
263. Task Force Report, supra note 220, at 23-24.
264. See Speta, supra note 47, at 1562 (reviewing Lessig's view of Spectrum rights).
265. But see Benkler, supra note 231, at 65 n.47 (objecting to band managers on the
grounds that "collective action problems are similar to those associated with gathering the
property rights necessary for a highway or public park"). But competing equipment
manufacturers routinely overcome those collective action problems in standards setting
processes, which often include the aggregation and exchange of intellectual property. See, e.g.,
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L.
REv. 1889, 1903-07 (2002) (studying the IP policies of forty-three standard-setting
organizations). The formation of the mesh network that Benkler envisions itself requires
significant coordination that would be subject to collective action problems. These networks
only work if equipment standards are carefully coordinated, and an individual manufacturer
would have an incentive to cheat. Moreover, an effective service probably requires robust and
reliable, coordinated interconnection points to other networks. Benkler also asserts that "if the
spectrum used for open wireless networks is owned by some segment of the equipment makers,
the owners are likely to have the opportunity and incentive to make entry by non-owning
competitors difficult." Benkler, supra note 23 1, at 65 n.47. But there is no reference to why, if
enough spectrum were available, this would be the case or even why the manufacturers would
have any incentive to try. See Speta, supra note 47, at 1577-78 (asserting that regulation should
be tied to an economic theory of preventive rational foreclosure); Speta, supra note 114, at 1010
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enough spectrum were made available to the market, acquiring operating rights
would not be a significant burden.266
4. Addressing Media Concentration
Some of the proposals above are open to the criticism that they will further
feed the trend towards media concentration, both on a vertical and horizontal
basis. Many have been critical of the 1996 Act's eliminating the pre-existing
ownership caps on radio licenses, which resulted in substantial consolidation in
the radio market.267 The FCC's proposals to liberalize ownership and crossownership rules touching television markets created a firestorm of protest that
has not subsided. FCC Commissioner Michael Copps has been eloquent in
arguing that media concentration threatens "fundamental values and democratic
virtues-things like localism, diversity, competition and maintaining the
multiplicity of voices and choices that undergird our precious marketplace of
ideas and that sustain American democracy. 268 He is far from alone.269
Although fewer than 15% of people currently watch television over the
broadcast airwaves, the combination of broadcast licenses with must-carry rules
ensures that broadcasters are a substantial, independent source of programming
on cable systems. Unless other aspects of communications reform yielded
increased competition to cable and satellite companies, eliminating or further
diminishing broadcasters increases the risk that cable and satellite companies
would have increased control over media delivery. The big television networks
may persist as sources of shows for cable because, despite their declining
viewership, they still provide much of the most popular programming. 27 But a
(arguing that even infrastructure monopolists will not discriminate against new services).
266. See Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 258, at 214-15 (discussing the effects of
increasing available spectrum).
267. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat. 56, 110
(requiring the elimination of "any provisions limiting the number of AM or FM broadcast
stations which may be owned or controlled by one entity nationally").
268. Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Statement at USC Media Consolidation Forum 2
(Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC233924A I .pdf. See generally Michael J. Copps, The "Vast Wasteland" Revisited: Headedfor
More ofthe Same?, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 473 (2003) [hereinafter Copps, The "Vast Wasteland"
Revisited] (arguing that there is more cause for concern over the content of television programs
now than there was in 1961).
269. See generally Kerri Smith, The FCC UnderAttack, 2003 DuKE L. & TEcH. REv. 19.
270. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, 26 (reporting that broadcast
networks continued to have 49% of viewers during prime time and 45% of viewers during the
day time).
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number of independent broadcasters depend upon must-carry, and must-carry's
granting all broadcasters a fallback access right shifts the economic balance
toward broadcasters in their negotiations with cable companies.
There is, of course, a significant debate over the definition of "media"
markets-whether only traditional video services should be included within the
market or whether the market must also include books, magazines and
newspapers, the Internet, radio, video rental stores, and any other means by
which a person might send or receive a message. Judge Posner raised the issue
over ten years ago in just these terms, and the D.C. Circuit's recent skepticism
toward ownership limits has been based in part on its view that the FCC has not
adequately defined the scope of competing services.271 The FCC has tried to
account for this in its recent media concentration rules; 272 but the Third Circuit
specifically found fault with its attempt to develop a new media-diversity index
that took account of "all" media.273
I believe, however, that policies that permit and encourage the entry of
new facilities-based carriers, combined with antitrust scrutiny of mergers and
structural limits on cable or satellite companies where market power persists, is
a superior alternative to creating broadcast licenses simply to control cable
companies. Antitrust scrutiny in particular should be more vigorous. After the
274
1996 Act, consolidation in radio occurred with minimal antitrust scrutiny,
and many have argued that the biggest companies now exert market power.2 75
Broadcast radio is currently without a significant intermodal competitor. Even
271. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (summarizing the court's 2004
decision).
272. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 ofthe Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620,
111-28 (2003) (discussing significant advances in media, compression, and Internet
technology), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part,Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372
(3d Cir. 2004).
273. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 402-12 (3d Cir. 2004)
(remanding this aspect of the FCC's rules).
274. See, e.g., Copps, The "Vast Wasteland"Revisited, supra note 268, at 475 (noting that
"[t]here are thirty-four percent fewer radio station owners than there were before protections
were loosened"); Anastasia Bednarski, Note, From Diversity to Duplication: Mega-Mergers
andthe Failureof the MarketplaceModel Underthe TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, 55 FED.
COMM. L. 273,280 (2003) (summarizing the liberals' and the conservatives' perspectives on a
marketplace model of radio regulation).
275. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, De-Regulation of the Air Waves: Is Antitrust
Enough?, 17 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 67, 71-74 (2003) (analyzing radio mergers from
an antitrust perspective); Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, Comment, The Game of Radiopoly: An
Antitrust Perspective of Consolidationin the Radio Industry, 52 FED. COMM. L.J.473, 481-83
(2000) (discussing arguments).
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the biggest of the new satellite radio services, of which there are only two, is
affiliated with Clear Channel, the largest terrestrial radio company.276 Wireline
services, such as Internet radio, provide competition which is limited by their
lack of mobility. If satellite radio does not develop as an intermodal competitor
and concern over market power continues, then other policies could encourage
competition. The allocation of new digital radio licenses should not proceed in
the same manner as the allocation of digital television licenses-with new
operating authority being allocated only to incumbents-but rather by
markets.277 Moreover, level competition policy, which I discuss more fully in
the next subpart, suggests that developing Internet radio solutions should not be
subject to different intellectual property burdens-that is, higher licensing
fees-than broadcasters.2 78
Structural regulation of cable or DBS, by requiring them to provide
unaffiliated programming for example, is more difficult, for it faces
heightened judicial review under t~ie First Amendment. It was only by
five-to-four margins that the Supreme Court found must-carry consistent
with the First Amendment, and that was on the grounds that the regulation
was not content-based but rather was designed to preserve free
broadcasting for those who could not afford pay services. 279 The Supreme
276.

See Ben Charny, Satellite Network Gets Insurance Static, CNET

NEWS.COM,

http://news.com.com/2100-1033_3-5061174.htmi (Aug. 7, 2003) (reporting 700,000 current
subscribers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). XM Radio, the largest of the
new services, see id., describes Clear Channel as a strategic investor and partner. XM Satellite
Radio, StrategicPartners,http://www.xnradio.com/corporateinfo/strategicpartners category.
jsp?category-investment (last visited Sept. 13, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Clear Channel has owned as much as 19% of XM. See generallyGregory L. White &
John Lippman, Media: Satellite Radio Gets a Lift from Ford and GM, WALL ST. J., June 16,
1999, at BI.
277. See generallyDigital Audio Broadcasting Systems and Their Impact on the Terrestrial
Radio Broadcast Service, FirstReport and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 19,990 (2002) (explaining how
digital radio is to be introduced by incumbent broadcasters).
278. The Digital Millenium Copyright Act required webcasters to pay royalties on their
play of music recordings, while broadcast radio is exempt from royalty payments. See generally
Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution Is Ready to Begin, as Soon as We Figure
Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2001). These differentials are justified on intellectual property groundsthat webcast music is more likely to be pirated than the lower-fidelity broadcast radio. See id. at
4-5 (discussing the recording process). The debate, however, has not focused on the
competition dimension, which puts new, intermodal competitors at a disadvantage to
incumbents.
279. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,224-25 (1997) (5-4) (deferring to
congressional determinations of economically preferred interests); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 630-34 (1994) (5-4) (describing the legislative history of the must-carry
provisions).
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Court has otherwise found that cable operators are entitled to full First
Amendment rights in their selection of programming, 28° and the D.C.
Circuit precedents strongly suggest that structural limitations on cable
operators (such as vertical, horizontal, and cross-ownership limits) will be
subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 281 In a controversial decision, one
federal district court struck down cable open access regulation on the
grounds that it violated the First Amendment.282
Nevertheless, so long as it is based upon well-founded concerns for
monopoly power and the use of that monopoly power to control access to
information, regulation that even-handedly grants access rights to content
providers or that limits certain ownership concentrations would probably be
sustained. The courts have never held that the First Amendment forbade
the imposition of common carrier requirements on telephone companies,
under which those companies were required to provide service to anyone
that requested it (no matter what the content of their conversations).28 3 To
be sure, the courts have sometimes held that common carrier rules only
apply to those companies that have already decided to do business with all
comers, 2 4 and it might be possible to argue that the nondiscrimination
requirement is therefore only an antifraud rule. "[T]he First Amendment
does not shield fraud. 28 5 But Justice O'Connor's dissent in the first mustcarry case, representing four justices who would have struck down the rules
as inconsistent with the First Amendment, suggests that even-handed

280. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 628-30 (reviewing the development of cable programming).
281.
See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1045-47 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(addressing the First Amendment to cable broadcast cross ownership rules); Time Warner
Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126,1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (implying that the First Amendment
may place restraints on horizontal and vertical concentration limits).
282. See Comcast Cablevision v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 698 (S.D. Fla.
2000) (striking down local open access ordinance); see also William E. Lee, Cable Modem
Service and the FirstAmendment: Adventures in a "DoctrinalWasteland," 16 HARv.J.L. &
TECH. 125, 147-57 (2002) (criticizing decision). See generallyYochai Benkler, Through the
Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2003, at 173.
283. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000) (establishing the duty to provide service); § 202(a)
(requiring service provision on a non-discriminatory basis).
284. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(identifying the two-part test to determine common carriage); Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("What appears to be essential to the
quasi-public character implicit in the common carrier concept is that the carrier 'undertakes to
carry for all people indifferently."'); Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d
601,608 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (same).
285. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003).
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access requirements would, in these Justices' view, be more likely to
survive.
Congress might also conceivably obligate cable operators to act as
common carriers for some of their channels, with those channels being
open to all through some sort of lottery system or time-sharing
arrangement. Setting aside any possible Takings Clause issues, it
stands to reason that if Congress may demand that telephone companies
operate as common carriers, it can ask the same of cable companies;
not suffer from the defect of preferring one
such an approach would
286
speaker to another.

At bottom, I am in favor of interconnection rules that require providers of
network services to deliver the content of unaffiliated entities, but a cautious
approach to other forms of structural regulation must prevail. In many cases,
structural regulation of distribution monopolies will be unnecessary, for even a
monopolist will have the incentive to distribute content that its customers want to
receive.287 Nevertheless, the statute should grant the regulator authority to make
structural rules (on an even-handed basis) where economic theory and available
evidence suggest that there is a need for control, 288 such as occurred (successfully)
with the 1992 rules that required cable companies to stop withholding the content
that was necessary for DBS to come to market.289
B. DecreasingEconomic Barriersto Entry
Although federal legislation has already eliminated state and local
governments' ability explicitly to franchise only a single telecommunications or
cable provider, 29 Congress and the FCC could take additional steps to change the
286. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 684 (1994) (5-4) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
287. See generally Speta, supra note 127 (making this argument in the context of cable

open access regulations).
288. For a good summary of the current economics applicable to the question of strategic
foreclosure, see Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration,and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence ofAntitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J.L & TECH. 85, 95-102 (2003).
289. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text (discussing cable regulation).
290. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (preempting state and local rules that "prohibit or have the
effect of prohibiting" the ability of any entity to provide telecommunications services);
§ 332(d)(3) (forbidding state and local franchising of commercial mobile services carriers);
§ 541 (a) (forbidding exclusive municipal franchising of cable operators); FinalDecision,supra
note 75, 147 (forbidding state and local regulation of consumer premises equipment); Inquiry
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory
Ruling and Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 34-69 (2002) [hereinafter
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economic barriers to entry into communications markets.2 91 The 1996 Act
federalized significant parts of local telecommunications regulation that was
previously within state or local jurisdiction; nevertheless, certain aspects of state
and local regulation remain that could profitably be eliminated. Additionally,
some current regulation puts new entrants at an economic disadvantage relative to
incumbent providers. This subpart discusses several steps that could decrease
barriers to entry, and it addresses the related argument, advanced by incumbents
and others, that "parity" ought to be a guiding regulatory principle.
1. Decreasingthe Economic Costs of State and Local Telecommunications
Regulation
Some local regulation continues to create economic barriers both to entry
and to a level competitive playing field among platforms. These regulations
ought to be reformed, either by the federalization of the entire area or by
establishing federal standards that ensure that competition can develop. For
example, although states and local government may not explicitly restrict entry
into communications services through limited franchising, they retain
substantial authority over rights of way and tower siting, and any new entrant,
except satellite carriers, will need access either to rights of way for wireline
placement or to towers for radio placements.292 As to rights of way, states and
municipalities have sometimes imposed burdensome disclosure, planning, and
permitting conditions on access, and worse, many courts have granted them
authority to charge fees that are a percentage of a carrier's revenues (instead of
a function of the cost of right of way). Both of these features increase the costs
of entry.29 3 Moreover, because the incumbent wireline carrier and all wireless
High-SpeedAccess DeclaratoryRuling] (defining Internet access as an interstate information
access service within the exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC), affd in part and rev'd in part,
Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
291. General spectrum reform is an important way to decrease barriers to entry in its own
right. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text (examining opposing perspectives on
spectrum reform).
292. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2000) (preserving local control over right of way);
§ 332(c)(7) (same); Speta, supra note 120, at 764-70 (discussing right of way). See generally
David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities Will Climb To
Prevent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP. L. 469 (1998) (discussing tower siting).
293. See Barbara S. Esbin & Gary S. Lutzker, Poles, Holes, and Cable Open Access:
Where the GlobalInformation Superhighway Meets the Local Right-of-Way, 10 CoMMLAW
CONSPECTUs 23,44-45 (2001) (reviewing some court decisions regarding municipalities' fees);
Speta, supranote 120, at 772 (addressing the exclusive franchise rights granted for over eighty
years). Those defending municipalities' pricing right of way use above cost do not dispute that
it raises the costs of entry into telecommunications markets. See generally William Malone,
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carriers generally operate without paying for right of way, it tips the
competitive balance against new wireline services.294

As to tower siting, the current federal rules on tower siting are inadequate
in two regards. By contrast to right of way, the difficulty of municipal pricing
for access is not present because a wireless carrier is likely to have sufficient
alternatives that the municipality will not be able to charge an above-economiccost rate. Unlike streets, which are uniquely suited as corridors for the
installation of wireline facilities and which are owned exclusively by
municipalities, private property is generally substitutable for public property as
a location for wireless towers.
The issue, rather, is cities' use of zoning regulations to exclude towers that
city leaders or residents consider unsightly.295 The current federal law
essentially permits municipalities to exclude any second or third towers in
places in which any current wireless carrier is providing service,29 6 and this
decreases the possibility of intramodal competition among wireless carriers.
Municipalities should be permitted to force companies to share towers where
such sharing is feasible, and a federal statute confirming access to towers which
is similar to the current statute that confirms access to utility poles would
decrease some of the economic costs of entry facing a new wireless carrier.29 7
Municipalities' Right to Full Compensation for Telecommunications Providers' Uses of the
Public Rights-of-Way, 107 DICK. L. REv. 623 (2003) (analyzing the municipality's role in
telecommunications regulation).
294. See Speta, supra note 120, at 770-75 (examining the procompetition nature of the
1996 Act). As I discuss, the right of way fee should capture the true economic costs of right of
way use, including both hard costs such as the costs to repair the streets and softer costs such as
traffic congestion costs. A too low rent-that is, one below economic cost-distorts the
competitive balance in the market as well. Id. at 770.
295. See generally Robert B. Foster & Mitchell A. Carrel, Towers of Babble: The
Continuing Struggle over Wireless Siting Issues Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 31
URB. LAW. 849 (1999).
296. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2000) (preserving local zoning authority); see also Foster &
Carrel, supra note 294, at 852 (discussing § 704's prohibition of regulation which effectively
prevents personal wireless service).
297. See 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2000) (establishing federal utility pole access requirements); see
also § 251 (b)(4) (requiring all local exchange carriers "to afford access to the poles, ducts,
conduits, and rights-of-way of such carrier to competing providers of telecommunications
services on rates, terms, and conditions that are consistent with section 224"); Implementation
of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R.
6777, 2 (1998) ("The purpose of Section 224 of the Communications Act is to ensure that the
deployment of communications networks and the development of competition are not impeded
by private ownership and control of the scarce infrastructure and rights-of-way that many
communications providers must use in order to reach customers."), affd in part, rev 'din part,
Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263 (11 th Cir. 2000), rev'd, Nat'l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002).

1128

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063 (2004)

Indeed, such a statute would probably eliminate the need for municipalities to
force sharing.298 But, where sharing is not feasible, federal law should not
permit the exclusion of multiple towers on a per se basis.
The current federal tower siting regime is also inadequate because it
applies only to towers used for "personal wireless services, ' ,299 which include
commercial cell phone service, private wireless service networks (such as
dispatch services), and "common carrier wireless exchange access services. 000
Thus, although the statute covers fixed services that substitute for plain old
telephone service, the section (at least arguably) does not cover fixed wireless
Internet access services. 30 1 A statute sensitive to intermodal competition and
the deployment of new services through new technologies generally would not
base rights or obligations on either the type of service offered or the technology
used, a theme to which I will return shortly.30 2 Surely the protocols used by the
radios atop the towers bear slightly if at all upon the aesthetic and other local
siting concerns.
It is tempting, given the foregoing, to conclude that all currently local
decisions over rights of way and tower siting should be entirely federalized to
ensure that competition values are given the appropriate weight. But that
solution is impractical. The sheer number of such decisions is probably beyond
the capacity of the FCC and the federal courts to manage. Moreover, the point
of devolving such decisionmaking is to give appropriate consideration to
localized differences. The optimal solution is to set federal rules for those
matters in which there is little need for local variation.30 3 For example, federal
298. Voluntary tower sharing does limit the municipalities' power in this regard, and there
is some evidence that the established carriers cooperate with one another due to their mutual
need for access to each others' towers. Cf Lynn Hanley, Note, Wireless Communicationsand
the Telecommunications Act of 1996: An Experiment in Federalism, 12 LoY. CONSUMER L.
REv. 48, 59-60 (1999) (discussing forced sharing attempts by certain municipalities).
299. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2000).
300. Id. § 332(c)(7)(C).
301. This answer is uncertain because, as discussed infra notes 368-73 and accompanying
text, there is still no settled regulatory category for Internet services. The FCC's preferred
classification-that of information services-would probably mean that they are not "common
carrier" services.
302. See infra notes 375-85 and accompanying text (describing the inequities of not
regulating VoIP like every other telecommunications service).
303. Some have argued that economic competition among cities will provide sufficient
limits on municipal zoning decisions, in particular that municipal competition for businesses
(tax base) and residents will yield the socially optimal amount of regulation. See Vicki Been,
"Exit" as a Constrainton Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the UnconstitutionalConditions

Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 506-28 (1991) (arguing that competition will prevent
governments from overregulating). I have elsewhere argued that there is no reason to believe
that this type of competition will yield efficient right of way and tower siting decisions. See
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law already prohibits municipalities from barring wireless towers on the basis
of health concerns.3" 4 Whether RF radiation is linked with cancer or other
health concerns is not a matter on which local decisionmakers have any
advantage. For similar reasons, although there may be diversity among
municipalities in their need to raise revenues through right of way charges; the
tradeoff between those revenues and telecommunications competition should be
resolved on a consistent basis.3 °s Moreover, even where the ultimate decision is
made at the local level on the basis of genuinely local factors, the Congress or
the FCC can provide substantial guidance by developing model local statutes,
best practices, or other guidelines that courts can look to in reviewing local
decisions.30 6 If municipalities were required to justify their decisions, then the
normal processes and costs of administrative review by the courts would
provide incentives to follow federal guidelines.30 7
Although it was focused only on the unbundling regime, and therefore on
the introduction of intramodal competition, the FCC's recent third attempt to
Speta, supra note 120, at 800-02 (asserting a need for a federal rule). Additionally, many
commentators consistently express the concern that state and local regulators do not sufficiently
value competition in telecommunications markets. This was certainly one of Congress's
concerns in debating the 1996 Act. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (quoting
legislators and their concerns).
304. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (2000) (prohibiting local regulation of tower siting
"on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such
facilities comply with the Commission's regulations concerning such emissions").
305. This proposition runs, of course, into the general objection that state and local control
can facilitate experimentation. Apart from whether claims of experimentation are simply masks
for economic protectionism through incumbent capture of local decisionmakers, federalizing the
decisionmaking is not inconsistent with experimentation or variation. Such variation should be
on the basis of objective economic (or other) differences, and not based on any unexpressed
different tolerance for competition.
306. In other words, where local variation is unimportant, the rule should be federal.
Where there is need for local variation or a need for local decisionmaking because of true
diversity of underlying facts, there should be federal standards to be implemented by state
adjudicators. To a large extent, this extends the model of federalism that, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, Congress used in the 1996 Act's local competition provisions. See AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. ed., 525 U.S. 366,370-75 (1999) (describing the effect of federal law on
local standards); Weiser, supra note 140, at 1720-23 (explaining challenges to agency
lawmaking).
307. This highlights one further continuing issue under the wireless tower siting rules: the
extent to which municipalities must build a written record and provide a writtenjustification for
their decisions. Despite a federal statutory requirement of a written decision, a significant
number of court decisions have essentially held that a municipality need not comply with basic
administrative law procedures. See Mitchell A. Carrel & Robert B. Foster, RailroadTracks by
Walden Pond: The Ongoing Struggle Between Towns and Providers Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 33 URa. LAW. 781, 785 (2001) (summarizing various court
decisions).
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devise unbundling rules erred in failing to set adequate federal rules to direct
the states in making important decisions under the Act. Without a doubt, the
FCC moved in this direction because it was prodded by the D.C. Circuit to
introduce more variation into its unbundling rules, to take account of
differences in numbers of competitors and of economic conditions in different
markets.3 °8 But nothing in the D.C. Circuit's decision required the FCC to
leave the field to the states as much as it did. The FCC's 576-page opinion sets
some minimum unbundling requirements and gives the states some guidance in
determining which additional network elements must be unbundled.30 9 But the
FCC's decision does not set standards or even provide quantitative guidance for
addressing most of the unbundling decisions. The D.C. Circuit was
undoubtedly correct that unbundling rules might vary based on market
(although I do not think the D.C. Circuit was correct to reverse the FCC's
earlier, uniform rules),3 '0 but the Chicago, New York, and Houston markets
probably have more in common than the Chicago, Springfield, and Cairo,
Illinois, markets. 3 " In other words, the unbundling rules are not like the case of
tower siting, where local decisionmakers are needed to take into account local
characteristics that cannot be captured in objective market data. Everything
about the relevant market variations can be reflected in market data, which can
form the basis of a decision as to unbundling and pricing.
2. DecreasingCosts Embedded in FederalRegulation
Congress and the FCC should also reform current federal regulation to
eliminate legal rules that unnecessarily raise the costs of companies entering
308.

See generally Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local

Exchange Carriers, Report and Orderon Remand andFurtherNotice ofProposedRulemaking,
18 F.C.C.R. 19,020 (2003) [hereinafter Section 251 Unbundling Obligations], vacated U.S.
Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The FCC's decision would also have

taken some of the judicial review out of the hands of the D.C. Circuit which has questioned the
FCC's implementation of the Act quite strongly.
309. Id.
310. In particular, the judgment about the appropriate level of "granularity" (as everyone
now describes the level of local variation) involves a balance between administrative costs and
errors on two dimensions-insufficient granularity can have economic costs, but excessive
granularity and poor administrative procedures can create costs as well. The FCC's prior orders
attempted a balance of these policies, to which the D.C. Circuit did not seem to give sufficient
deference.
311. According to the 2000 Census, the respective populations of these three cities are:
2,900,000; 111,000; and 3,600.

2000 Census Population Compared to 1990: Illinois

Municipalities,http://illinoisgis.ito.state.il.us/census2OOO/censusData/2000/docs/munipop.pdf
(last visited Sept. 14, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

DEREGULA TING TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1131

communications markets. Although wholesale spectrum reform is the largest
area in which this could be accomplished, Congress and the FCC could also
adopt rules that all current spectrum users may introduce noninterfering
secondary uses without administrative permission. The FCC has gone some
lengths in this direction,312 but confirming the general principle would allow the
introduction of additional competing services. For example, the TV spectrum,
if political barriers prevent it from being reclaimed wholesale, could support
additional, lower-power services, perhaps even the types of services that
commons advocates envision. A second-best solution to reallocating the entire
spectrum, both politically and technically, might be to give the incumbents the
(tradeable) rights to introduce noninterfering uses. Politically, vesting these
rights in the incumbents provides them economic incentives both to reduce
interference in their existing uses and to facilitate new entry.313 Technically,
vesting the rights in the incumbent may make the problem of resolving
interference disputes more tractable.3 14
3. Beginning the End of "RegulatoryApartheid"
Peter Huber called the Communications Act "regulatory apartheid," 3 s
referring to the way the Act had and still has separate titles and regulatory rules
for telephone (Title II), broadcast (Title III), and cable (Title VI). Remarkably,
312. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 220, at 339 (explaining the interference determination
process).
313. Advocates of a "big bang" auction of spectrum sometimes structure the auction so that
payments go to the existing license holders, in order to help secure their political acquiescence
in the new regime. See, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 255, at 542-43 (explaining why incumbent
licenses support the spectrum allocation regime). Tom Merrill has generalized the point, noting
that in any transition from an administratively controlled regime to one based on markets, some
payout (payoff) to those incumbents with an interest in the administrative scheme has been
necessary. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms,2000 U. ILL. L.

REv. 275, 290-94.
314. Commons advocates and others advocate a rule which permits any person, whether or
not the license holder, to introduce noninterfering uses. The proposal here is a smaller step that
might be easier to manage, both politically and technically. As to the latter, Ellen Goodman has
made the case that neither the property rights advocates nor the commons advocates, both of
whom rely upon noninterference as the touch-stone of operating permission, have given much
thought to how interference disputes will be resolved. Indeed, she makes the case that resolving
such disputes will be quite difficult, especially as the number of users increases. See Goodman,
supra note 220, at 375-79, 402-03 (discussing spectrum etiquette, interference control, and
conflict resolution). If incumbents are given the interference rights, they have an internal
incentive to resolve interference before transferring any underlying rights. They maximize their
returns by doing so.
315. Hazlett, supra note 130, at 220.
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the 1996 Act did little to eliminate these categories, despite the sometimes
*expressed hope that different types of carriers would compete with one another.
Instead, the 1996 Act added another category by codifying a definition of
"information services" 3 16 mirroring the FCC's old definition of "enhanced
services, 3 17 although the Act provided very little in the way of specifics as to
how information services should or should not be regulated. 318 New services
therefore confront regulatory uncertainty-uncertainty borne of determining
which definition will apply and what rules will flow from that.
This is not a new problem in communications law, but the prospects for
intermodal competition make it a more pressing one. In the case of the FCC's
Computer Inquiries, in which the agency invented the "enhanced services"
category to ensure that computing services were not themselves regulated, 1 9
these new services used telecommunications as an essential component of their
services, but they were not in competition with traditional telephone service.
Instead, they were dependent on the telephone network, and the competitive
concern was that the telephone companies either would discriminate against
them in favor of their own enhanced service offerings or would extract
significant monopoly rents for providing service.320
Today, the definition of a service can have serious consequences for
competition. Cable modem service is the prime mature example. Although the
service has been in use since the mid-1990s, there is still no definitive
statement about how it is, or is not, regulated under the Communications Act.
Some academic commentators argued for it to be considered an information
service because the FCC had previously classified Internet services as
information services; as such, it would not be subject to common carrier
regulation or to local franchising rules.32' Others argued that it should be
316. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000) (defining "information service").
317. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (describing the FCC's definitional
moves).
318. Other than the definition, the Act contains only six further references to information
services. See 47 U.S.C. § 228 (2000) (regulating "pay per call" services); § 230 (granting
certain copyright and defamation immunities to information services providers and others);
§ 254(b)(2), (3) (calling for certain universal service commitments to information services);
§ 257(a) (requiring an FCC proceeding to examine barriers to entry for entrepreneurs into
telecommunications and information services markets); § 272(f)(2) (requiring BOCs to offer
long-distance information services through separate subsidiaries for four years after receiving
operating authority).
319. See supranotes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing the first of the Computer
Inquiries).
320. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (summarizing the FCC's various acts
of redefinition).
321. See Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate BroadbandInternetAccess Over Cable, 16
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considered a "cable service" because it was offered by cable companies and
because the definition of "cable service" included "interactive services. 322 As
a cable service, it would be subject to local taxation, but no regulator (state or
federal) would be permitted to impose common carrier rules.323 In the first
appellate case to consider local regulation of cable modem service, the parties
litigated the case on the stipulation that the service was a cable service, but the
Ninth Circuit rejected that assumption and held that cable modem services were
"telecommunications services," which would make them subject to all of the
Communications Act's Title II burdens.324 When the FCC finally decided it
was time to issue an opinion, it defined cable modem services as "information
services, 3 25 but the Ninth Circuit, adhering to its earlier precedents, reversed
that decision.326 Further proceedings are ongoing, ten years in.327
The classification of cable modem service has direct regulatory
consequences for that service, but the decision also affects other services,
regulated under other categories, that compete with it. Today, cable modem
service competes with DSL and, to a limited extent, satellite Internet
services.32 The hope is that fixed wireless broadband services will soon be
added to the mix.329 Incumbent telephone companies are subject to the 1996
Act's unbundling regime, which means that they must lease local telephone
wires to other companies for the competing provision of DSL service-a
requirement that would not apply to cable companies unless cable modem
BERKELEY

TECH. L.J. 677, 696-713 (2001) (analyzing cases which govern the regulation of

broadband Internet access).
322. See Speta, supra note 114, at 989-90 (explaining how some provisions of the Act
appear to inhibit open access regulation).
323. Id.
324. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding an
intention that cable modem service be regulated as a telecommunication service).
325.

See High-Speed Access Declaratory Ruling, supra note 290,

34-69 (ruling that

cable modem services are interstate information services).
326. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132(9th Cir. 2003),petitionfor
cert.filed (U.S.Aug. 27, 2004) (No. 04-28 1) (concluding "that cable broadband service was not
a 'cable service' but instead was part 'telecommunications service' and part 'information
service."').
327. See, e.g., IP-Enabled Services, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863,
43 (2004) (calling for, among other things, comment on: "What effect, if any, do judicial
decisions-including but not necessarily limited to those issued inBrandXInternetServices v.
FCC and Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n-have on the

Commission's discretion to classify IP-enabled services?").
328. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (discussing competition inlocal highspeed Internet access markets).
329. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (examining the struggle to
successfully provide fixed wireless platforms).
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service was also a "telecommunications service." Satellite Internet services and
fixed wireless services would, under the FCC's classifications, be "information
services" and outside of Title II and unbundling rules as well. 330 There may be
good reasons for different regulatory treatment (which are discussed more in
the next section), but these services are precisely the same from a consumer's
perspective and basing them in different regulations only as an exercise in
applying outmoded regulatory categories simply makes no sense.
A new Communications Act would attempt to eliminate regulatory
apartheid and time-wasting battles over whether identical services offered by
different technologies will be regulated in the same or different manners. A
new Act would focus on economic realities of service, such as whether certain
providers had market power and the appropriate responses to such market
power. In a new Act, the FCC's role would be diminished. In my view, and
that of others, the principal role for the agency would be to assure
interconnection among carriers and to serve as an expert body resolving
spectrum interference disputes.33 '
For a system with eighty years of history with technology dependent rules,
a new Act along these lines is difficult to fully imagine. A number of helpful
precedents exist. The first is antitrust law as it has been re-envisioned by the
law and economics movement.332 The most notable example of this is Frank
Easterbrook's proposal for a series of "screens" to govern antitrust cases, the
333
first of which is a required showing of the defendants' market power.
Professor Philip Weiser has proposed that the FCC regulate all Internet services
by developing a new body of communications law for these services and that it
employ principles consistent with antitrust law.334
330. See Speta, supra note 127, at 70-71 (summarizing regulatory treatment of these
services).
331. See Kearney, supra note 125, at 1198 ("Telecommunications will ... benefit from
having a regulator that can adjudicate interconnection disputes... [and] some...
superintend[ence of] at least some spectrum related matters.").
332. See Fred S. McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competitionfor
and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1404-05 (2003) (noting the
evolution of analysis in antitrust law). McChesney states:
Traditionally in antitrust, each sort of "contract, combination, or conspiracy" or
allegedly "monopolizing" practice has been treated as requiring a separate mode of
analysis .... Increasingly, however, the disparate strands of antitrust law have
coalesced [following economics] and have moved away from this needless
taxonomy, with its different cases and analyses for different contracts or practices.
Id.
333. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 17 (1984).
334. See Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next GenerationRegulatoryStrategy, 35 Loy. U. Cm.
L.J. 41, 66 (2003) ("outlin[ing] how the FCC can rely on its Title I authority to employ a
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A second example is the European Union's recent attempt to harmonize
telecommunications laws through a series of Directives that extend across
telecommunications markets. A comprehensive treatment of those Directives is
beyond the scope of this Article, 33' and we are still relatively early in their
implementation by the European Union's Member States. Nevertheless, they
do provide an example of a regulatory approach that attempts to address
markets on a technology-neutral basis. For example, the so-called "Framework
Directive,3 36 which anchors all of the more specific telecommunications
directives, premises most economic regulation upon a finding that an entity has
"significant market power. 3 37 The prescribed approach to determine
significant market power has the steps of market definition (by considering
demand and supply substitutability) and of ability to raise prices through
restricting output without incurring significant loss of sales of revenues that
echo the United States merger guidelines and antitrust economics generally. 33 8
A series of subsidiary directives-on access, interconnection, and universal
service-likewise adopt a technology neutral approach to regulation. 339 The
reactive, antitrust-like model of regulation for the emerging broadband market"). Weiser's is the
best proposal for a comprehensive strategy for the FCC to address Internet services under the
current Communications Act, and it, therefore, may be politically more feasible than a wholesale
revision of the statute (an issue addressed infra notes 384-85 and accompanying text). See
James B. Speta, FCC Authority To Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting It, 35 Loy.
U. CiH. L.J. 15 (2003), for my own view that the FCC does not have authority under Title I of
the Act to accomplish all that Weiser proposes, and that there are reasons to limit the FCC's
regulatory authority.
335. For descriptions of the regulatory regimes established, see, for example, L. J. H. F.
GARZANITI, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, BROADCASTING AND THE INTERNET: EU COMPETITION LAW
AND REGULATION, ch. I (2d ed. 2003); EC COMPETITION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW

(Christian Koenig et al. eds., 2002).
336. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 7,
2002 on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and
Services, 2002 O.J. (LI 08) 33 [hereinafter Framework Directive].
337. Id. at art. 14(2).
338. See generally id. (determining when an undertaking has "significant market power");
Commission Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant Market Power
Under the Community Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and
Services, 2002 O.J. (C 165) 6 [hereinafter Commission Guidelines]; Jens-Daniel Braun & Ralf
Capito, The Framework Directive, in EC COMPETITION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 309,
312-13 (Christian Koenig et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the significant market power concept).
339. See generally Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and ofthe Council of
7 March 2002 on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks and
Associated Facilities, 2002 O.J. (L108) 7; Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 26 February 1998 on the Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to
Voice Telephony and on Universal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive
Environment, 1998 O.J. (L I 1)24.
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European Union Directives seem more concerned with the possibilities of
monopoly leveraging than do American regulation and antitrust law, and other
substantial differences would need to be worked out.340 As a starting point,
however, they are undeniably ahead of the current American regulatory regime.
What I would like to see borrowed from the Directives is their overall
approach. Regulation in the telecommunications field should be directed to all
electronic communications, instead of to particular services defined only on the
basis of the underlying platform technology. Substantive regulatory authority
should be limited to circumstances in which the relevant parties have market
power that threatens consumers, and the regulatory tools should be limited to
the minimum necessary to control that power. The Directives provide a
substantial toolkit to the regulators in individual countries. But, as long as
competition continues to develop along the lines hoped for, regulation limited
to interconnection rules and to preventing the strategic use of monopoly power
should provide all of the protection that the market requires.34'
4. AddressingRegulatory Parity
Congress and the FCC should ensure that regulation does not create costs
for new entrants that are not borne by incumbents. For example, municipalities
have the authority to charge franchise fees to cable operators, capped at 5% of
revenues by federal law.342 Many municipalities have imposed this tax on cable
340. The Framework Directive states:
Where an undertaking has significant market power on a specific market, it may
also be deemed to have significant market power on a closely related market, where
the links between the two markets are such as to allow the market power held in
one market to be leveraged into the other market, thereby strengthening the market
power of the undertaking.
FrameworkDirective,supra note 336, at art. 14(3). The Commission states that "[t]his is often
the case in the telecommunications sector, where an operator often has a dominant position on
the infrastructure market and a significant presence on the downstream, services market."
Commission Guidelines, supra note 338, 84. In the United States, monopoly leveraging as the

basis for communications access rules is receiving very little traction. See Farrell & Weiser,
supra note 288, at 133-34 (proposing a more "anti-trust like" perspective on rethinking the
reasons for the FCC's rules); see also James B. Speta, VerticalRegulation in Digital Television:
Explaining Why the United States Has No Access Directive, in REGULATING AccEss To DIGrrAL
TELEVISION TECHNICAL BOTTLENECKS, VERTICALLY-INTEGRATED

MARKETS AND NEw

FORMS OF

69, 76 (European Audiovisual Observatory 2004) (noting the debate
between the "Chicago school" and the "post-Chicago" school regarding monopoly leveraging).
341. See supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text (evaluating interconnection rules in
light of monopoly concerns).
342. See 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2000) (limiting franchise fees).
MEDIA CONCENTRATION
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operators' high-speed Internet access service, and the FCC has not yet stopped
this practice. 343 Telephone companies are not subject to such franchise fees for
DSL service, and so cable would be at a 5% cost disadvantage. 344 Similarly,
whatever the appropriate pricing rules are for right of way, it should not be the
case that states and municipalities are permitted to charge new
telecommunications carriers right of way fees that are essentially taxes on
revenues while permitting incumbents free use of streets. Yet, this is precisely
the result the Sixth Circuit approved 345 and the FCC acquiesced in until
recently. Another example is the permission to incumbent television
broadcasters to use part of their digital licenses for nonbroadcast services such
as data,346 while other new entrants to those services will have to acquire
spectrum rights at auction (if any such rights are made available). 347
Of course, the story can work in reverse: Regulation can give the upper
hand to new entrants as above-cost long-distance access charges did to voice
over IP services. The FCC eventually limited VolP's advantage by informally
expressing the view that phone-to-phone VoIP providers should pay the same
access charges as traditional telephony services and then by substantially
reducing access charges. 348 But computer-to-computer voice communications
continue to be exempt from access charges and from direct contributions to
universal service, and as is more fully described in the next section, this
informal regime is breaking down. Similarly, the FCC long justified its
decision not to require enhanced service providers and ISPs to pay access
charges as a means of helping a nascent industry develop.349 More recently,
343. The FCC has called for comment on the issue and issued its tentative view that this is
the correct result, but it has not yet issued rules. See High-Speed Access Declaratory Ruling,
supra note 289,
106-08 (discussing "franchise fees previously paid pursuant to Section

622").
344. Of course, cable Internet service has approximately two-thirds of the high-speed
Internet access market, see FCC, supra note 161, at tbl. I (showing change in percentage of
high-speed line ownership), and my portraying the powerful cable companies as disadvantaged

new entrants therefore does not quite fit the bill.
345. TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618,625-26 (6th Cir. 2000) (determining
that statutory revisions did not affect pre-existing franchise rights).
346. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text (discussing changes in spectrum
licensing).
347. See 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (2000) (requiring the auction of all spectrum rights except
broadcast and satellite services).
348. See JASON OXMAN, FCC, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET: OPP
WORKING PAPER No. 31, at 22, http://www.fcc.gov/osp/workingp.html (July 1999) (arguing that

everyone who uses the telephone network should pay the same charges) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
349. See id. at 10 ("The Commission determined that the participation of common carriers
in the data processing market would benefit consumers by offering them innovative new
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although I think it unfair to blame regulators, dial-up ISPs took advantage of
regulatory arbitrage to receive above-cost termination payments from
incumbents-to the tune of millions of dollars.350
These examples lead to the more general question, which currently goes
under the catch-name "regulatory parity," of whether all providers of a

particular service must be subject to the same regulatory rules. For example,
incumbent local exchange carriers make much of the fact that they are required
to provide unbundled network elements to competing DSL providers who may
then market unaffiliated Internet services, while the cable companies are not
subject to any regulatory requirement that permits other ISPs direct access to
cable customers.3 5' Similarly, the FCC continues the ISP exemption from
access charges and universal service taxes.352 If competition is the end goal and
converging services provided by multiple platforms the expected market
structure as some commentators argue, then communications regulation ought
to strictly apply
principles of regulatory parity to ensure that competition is on
353
footing.
equal
Regulatory parity is certainly an important touchstone in ensuring that the
market is served by the most efficient providers and efficient technologies,3 54
but applying it in any given instance can be elusive, particularly when
regulatory policy must serve multiple goals. For example, William Rogerson
has defended the disparity between the unbundling rules and the absence of
cable open access by pointing to the different underlying technologies.
Because DSL service requires a much more minimal change to the carrier's
services at lower prices.").
350. It is unfair to blame regulators because it appears that the incumbents created the
situation for themselves by insisting that local traffic exchange be made on a paid (and abovecost) basis instead of a bill and keep basis, which is what created the opportunity for ISPs (who
only receive telephone calls) to receive substantial payments.
35 1. See, e.g., Nirali Patel, Comment, FCCBroadbandPolicy: More Powerfor the Bell
Monopolies, 55 ADMiN. L. REv. 393,417-19 (2003) (discussing the regulatory parity debate).
352. See, e.g., OXMAN, supra note 348, at 24 (advocating the continued nonregulation of
IP-bound services).
353. This is the focus of Dan Spulber and Christopher Yoo's extended defense of "marketbased" prices for access rights. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 131, at 895-900, 1023-24
(discussing the economic effects of regulation). I disagree with their proposal. See infra Part
V.F and note 426 (criticizing their proposal). See generally Rob Frieden, Regulatory
Opportunism in Telecommunications: The Unlevel Competitive PlayingField, 10 COMMLAw
CONSPECTUS 81 (2001); Mark Schankerman, Symmetric Regulation for Competitive
Telecommunications, 8 INFo. ECON. & POL'Y 3 (1996).
354. See, e.g., Speta, supranote 120, at 795-96 (examining the benefits ofefficiency); see
also William J. Baumol et al., Parity Pricingand Its Critics: A Necessary Conditionfor
Efficiency in the Provision ofBottleneck Services to Competitors, 14 YALE J. ON REQ. 145, 169
(1997) (addressing the need for regulatory parity in the solid waste management industry).
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network than does introducing cable modem service, the risk of regulation
interfering with cable company investment incentives is much greater than the
risk of its interfering with incumbent telephone companies' incentives.355
Where regulatory policy is attempting simultaneously to test the prospect of
intermodal competition (cable companies) and to balance the risk of its not
developing with an experiment in wholesaling and intramodal competition
(telephone company unbundling), such an argument can justify differential
regulatory treatment. Similarly, as Ashutosh Bhagwat has discussed, after the
Bell breakup, the FCC successfully applied a variety of regulatory policies that
helped the new entrants get a foothold in the long-distance market-most
notably the rule that local companies could not give AT&T lower access prices
even where AT&T's more efficient access structure yielded relevantly lower
costs to the local companies.356 Bhagwat makes the case that without these
regulatory assists, AT&T's scale would have enabled it to prevent the
development of facilities-based competition among long-distance companies.357
The danger, of course, with any explicit "transition" assist is that it creates
a regulatory process in which the new entrants have a continuing
political/economic interest. 35 8 Gains that regulation creates through earlier
competition than would develop without regulatory assistance may be lost if
regulation continues to tip the playing field longer than necessary. 35 9 The FCC
certainly continued its heavy-handed regulation of AT&T's long-distance
service long after AT&T lost market power in that market. 36 0 And even
regulators committed to eliminating regulation when it has served its purpose
may not be able to develop
information adequate to know when the stopping
36
point has been reached. 1
355. William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the
PrincipleofRegulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and IncentivesforInvestment and
Innovation, 2000 U. Cti. LEGAL F. 119, 145 (discussing the underlying technology).
356. See Bhagwat, supranote 98, at 1483-84 (examining AT&T's heavier regulatory and

financial burden).
357. See id. at 1483-89 (critiquing the regulation of AT&T and subsequent analysis).
358. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in
Telecommunications,Electricity,and Other Network Industries,51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252
(1999) ("[R]egulation must accord rights of participation and policy review to anyone

substantially affected by its policies, which invites strategies and tactics that, at best, retard the
competitive process and, with depressing frequency, invite cartelization.").
359. An optimal regulation permits efficient entry but does not induce inefficient entry.
See Baumol, supra note 354, at 147-49 (providing a "parity-pricing solution" for the problem of

inefficiency in access pricing for facilities needed for competitors).
360. See Jim Chen, Standing in the Shadows of Giants: The Role of Intergenerational
Equity in TelecommunicationsReform, 71 U. CoLO. L. REV. 921, 953 (2000).

361.

Some data is easy to come by, and a significant number of active competitors in the
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The following general principles seem to emerge. Regulation that burdens
new entrants should be more suspect than regulation that burdens incumbents,
and regulation that absolutely forbids entry into a communications market is
presumptively impermissible. Pure interconnection regulation is justified, even
though its intent is explicitly to assist new entrants. Where a network is
necessary for a communications service, an interconnection rule will almost
always be necessary3 62 to test whether monopoly is due to demand or supply
side effects and to preserve the social utility of the communications networks.
(Of course, on its face an interconnection rule does not violate regulatory
neutrality, for it applies to new carriers as well as old). Other regulation that
burdens incumbents should be more suspect where it only assists new entrants,
and especially where it does so without a sunset or other reasonably definite
mechanism for reevaluating its continuation. Regulation that burdens
incumbents to serve another goal, such as limiting market power, testing
alternative market structures, providing universal service, or advancing other
noneconomic goals (such as free expression) would be more tolerable. It will
always do to weigh the costs and benefits of those other goals versus the likely
efficiency compromises, but asking for more either oversimplifies the difficulty
of policymaking in these areas or exaggerates the precision with which limited
policy tools can be wielded.

market presents an easy case to imagine. But, where markets are monopolized or oligopolistic,
the question of whether the players have relevant market power is of course much more difficult.
362. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing generally why structural
regulation of monopolies will be unnecessary). The exception is where the new entrant's new
network is so superior that all of the incumbent's customers (or at least a critical mass) expect
that a sufficient number of others will switch to the new entrant. See Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities,94 J. POL. ECON. 822,
825 (1986) (evaluating the effects of sponsorship on the standardization of technology);
Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 10 1,at 6-15 (discussing interaction between network effects and
competition for the market more generally). What is difficult, perhaps intractable on an ex ante
basis, is determining whether a given market with network effects will exhibit inertia or "quick"
tipping. The working assumption has been that, at least in wireline communications markets,
the combination of network effects and economies of scale, scope, and density make an
interconnection rule necessary. See supra notes 150-66 (evaluating the limited competition in
wireline communications); Speta, supranote 127, at 81-82 (examining "common carrier duties
to confront direct network externality"). But with pure wireless networks (that is, where
interconnection with a wireline incumbent is not necessary to maintain the network nature of the
service), the market might be less likely to become entrenched. See id. at 83-84 (discussing
lower economies of scale for deployment of wireless networks).
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C. VoIP as a Case Study
As noted above, VoIP may provide a new source of genuine competition
to incumbent local telephone companies. But VoIP is also a perfect case study
in the regulatory uncertainties that face a new service. As Senator McCain said
in introducing a recent hearing on VoIP:
In many ways, VoIP is a microcosm of the broad array of
telecommunications regulatory issues that have been debated since passage
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, including the role of state
regulators, the legal classification of services, universal service, 3access
63
charges, emergency services and access by people with disabilities.
In this section, I describe these issues in the VolP context and discuss the
optimal regulatory structure for VoIP services.
To do so, however, requires a bit more technical background about
VolP. 364 As the name suggests, it is a voice service run over the Internet
protocol, which means that it transmits voices over Internet networks in the
same fashion in which e-mail, webpages, music, or instant messaging transits
the Internet. In fact, a close technical analogy is simply to think of it as instant
messaging that uses voices instead of text. VoIP can be provided over any
moderately high-speed Internet connection as long as the user has the
appropriate software and hardware. As a result, VoIP can actually be provided
in a number of configurations. It can be provided through a computer running
a simple application to which the user has attached a microphone and a speaker;
it can also be provided through a special VoIP phone that looks and feels like a
traditional phone, that itself connects to the Internet, and that does not require
an additional computer to operate. Some VoIP providers will install a box in a
person's home that connects a high-speed Internet connection to the
consumer's in-home telephone wires, so that regular telephones may be used in
365
existing telephone jacks.
Some VoP services, such as ICQ's voice-chat feature or the currently
popular Skype, which was created by the same programmers who created the
Kazaa software, are only computer-to-computer services and only link to
members of the same network-that is, both parties must be running the same
363. Hearing Before the S. Commerce, Sci. & Transp. Comm., 108th Cong. (Feb. 24,
2004), LEXIS, News Service file [hereinafter S. Hr'g] (Senator John McCain).
364. See generally FCC, Voice Over Internet Protocol,at http://www.fcc.gov/voip (last
visited Sept. 13, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
365. See S. Hr'g,supra note 363 (Glenn A. Britt, Time Warner Cable) ("Our customers can
use their existing phones and existing phone jacks and they can even keep their same telephone
numbers.").
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software and both must be connected to the Internet when the session begins.366
Other VoIP services, such as Net-2-Phone, have long provided links to the
public telephone network, permitting Internet users to connect through their
computers to any telephone number.367 The current generation of voice
services-the ones that are expected to provide competition to the local
telephone incumbents-provide traditional telephone numbers to users and
permit them both to call and to receive calls from any other person with a
telephone number.
This short description should make obvious that VoIP raises a difficult
classification issue under the Communications Act.368 On the one hand, the
service is identical to traditional telephone service-it connects two parties, in
real time, and transmits their voices to one another. As such, it would appear at
first blush to be a telecommunications service. On the other hand, VoIP is
carried over Internet access connections and largely over Internet backbones,
and the FCC has long369described Internet and Interet-based services as
"information services."
Over the past several years, the FCC has taken the position that "phone-tophone" VoIP is a telecommunications service, while "computer-to-phone" or
"computer-to-computer" VoIP is an information service.3 7 ° More recently, the
FCC has held that a VoP service that does not interconnect with the public
telephone network is not "telecommunications," even though the service is
designed to use a telephone-like device and connects voices in real time.3 7'
Rather, the FCC declared it to be "an unregulated information service subject to
federal jurisdiction. 3 72 Crucial to the FCC's decision, however, was the fact
that the provider did not itself provide any transmission service. Rather, users
had to have their own broadband Internet access; the provider simply provided
366.

See Jon Van, Computer-Based Calls Source of Net Concern, CHi. TRm., Nov. 11,

2003, at Cl (expressing some people's concern that VoIP will hurt phone companies like
Napster hurt record companies).
367. Id.
368. See S. Hr'g,supra note 363 (Sen. McCain) ("The FCC is forced to shoehorn a newly
emerging technology into Congress' 1996 vision of communications regulation and to classify
as either fish or fowl that which may be neither.").
369. See OxMAN, supra note 348, at 22-24 (discussing information services definition).
370. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R.
11501,

371.

21-54 (1998) (providing background for statutory definitions).

See Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free World Dialup is Neither

Telecommunications nor a Telecommunications Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19

F.C.C.R. 3307, 7 (2004) [hereinafter pulver.com Declaratory Ruling] (examining
pulver.com's perspective on its service definition).
372. Id. 8.
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the core of a peer-to-peer service, matching up users through a central
directory.37 3
The FCC's decisions have been largely driven by a desire to avoid
regulation of Internet-based services. In the very first sentence of his separate
statement in the pulver.com decision, Chairman Powell simply states: "Today
we affirm our commitment-and fulfill our statutory obligation-to keep the
Internet free from unnecessary government regulation. 3 74 But it is clear that
decisions like this stretch the Act's definitions and may, ultimately, result in
different kinds of Vol? services being regulated differently.
Indeed, the Act's definition of "teleconmunications"-"the transmission,
between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's
choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received" 37 5-would seem to cover many Internet services. That a service uses
protocols other than the protocols traditionally associated with telephone
service does not affect the service's definition as telecommunications, as the
FCC itself has long held. 37 6 Other Internet services, such as e-mail, that
transmit information from one user to another without changing that
information at all have escaped classification as "telecommunications" only
because they are stored in a server that is intermediate between the sender and
the receiver until such time as the receiver logs on to retrieve his or her email.377 But Vol? transmissions are not delayed in this manner.
The FCC's current decision simply does not address the two more
important manifestations of VolP service, namely those services that are
provided together with the underlying transmission (as when the Internet access
provider is also the VolP provider) and those services that interconnect with the
373. See id. $10-13 (explaining why pulver.com is an information service rather than a
telecommunications service).
374. Id. at 3326 (separate statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell).
375. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000).
96 (stating that "basic"-now
376. See Final Decision, supra note 75,
"telecommunications"-services are those that provide "pure transmission capability over a
communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with customer
supplied information"); id. 95 (asserting that the use of packet switching and error control
techniques "that facilitate economical, reliable movement of [such] information do[] not alter
the nature of the basic service"); Application of AT&T for Authority Under Section 214 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, to Install and Operate Packet Switches at Specified
Telephone Company Locations in the United States, Memorandum Opinion, Order, and
Authorization,94 F.C.C.2d 48, 1 15-20 (1983) (holding that X.25 packet switching networks

provided basic services because they transmitted user-supplied information without changing
the content of that information).
377. See generally Weinberg, supra note 84, at 227-30 (discussing FCC's precedents in
this regard).
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public telephone network. Many cable modem companies are proposing to
provide VolP services, 378 and modem VoIP service is envisioned to provide
connectivity to and from all telephone numbers. To accomplish the latter, VolP
providers need to install equipment that converts VoIP calls into protocols that
are acknowledged by the voice telephone network-and they need to do this
whether or not they provide the Internet access and Internet transit portions of
the service. Each of these types of services, because it provides an element of
transmission, would then be within common carrier and other regulation. At
the Senate Commerce Committee's recent hearing on VoP, several witnesses
advocated bringing VolP within the traditional regulatory regime to ensure that
states and local governments would be able to continue to tax and otherwise
regulate these services.379

If VoIP is not regulated as telecommunications, but is left unregulated as
an Internet (information) service, then many of the issues discussed above arise.
The first and perhaps most important is that of competitive neutrality.
Traditional telecommunications services are not only regulated, but they are
subject to a variety of taxes at the state, local, and federal levels. Exempting
VoIP puts it at a cost advantage, but one that is a feature of the regulatory
structure and not of the superiority of the underlying technology. This is not
economically efficient. 380 The second issue is jurisdictional. If VoIP is not
telecommunications, it may be subject to regulation at the state and local level,
where the prospect of multiple and varying regulation may (by contrast to
telephony) put it at a competitive disadvantage.38' The FCC currently intends
to exercise its so-called ancillary jurisdiction over information services to
preempt state regulation,38 2 but the FCC's authority in this regard is
unsettled.383
378. See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text (presenting plans to unveil VolP
services).
379. See S. Hr'g,supra note 363 (statements of Senator Lamar Alexander and Stan Wise,
Chairman, Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'ns).
380. See Speta, supra note 120, at 795-96 (discussing the costs of economic inefficiency).
381. See Esbin & Lutzker, supra note 293, at 63 (reviewing the Broward County
legislation); see also supra notes 291-93 and accompanying text (describing problems with
local regulation regarding tower siting and rights of way).
382. See pulver.com Declaratory Ruling, supra note 371, 15 ("We determine, consistent
with our precedent regarding information services, that FWD is an unregulated information
service and any state regulations that seek to treat FWD as a telecommunications service or
otherwise subject it to public-utility type regulation would almost certainly pose a conflict with
our policy of nonregulation.").
383. See Speta, supra note 334, at 16-19 (arguing that the FCC lacks jurisdiction to
develop comprehensive regulation of Internet services).

DEREGULA TING TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1145

Third, if VolP is not regulated as a telecommunications service, other
important social objectives may be implicated. For example, and as is
discussed more in subpart E, if VoIP begins to take significant market share
from traditional telecommunications services, then revenues raised for universal
service and for other purposes through telecommunications taxes will decrease.
Additionally, VolP providers will not be required to provide 911 service
(although most VolP services that are designed to substitute for traditional
telephone service provide some kind4 of911 access), wiretapping capabilities, or
access for those with disabilities.1
A rational statute would not make the regulatory decision depend upon the
metaphysics of classifying VoP as telecommunications or not. And a rational
statute would not tip the competitive playing field among services that are identical
from the consumer's perspective. VolP, of course, is a new entrant, and so under
the general outlines discussed above,38 5 the lack of regulatory parity may not be of
immediate concern. But, if the predictions for its success begin to materialize, then
a new regulatory framework should be adopted.
The difficult issue for current telecommunications policy, however, is that the
appropriate response to the success of VoIP is not necessarily to subject it to
regulation to bring it into parity with telephone regulation, but rather to lift the
regulation and regulatory costs to which telephone service is subject. To take the
easier issues first, it seems to me that VoIP providers that interconnect with the
voice telephone network ought to be required to provide 911 service and access for
people with disabilities. By interconnecting with the traditional network, these
services declare their "publicness" in an important regard, and current policy
requires consistent access to emergency services and for disabled persons.
Similarly, if public policy otherwise demands that law enforcement has the ability to
tap voice telephone calls, then VolP providers should be required to build this into
their service.
The foregoing regulatory trigger--that the VoIP service interconnects with the
public telephone network-is itself, however, at least potentially an anachronism.
Not tomorrow and not in the next few years, but a time may arrive when "voiceonly" is not the service that unites all Americans. When that day comes, these
384. See FCC, VoIP/Internet Voice Fact Sheet, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/
voip.pdf (last visited June 14, 2004) (addressing some of the drawbacks of VoIP) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). The FCC has recently proposed rules that would require
all VolP providers to ensure that law enforcement agencies can tap VolP calls.
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services,
Notice ofProposedRulemaking and DeclaratoryRuling, FCC 04-187 (Aug. 9,2004), available
at http:www.hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-187A ] .pdf.
385. See supra notes 351-61 and accompanying text (examining various aspects of
regulatory parity).
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policies will need to be tied to access or to whatever that generation ofnetwork turns
out to be.386
If VolP becomes a real competitor to voice telephone service, then the
regulation currently designed to control the rates of voice service will need reform.
Currently, traditional long-distance carriers pay higher rates to the local telephone
companies for the origination and termination of telephone calls than VolP
providers would pay because VolP terminations into the local network would be
considered local telephone calls, not long-distance. This lack of competitive
neutrality is largely indefensible. More radically, competition in local markets
would eliminate the justification for retail rate regulation. The extent ofthis reform,
however, will depend upon the nature of the broadband market as this competition
takes hold. VolP, ofcourse, depends upon an underlying access service; it does not
itself provide a connection into a home. VolP changes the competitive playing field
between facilities-based carriers, because VolP is an application that may make
cable broadband (or wireless or whatever platform utilizes it) more attractive to
consumers vis-i-vis a traditional voice telephone line.
D. GovernmentSubsidies
Some commentators and industry officials have gone further in
suggesting that the government assist the development of new
communications services by advocating government financing or building new
communications networks. Many municipalities are developing their own
broadband networks, either because no broadband service is available or the
municipality perceives there to be insufficient competition.387 And some groups
have called for substantial federal deployment of new "fiber to the home"
networks. 388 Entry or explicit financing by governments would introduce new
providers into the markets even more surely than would the simple steps of lifting
barriers to entry and a bit of regulatory hospitality.

386.

See Speta, supra note 127, at 81-82 (suggesting interconnection policy based upon

the need for a single network to provide service).
387. See Kathryn A. Tongue, Municipal Entry into the Broadband Cable Market:
Recognizing the Inequities Inherent in Allowing Publicly Owned Cable Systems to Compete
Directly Against PrivateProviders, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1103-05 (2001) (discussing
trend).
388. See, e.g., TECHNET, A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE: UNIVERSAL AVAILABILITY OF
BROADBAND BY 2010, at 7, http://www.tchnet.org/news/newsreleases/2002-01 - 15.64.pdf (last
visited May 29, 2004) (calling on network providers to invest billions in infrastructure upgrades
and increased bandwidth capacities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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In the main, these proposals do not situate the government as the only
communications provider in a market; indeed, no one seems to think the old
European model of a Post, Telephone, and Telegraph monopoly is a good idea.
Rather, these proposals are made with the rhetoric of competition. However,
creating a government stake in a particular provider of service threatens two kinds
of inefficiencies. First, the government provider might be cross-subsidized from
general revenues or by lighter regulatory treatment and might gain an inefficient
advantage over others.389
Second, if not subsidized, the municipal
telecommunications company might lose money, creating the politically
unpalatable prospect that city officials are losing taxpayer money and prompting
them to take regulatory measures against their competitors. 390 For these reasons,
and because of the possibility of profligate municipal spending, some states have
adopted legislation forbidding municipalities to enter telecommunications
markets. The Supreme Court upheld these laws. 39 1 Despite my general call for
the lifting of legal barriers to entry, I do not think these state laws violate the
imperative to develop new competition in telecommunications markets. The
commonly heard expression from antitrust law, that it is designed for "the
protection of competition, not competitors, 392 seems applicable here. A law that
forbids entry by one narrowly defined entity may or may not be justified
(although the arguments about avoiding anticompetitive subsidy and protecting
the public fisc seem quite important). But excluding one potential entrant should
not, itself, damage competition in an otherwise structurally competitive market.
Nevertheless, while government itself probably should not get into the
telecommunications carrier business, government could accelerate the process of
intermodal competition in the more customary manner of providing funds for
basic research and development. Government-funded research, especially
military, provided some of the essential Internet and wireless technologies now in
commercial service.393 But, the level of funding such basic research has not kept
pace with the growth of the communications sector, 394 nor has it focused
389.

See Tongue, supra note 387, at 1120 (discussing these sorts of subsidies in the context

of municipal and municipal utility-owned communications companies).

390. Id.at 1125.
391. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 124 S.Ct. 1555, 1559 (2004) (construing § 253's
"any entity" to not include municipalities). Section 253 forbids any state law that "prohibits...
any entity" from providing telecommunications services. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000).
392. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
393. See COMM. ON INNOVATIONS IN COMPUTING AND COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS FROM
HISTORY, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR
COMPUTING RESEARCH, at ch. 7 (1999) (discussing the government's role in and funding of early

Internet projects).

394.

See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S INFO. TECH. ADVISORY COMM. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT,
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explicitly on funding research into technologies on the basis of their potential to
provide intermodal competition. Indeed, a presidential commission has
concluded that military funding of communications research, while still
significant, now focuses exclusively on near-term war fighting projects and not on
the types of basic research that previously inspired the Internet.395
Competitive markets, in fact, likely increase the need for government
funding. The Bell System's ability to subsidize basic research with its monopoly
profits is well known, 39 6 and some economic work argues that competitive
industries invest less in basic (as opposed to applied) research and
development.397
E. A Note on Universal Service
Competitive telecommunications markets need a new universal service
policy. Although airline and railroad deregulation attempted to ease the
transition to competition and to provide some funds to continue service on
lightly traveled routes, both transitions have resulted in the loss of service to a
substantial number of communities. 398 By contrast, universal service has long
been a goal in telecommunications regulation; indeed, universal service to some
extent provided the argument that resulted in the comprehensive regulation of
what was, at its outset, a competitive local telecommunications market. 399 The
1996 Act did not decrease the commitment to universal telecommunications
service; 4 win many regards, it increased its scope by including Internet access
for many entities as part of universal service.40 '
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH: INVESTING IN OUR FuTuRE 21-24 (1999) (concluding
that government funded basic communications research is inadequate and has not grown with
the increasing importance of communications to the economy), availableat http://www.hpcc.
gov/pitac/report/pitac-report.pdf.

395.

1d.

396.

See generally A. Michael Noll, Bell System R&D Activities:

The Impact of

Divestiture, I I TELECOMMS. POL'Y 161 (1987) (evaluating Bell's research and development
activities).
397. See VIsCUSi ET AL., supra note 136, at 232-35 (discussing this literature).

398. See supra notes 24-26, 59 and accompanying text (acknowledging loss of service).
399. See MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION,
AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM 97-98 (1997) (providing
justifications for universal service).
400. See generally Eli M. Noam, Will UniversalService and Common CarriageSurvive
the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996?, 97 CoLuM. L. REV. 955 (1997) (discussing goals and
challenges of universal service under the Act).
401. For example, the Act provided universal service funds to schools, libraries, and health
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The 1996 Act's stated goals with respect to universal service are
compatible with the agenda to facilitate intermodal telecommunications
competition. The Act itself states that "[aill providers of telecommunications
services should make an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the
preservation and advancement of universal service., 40 2 In practice, however,
distortions have been introduced, because "providers of telecommunications
services" has been limited to traditional wireline and wireless telephony
services. 4 3 Thus, if VolP is successfully kept out of the telecommunications
category, it will not pay universal service fees, just as the providers of instant
messaging (which already is a limited substitute for voice calls) do not. The
most vocal advocates of VoP regulation tout concern
for universal service
4 4
funds as the principal ground for such regulation. 0
The long-run goal for universal service should be a funding mechanismfrom both the collection and distribution sides-that is entirely competitionneutral. As many have argued, the least distorting mechanism would be a
system funded through the general federal revenues. ° This has long been
considered politically impossible, and so some specific tax on communications
service will probably continue. But taxing VoiP will prove difficult because
the essential components of VoIP service can be provided overseas. 40 6 One
alternative would be to embed the universal service tax in the allocation of
telephone numbers, although, if the charge were passed through on a "pernumber" basis, it would raise the costs of service for the lightest users. Perhaps
more promising would be to require any entity that receives telephone numbers
to pay a universal service fee based upon the percentage of their revenues likely
derived from voice service. Because the entire point of VoIP is that the traffic
appears to be the same as other Internet traffic, the FCC would have to engage
in some sort of sampling or other estimation to determine a baseline voice
percentage as to which the universal service charge would apply. These
care providers for the deployment of broadband services. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000)
(increasing requirements for telecommunications providers).
402. Id. § 254(b)(4).
403. See Robert M. Frieden, Universal Service: When Technologies Converge and
Regulatory Models Diverge, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 399-401 (2000) (examining
telecommunications regulations prior to technology convergence).
404. See supra note 384 and accompanying text (describing possible problems with not
regulating VoIP).
405. See, e.g., Gregory L. Rosston & Bradley S. Wimmer, The ABC's ofUniversalService:
Arbitrage,Big Bucks, and Competition, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1585, 1606 (1999) (recounting the
FCC's justifications for federal universal service mechanisms).
406. See S. Hr'g, supra note 363 (FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell) (addressing tax
jurisdiction concerns).
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difficulties might be enough to push the political process toward the more
competitively neutral "tax and spend" structure. In all events, the imperative is
to continually revisit the universal service mechanism as the unpredictable path
of telecommunications innovation continues and to adjust the collection and
payment mechanisms to eliminate competitive imbalances.
A better result would seem to be a tax on all services that provide access to
electronic communications, including all of those services currently known as
telecommunications transmission and those known as information services
transmission. This means taxing Internet access, which has been forbidden
from time to time by the so-called Internet tax freedom acts. 40 7 Taxing the
Internet does run counter to the prevailing impulse to leave the Internet free
from regulation. But taxing Internet access on an even basis with the taxes
placed on telecommunications services becomes necessary for competitive
neutrality when those services compete with one another-as VoIP and other
developments promise. Exempting Internet access services from taxation
seemed valuable in their infancy, but it is hard to argue today that the likes of
AOL, Microsoft, Earthlink, and others continue to need an implicit subsidy. 40 8
The more important point from the perspective of introducing new
competition into telecommunications markets is that regulatory policies which
are actually universal service policies should be identified as such and
evaluated for their effectiveness as such. To return to the example of television
broadcast spectrum, the must-carry rules that put broadcast content on cable
systems were defended on the basis of "preserving free broadcasting" for those
who received television in that manner-in other words, to provide universal
service to video.4 9 Judged from that perspective, the policy just does not make
sense. Although there remain some 15% of television households that do not
subscribe to cable or DBS, many of those nonsubscribers are in higher income
brackets and might subscribe if there were no broadcast. 410 What is needed is
an analysis that compares the number of subscribers to free television that
407. See generally Joseph R. Feehan, Comment, SurfingAround the Sales Tax Byte: The
Internet Tax FreedomAct, Sales Tax Jurisdictionand the Role ofCongress, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. &
TECH. 619 (2002) (providing background on legislation).
408. It is beyond the scope of this Article, but much of what I have just said also applies to
state and local taxes on telecommunications, even those not designed to find universal service.
See, e.g., Jonathan Bick, Implementing E-Commerce Tax Policy, 13 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 597,
604 (2000) (noting that, in 1998, the average state tax on telecommunications was 14%). All
taxes suppress demand, but competitively neutral taxes are less problematic.
409. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,644-46 (1994) (examining
the burden of must-carry provisions).
410. See Ninth Annual MVPD Report, supranote 162, 13 (summarizing developments in
the broadcast market).
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depend upon it to the value of the spectrum for other uses. I suspect that it
would be more efficient to fund a universal service program for cable or DBS.
This would be wrenching to the broadcast industry, to be sure, but the
competitive gains could be quite significant.
Similarly, one of the arguments advanced in favor of cable open access
rules is that competition among ISPs would ensure users greater free speech
possibilities than if the cable companies had exclusive control of the ISPs. 41 I
This is not precisely a universal service argument, although it is similar in that
the regulation is designed to advance a noneconomic good.41 If cable company
restrictions on user speech are considered problematic, however, then the
relevant comparison is between open access policy and an explicit rule, i la
common carrier regulation, that forbids the cable companies to interfere with
user speech. This rule might be more susceptible to a First Amendment
challenge, 1 3 but it would focus the discussion on the respective technical and
economic advantages of the proposal. From a purely economic perspective, the
conversion of cable systems to common carriers would meet the speech goal in
the same manner, without the technical costs of changing the cable systems to
accommodate additional ISPs. 414 This might not satisfy the advocates of open
access rules, but the debate could then proceed on other grounds.
F. A Return to the Unbundling andPricingPuzzle
I have already identified the 1996 Act's unbundling regime as highly
contentious, and indeed, its difficulties are part of the premise for a new focus
on intermodal competition. This new paradigm, if implemented successfully,
will have implications for the network sharing regime, and despite my desire
largely to steer clear of the current controversies over unbundling, this topic
411. See, e.g., Harold Feld, Whose Line Is It Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable
Open Access, 8 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 23, 35-37 (2000) (evaluating the arguments for
competition in light of the First Amendment).

412. Universal service isoccasionally justified on economic grounds-that the network is
more valuable to all subscribers as subscribership rises, but the network owner cannot capture
all of those gains and will therefore supply aless than optimal level of service. But this ismore
of a welfare argument than an efficiency argument. More importantly, universal service is
usually justified on noneconomic grounds of subsistence and equality.
413. See generally Lee, supranote 282 (discussing court decisions finding that open access
rules violated the First Amendment and assessing arguments).
414.

There might be economic costs to a common carrier rule depending on its design, such

as an inability to price discriminate. See Noam, supra note 400, at 967-68 (discussing the need
for price discrimination in the provision of telecommunications services). The point is to debate
those costs and benefits directly.
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now requires a few comments. The FCC has adopted, and the courts have
approved, a forward-looking cost methodology known as TELRIC for those
parts of the incumbents' network that it is forced to share. 415 TELRIC, as I
have noted, is successful at squeezing the incumbent's monopoly profits out of
the prices charged for local loops and other essential network elements. The
regulations therefore permit a certain level of retail competition, and TELRIC
limits monopoly profits at the wholesale level much as rate regulation
historically controlled them at the retail level. For this reason, unbundling and
TELRIC pricing make the most sense if one views the natural monopoly
characteristics of the local loop and other elements of the local network as
relatively stable.
Adopting facilities-based, intermodal competition to the local incumbents
as the legislative and regulatory priority does not necessarily require
abandoning the unbundling regime or TELRIC, but it does require some
modification. The extreme, current criticisms of TELRIC as inadequate
compensation (to the point of being a constitutional taking) are wide of the
mark. 416 The FCC's TELRIC rules do require that interconnection and
unbundling prices be set so as to make a fair contribution to the maintenance of
the incumbent's local network.417 TELRIC is therefore not marginal pricing in
the sense that the incumbent cannot recover its fixed costs or the contribution
that the foregone provision of a certain retail service would make to the joint
and common costs of the incumbent's network. Moreover, the FCC, prodded
by the courts, 4' 8 has eliminated those applications of TELRIC most likely to
upset a level playing field by limiting the number of elements that must be
unbundled under that scheme. In fact, under the current rules, the FCC has
41 9
limited the elements presumptively required to be unbundled to local loops,
415. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (discussing the 1996 Act's
justification for unbundling).
416. See, for example, Spulber & Yoo, supra note 131, for the argument that TELRIC
constitutes a taking. For a rebuttal, see Baumol & Merrill, supra note 132. The Supreme Court
rejected the argument that TELRIC methodology offends the Takings Clause in Verizon
Communications,Inc. v. FCC,533 U.S. 467 (2002).
417. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 519 (2002).
418. In its initial rules implementing the local competition provision of the 1996 Act, the
FCC required all elements to be unbundled and made available to CLECs. The Supreme Court
reversed this aspect of the rules in AT&TCorp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,525 U.S. 366 (1999).
In its second set of rules, the FCC limited the list of elements to be unbundled to seven, but the
D.C. Circuit found that this nationwide list did not adequately account for likely local variations
in conditions of competition in United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 422-24
(D.C. Cir. 2002).
419. See Section 251 Unbundling Obligations, supranote 308, 197-342 (analyzing loop
deployment, types, and unbundling proposals).
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which, because of their sunk cost characteristics, are the least likely to be
duplicated by new entrants. 42
Nevertheless, an affirmative attempt to develop new platforms will require
intensifying the vigilance that the FCC adverts to in its third-generation
unbundling rules-that mandatory unbundling should be lifted when the
market demonstrates that one or more entities actually have bypassed the
incumbent's facilities with substitute facilities.42' More importantly, it requires
sensitivity to the possibility that bypass, even if not currently feasible, will
arrive in the (nearer) future. To the extent that unbundling is necessary at any
particular time because the local loop (or some other facility) is then a natural
monopoly facility, the TELRIC unbundling price must be based upon a
projection of the useful life of that facility. As the FCC has long acknowledged
but only just begun to implement, the depreciation rate should include not only
the expected life of the facility based on wear and tear but also the expected
useful life of the facility based422on the prospect that it will be rendered obsolete
by a new bypass technology.
This possibility of developing bypass has led a number of commentators to
argue that TELRIC should be replaced entirely by the efficient component
pricing rule, global price caps, or another rule that permits the incumbent
greater leeway in recovering from new entrants contributions to the
incumbents' fixed and joint and common costs. 423 But, as William Rogerson
420.

See Hausman & Sidak, supra note 126, at 462-63 (noting that items with sunk costs,

as opposed to fixed costs, are less likely to be duplicated).
421. See Section 251 Unbundling Obligations, supra note 308, 178 (evaluating
arguments supporting and detracting from mandatory unbundling); see also 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(2000) (requiring the forbearance from regulation when competition develops). This analysis
requires, of course, an assessment familiar from antitrust law of the demand and supply
substitutability of the goods on all dimensions. For example, while cable-based VoIP and cell
phones are technical substitutes for local loops, it is not clear that they are yet in precisely the
same economic market as traditional voice. The quality of those services is lower; they are often
not compatible with the same range of vertical services such as call-waiting, caller ID, and
voicemail; and they may not have independent power in emergency situations.
422. See Local Competition Provisions, supra note 127, 686 (claiming that "properly
designed accounting depreciation schedules should account for expected declines inthe value of
capital goods"); Section 251 Unbundling Obligations, supra note 308, 685-91 (analyzing
depreciation rate components).
423. The ECPR was developed by William Baumol and Robert Willig, and it sets the
unbundling price at the incumbent's retail price less the incremental avoided costs (that is, the
incremental costs of that part of the service that the new entrant will supply) of providing the
service. See generally Robert D. Willig, The Theory ofNetwork Access Pricing,in ISSUEs n
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 109 (Harry M. Trebing ed., 1979) (discussing technical network
access prices); Baumol et al., supra note 354. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole advocate a
global price cap, by which the incumbent maintains the freedom to price access and final goods
subject only to a price cap weighted by the relative provision of both wholesale and retail goods.
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has pointed out, keeping unbundling prices lower and thereby "artificially
handicapping incumbents in the most profitable areas of4 24
their territories is
actually a reasonably good way of encouraging... entry.
Thus, for the same reasons that I am willing to tolerate a degree of
regulatory asymmetry when that asymmetry benefits new challengers to
incumbent carriers,4 5 I do not think that a regulatory policy designed to further
the possibility of bypass must necessarily abandon TELRIC at the outset.
When and if the hoped-for facilities-based competition begins to develop,
TELRIC can then be revised.426 And when it develops completely, then the
pricing problem will, mercifully, go away.
VI. Conclusion: Not a PoliticalPipedream
It does not seem necessary or appropriate, after setting out this proposal at
such length, to conclude with a rote summary of the foregoing. What does
seem necessary, by contrast, is at least a few words on why this radical proposal
to rewrite telecommunications law-a task the Congress thought it successfully
accomplished less than a decade ago--is anything other than an academic's
pipedream.4 27
The answer is again supplied by some of the earlier deregulatory successes
in transportation and long-distance. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk have
made a study of some of these deregulatory episodes, 428 and their conclusions
suggest that a window for further telecommunications reform may now be
opening. In particular, they studied airline and trucking deregulation as well as
See LAFFONT & I ROLE, supra note 13 1, at 170 (examining the benefits of a global price cap).
424. William P. Rogerson, New Economic Perspectives on Telecommunications
Regulation, 67 U. CIn. L. REv. 1489, 1497 (2000) (reviewing LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note

131).
425. See supra notes 354-61 and accompanying text (justifying regulatory disparity in
certain circumstances).
426. In this regard, one's regulatory prescription flows from how one reads the evidence
concerning current competition and (an even less objective matter) what one thinks will happen
with competition in the near term (not to mention how near one thinks the near term is).
Christopher Yoo and Daniel Spulber advocate eliminating TELRIC pricing right now. See
Spulber & Yoo, supra note 131, at 1019-21 (arguing against compelled access to broadband
networks and then basing prices only on direct cost). I think they read the evidence of
competition far too optimistically and see competition that has, in fact, yet to develop. As
explained above in Part IV.A, there is reason for optimism, but the current evidence reveals only
limited competition.
427. Excuse the pun.
428. See generally DERTFICK & QuiRK, supra note 45.

DEREGULATING TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1155

the early stages of telecommunications deregulation, and they identified a
number of economic and political forces as important. First, they note that,
prior to deregulation, "[e]lite opinion converged in support of reform. '4 29
Second, they note that "[o]fficeholders in positions of leadership took
initiatives." 430 Third, they note the importance of economic analysis that
justified legislative action. 43' To Derthick and Quick's factors should be added
the important force that industrial users of utility services have sometimes
added to pushing for legislative reforms.432
Each of these factors is emerging. In a very recent hearing prompted by
VoIP, Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain stated his
preference for overhauling the Telecommunications Act and stated
unequivocally that he was not alone in the Senate:
In many ways, VolP is a microcosm of the broad array of
telecommunications regulatory issues that have been debated since passage
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 .... We began the 108th
Congress with a hearing on the state of competition in the industry and I
reminded the public, the FCC Commissioners and my colleagues then of
my long held beliefs that the 1996 act is a fundamentally flawed piece of
legislation. Since then, some of my colleagues have joined me in
expressing
the need for Congress to take a serious look at reforming the
43 3
act.

At the same hearing, FCC Chairman Powell agreed:
[W]hether it's now or in the near future, it is my responsibility as your
expert agency to tell you, I think the days are numbered on the way we're
doing this under the current statute. I do believe there is going to have to

429.

Id. at 238.

430.

Id. at 239.

431. See id. at 246 ("As vividly and impressively as possible, our cases demonstrate the
role that disinterested economic analysis can play in the formation of public policy. If
economists had not made the case for procompetitive deregulation, it would not have
occurred.").
432. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1395-96 (addressing another important
force in deregulation). Kearney and Merrill state:
In addition to struggles among rival producer groups, there is also evidence that
powerful consumer groups have played a greater role in more recent reform
initiatives. It is always instructive to consider who are the winners and who are the
losers from major policy changes. With respect to changes in telecommunications
(both long distance and presumably local exchange service), electricity, and gas, the
big winners appear to be large commercial and industrial users of these services.
Id.
433.

S. Hr'g, supra note 363.
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be a statute in the future that recognizes these434dramatic technical changes
and gets us out of the buckets of the '96 Act.

Senator Lautenberg agreed with one of the principal proposals in this paper:
"I'd urge some day that a whole bunch of wordsmiths get together and simplify
the language and the structure and have a better understanding of it, because it
seems to me at times we're fighting for definitions. 4 35 It may be that a reprise
of the Kennedy hearings-which built political momentum for airline
deregulation 43 6-- can occur for local telecommunications.
Economists and legal commentators strongly support reform of the
communications laws, as detailed above, and companies that have experienced
lower long-distance prices can be expected to advocate for further legislation
that promotes competition. With these groups in agreement and the seeming
energy both of important Senators and of the FCC Chairman, it is possible that
a window of legislative opportunity is available. Economists and other
commentators need to marshal evidence of the success of markets in
telecommunications-such as the evidence of how the intrastate airline markets
or the unregulated agricultural commodities markets, each behaving
competitively, helped spur reform in those areas.437 Such evidence should be at
hand, for competition in long-distance and other telecommunications and cable
markets has succeeded.438 Prompting this legislative action is important
because the FCC is bound to the current definitions of the Act and because its
actions are going to be challenged and subjected to judicial review. In passing
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Congress faced the question of what
more there was to do after CAB Chairman Alfred Kahn had already instituted
much of the deregulatory agenda. The answer was clear:
[A] revised act is needed to insure that a future CAB's do not undo the
work of the present CAB and reimpose strict regulation. And even with
respect to the present Board, its programs have not been subjected to
complete judicial review, and it is not clear that the courts will conclude
that existing law allows these programs. Moreover, the different elements
of the Board's reform programs are interrelated... and a court decision

434. Id.
435. Id.
436. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing the 1975 "Kennedy
hearings").
437. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (describing airline deregulation).
438. See supra notes 150-77 and accompanying text (addressing competition between
wireline and video service providers).
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overruling any single CAB policy could set back the entire CAB
program.
The FCC has been doing heroic work trying to keep up with a market changing
in Internet time, but legislative confirmation and assistance is now necessary.
I have not provided all of the pieces to implementing this agenda, but the
framework for the future seems clear. New competition will need more than
the lifting of legal prohibitions on entry; it will need a comprehensive review of
the economics ofregulations that may deter entry as an economic matter. Only
then can there be a test of whether communications markets can become more
fully competitive as a structural matter, and only then will a "deregulation" in
the model of trains, trucks, and planes yield competition's benefits.

439.

Air Service Improvement Act of 1978, H.R. REP. No. 95-1211, at 4 (1978).

